Herman v. Muhs

• Decision Date: 11 February 1964
• Docket Number: No. 51234,51234
• Parties: , 7 A.L.R.3d 1199 Bill Lee HERMAN, Appellee, v. Norman L. MUHS, Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 400

126 N.W.2d 400

256 Iowa 38, 7 A.L.R.3d 1199

Bill Lee HERMAN, Appellee, v. Norman L. MUHS, Appellant.

No. 51234.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Feb. 11, 1964.

McDonald, McDonald & Carlin, Davenport, for appellant.

Winter & O'Toole, Dennis J. Britt, Davenport, for appellee.

MOORE, Justice.

While driving west on U. S. Highway 67 about 9:30 p. m., July 25, 1960, plaintiff started to pass defendant's automobile traveling in the same direction. At that time defendant turned left to enter Lunex Corporation road going south. A collision occurred. This is an action, tried to the court, for resulting damage to each vehicle. The court found defendant negligent for failure to signal for his left turn, plaintiff free from contributory negligence and entered judgment for the stipulated amount of plaintiff's damage. Defendant has appealed.

The sole question here concerns the issue of contributory negligence. It is brought into sharp focus by the trial court's ruling that the area where the accident occurred was not an intersection within the meaning of Code section 321.304, I.C.A., and plaintiff's concession that if it was such an intersection he was contributorially negligent as a matter of law in passing there. plaintiff claims no legal excuse.

We have consistently held that violation, without legal excuse, of a statute which prescribes care required under given conditions constitutes negligence per se. Kisling v. Thierman, 214 Iowa 911, 915, 916, 243 N.W. 552, 554; Florke v. Peterson, 245 Iowa 1031, 1034, 65 N.W.2d 372, 373; Cunningham ningham v. Court, 248 Iowa 654, 664, 82 N.W.2d 292, 298; Kohler v. Sheffert, 250 Iowa 899, 905, 96 N.W.2d 911, 915.

Other than on the question whether defendant gave a signal of his intention to turn left, the evidence is not in dispute. The roadway to the south is not shown on the maps of the county auditor's office as a public road. It is a dead end road leading to the Lunex Corporation and then to the quarters of approximately 75 families. It is used for ingress and egress for Lunex Corporation and families living thereon. Mailboxes and a stop sign are on the road near where it enters Highway 67. It does not continue across and north of 67. Both parties prior to the accident had used this road.

The trial court found the evidence failed to establish this road was open to use of the public for the purpose of vehicular traffic as a matter of right. While not agreeing with this finding, defendant argues such proof is not required. Defendant contends Code section 321.304, I.C.A., prohibits passing to the left at 'any' intersection and is not limited to intersections of public highways.

60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 352, page 836, states:

'The question whether statutes prescribing the duties of drivers at intersections apply at a place where a highway meets a private was depends on the terms of the particular statutes involved.'

Our Code section 321.304, I.C.A., provides:

'No vehicle shall, in overtaking and passing another vehicle * * *, be driven to the left side of the roadway under the following conditions: * * *

'2. * * * when approaching within one hundredfeet of or traversing any intersection * * *.'

If our statutory provisions were limited to this section we might agree with defendant but there are other considerations. Code section 321.1, I.C.A., provides:

'Definition of words and phrases. The following words and phrases when used in this chapter shall, for the purpose of this chapter, have the meanings respectively ascribed to them * * *

'48. 'Street or highway' means the entire width between property lines of every way or place of whatever nature when any part thereof is open to the use of the public, as a matter of right, for purposes of vehicular traffic. * * *

'54. 'Intersection' means the area embraced within the prolongation or connection of the lateral curb lines, or, if none, then the lateral boundary lines of the roadways of two highways which join one another at, or approximately at, right angles, or the area within which vehicles traveling upon different highways joining at any other angle may come in conflict.'

We have long recognized the rule that where the language of a statutes is plain and unambiguous and its meaning clear and unmistakable there is no room for construction, and we are not permitted to search for its meaning beyond the statute itself. Eysink v. Board of Supervisors, 229 Iowa 1240, 1244, 296 N.W. 376, 378; In re Adoption of Alley, 234 Iowa 931, 933, 14 N.W.2d 742, 744; Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of Bettendorf, 241 Iowa 358, 361, 41 N.W.2d 1, 3; Dingman v. City of Council Bluffs, 249 Iowa 1121, 1126, 90 N.W.2d 742, 746; Cowman v. Hansen, 250 Iowa 358, 362, 92 N.W.2d 682, 684.

In Jones v. Thompson, 240 Iowa 1024, 1036, 38 N.W.2d 672, 678, we said:

'The only legitimate purpose of statutory construction and interpretation is to ascertain the legislative intent. And when the language of the statute is so clear, certain, and free from ambiguity and obscurity that its meaning is evident from a mere reading, then the canons of statutory construction are unnecessary, because there is no need of construction and interpretation. We need not search beyond the wording of the statute. These are general rules, and this court has uniformly so held in many decisions.'

The meaning of the word 'any' has been considered by us in Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of Bettendorf, 241 Iowa 358, 363, 364, 41 N.W.2d 1, 4, and by the many authorities cited...