State v. Tait
| Decision Date | 08 September 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. W2001-02157-SC-R11-CD.,W2001-02157-SC-R11-CD. |
| Citation | 114 S.W.3d 518 |
| Parties | STATE of Tennessee v. Robert TAIT. |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General & Reporter; Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General; Kim R. Helper, Assistant Attorney General; and Stephen P. Jones, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, the State of Tennessee.
ADOLPHO A. BIRCH, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which FRANK F. DROWOTA, III, C.J., and E. RILEY ANDERSON, JANICE M. HOLDER, and WILLIAM M. BARKER, JJ., joined.
We granted this interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure to determine whether, in a prosecution commenced by an arrest warrant for driving under the influence of an intoxicant, the resulting indictment may charge the defendant for offenses that can be inferred from the arrest warrant. The arrest warrant charged the appellant, Robert Tait, with driving under the influence of an intoxicant, and the grand jury indicted him for that offense (count one)2 and for driving with a blood-alcohol concentration of .10 percent or more (count two).3 The trial court dismissed the second count, finding that it described a new and additional charge and was, therefore, barred by the applicable one-year statute of limitations because its prosecution had been commenced more than one year after the conduct occurred. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, concluding that the second count merely constituted an alternative theory for conviction and did not charge an offense distinct from that for which the appellant was initially charged. After reviewing the record and controlling legal authority, we hold that the language of the warrant sufficiently tolled the limitations period for count two. Therefore, we affirm the holding of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.
The underlying facts of this case are undisputed. On July 11, 1999, the appellant, Robert Tait, was arrested for driving under the influence of an intoxicant. The warrant stated: "To any lawful officer of the State: information on oath having been made that the offense of D.U.I. has been committed, and accusing Robert Tait thereof, you are hereby commanded in the name of the State, forthwith, to arrest the above named person. . . ." On November 2, 2000, the grand jury returned a two-count indictment against Tait; both counts alleged violations of section 55-10-401 (1998)4 of the Tennessee Code Annotated ("D.U.I.statute"). Specifically, count one alleged the offense of driving "while under the influence of an intoxicant . . . in violation of Tenn.Code Ann. § 55-10-401." Count two alleged the offense of driving "while the alcohol concentration in the said Robert Tait's breath was .10 percent or more, in violation of Tenn.Code Ann. § 55-10-401."
Tait moved to dismiss count two of the indictment. In his motion, he asserted that he had never been arrested or charged with the offense of driving with a blood-alcohol concentration of .10 percent or more. He asserted that the offense charged in count two was a misdemeanor and, as such, prosecution for this offense must begin within one year of the warrant or it is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Further, he asserted that because the grand jury indictment was the initial charge of such offense, and occurred more than a year after the original arrest warrant, count two of the indictment was barred by the statute of limitations. The trial court agreed, finding that the second count of the indictment alleged the independent offense of "D.U.I. per se," which was not specifically mentioned in the arrest warrant. The court concluded that the prosecution of this offense was not initiated until the issuance of the grand jury indictment on November 2, 2000, well over one year after the commission of the offense. Accordingly, the trial court dismissed count two as barred by the statute of limitations.
Upon permissive interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the offense of D.U.I. can be established with alternative theories. The intermediate court held that the first theory supported count one of the grand jury indictment and that the second theory supported count two. It concluded, therefore, that count two did not allege a separate or later-charged offense than alleged in the arrest warrant. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the cause on both counts to the trial court.
We granted review to determine whether, in this prosecution commenced by an arrest warrant for driving under the influence of an intoxicant, the charge of driving with an alcohol concentration of .10 percent or more is barred by the statute of limitations under the facts of this case.
Because the material facts of this case are not in dispute, the outcome rests solely upon statutory interpretation. Issues of statutory construction are questions of law that are reviewed de novo with no presumption of correctness accompanying the trial court's conclusions. Beare Co. v. Tenn. Dep't of Revenue, 858 S.W.2d 906, 907 (Tenn.1993); Union Carbide Corp. v. Huddleston, 854 S.W.2d 87, 91 (Tenn.1993).
In order to determine whether count two of the indictment is barred by the statute of limitations, we first look to the D.U.I. statute, which provides in pertinent part:
(a) It is unlawful for any person to drive or to be in physical control of any automobile or other motor driven vehicle on any of the public roads and highways of the state, or on any streets or alleys, or while on the premises of any shopping center, trailer park or any apartment house complex, or any other premises which is generally frequented by the public at large, while: (1) Under the influence of any intoxicant, marijuana, narcotic drug, or drug producing stimulating effects on the central nervous system; or (2) The alcohol concentration in such person's blood or breath is ten-hundredths of one percent (.10%) or more.
Tenn.Code Ann. § 55-10-401. The penalties for a violation of the D.U.I. statute are codified and provide for a maximum punishment of eleven months and twenty-nine days. Tenn.Code Ann. § 55-10-403(a)(1) (1998). As an offense "punishable by fine or confinement for less than one (1) year," the offense of D.U.I. is classified as a "misdemeanor." Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-11-110 (1997). Aside from a few statutory exceptions, all prosecutions for misdemeanors must be commenced within twelve months of the commission of the offense. Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-2-102 (Supp.2002). Therefore, the limitations period for commencing the prosecution for count one or count two in this case ended one year from July 11, 1999, the date of the appellant's offense and arrest. Consequently, to withstand a statute of limitations challenge, the prosecution for count two, driving with an alcohol concentration of .10 percent or more, must have commenced before July 11, 2000.
A criminal statute of limitations functions to place a defendant on timely notice of the charges the defendant will have to defend. Further, the primary purpose of the statute of limitations is to protect the defendant's ability to preserve relevant evidence necessary to the defendant's defense. State v. Pearson, 858 S.W.2d 879, 886 (Tenn.1993). The limitations period insures that governmental action against an accused will be commenced promptly or such action will be forfeited. See id. (citing United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 122, 86 S.Ct. 773, 15 L.Ed.2d 627 (1966)); see also State v. Nielsen, 44 S.W.3d 496, 499 (Tenn.2001). Thereby, the limitations statutes protect that defendant "whose defense [may] have been lost over time." State v. Ricci, 914 S.W.2d 475, 479 (Tenn.1996).
Commencement of the prosecution tolls the running of the limitations period because such commencement initially notifies the defendant of the charge or charges to be defended. By statute, the prosecution for an offense may be commenced in one of several ways, all deemed to provide the defendant with sufficient notice of the crime:
A prosecution is commenced, within the meaning of this chapter, by finding an indictment or presentment, the issuing of a warrant, binding over the offender, by the filing of an information as provided for in chapter 3 of this title, or by making an appearance in person or through counsel in general sessions or any municipal court for the purpose of continuing the matter or any...
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