State v. Taylor

• Decision Date: 16 April 1918
• Docket Number: 14680.
• Citation: 172 P. 217,101 Wash. 148
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE ex rel. MURPHY v. TAYLOR, Superior Court Judge.

172 P. 217

101 Wash. 148

STATE ex rel. MURPHY v. TAYLOR, Superior Court Judge.

No. 14680.

Supreme Court of Washington

April 16, 1918

Department 1. Application by the State of Washington, on the relation of W. P. Murphy, for a writ prohibiting Harcourt M. Taylor, as judge of the Superior Court of the State of Washington in and for Yakima County, sitting as committing magistrate, from proceeding further in a cause wherein relator was charged with a gross misdemeanor. Writ granted.

Thos. H. Wilson and Harold B. Gilbert, both of North Yakima, for appellant.

FULLERTON J.

On February 2, 1918, one Arthur Garden appeared before the Hon Harcourt M. Taylor, one of the judges of the superior court of Yakima county, and made complaint that a criminal offense had been committed by one W. P. Murphy. The judge, acting as a magistrate, examined on oath the complainant and the witnesses provided by him, reduced the complaint to writing caused it to be subscribed by the complainant, and issued a warrant for the arrest of Murphy. The warrant as issued charged Murphy with the commission of an assault upon the person of Garden, an offense denominated and punishable as a gross misdemeanor under the statute. On being brought before the magistrate, Murphy, through his counsel, moved the court to dismiss the complaint and discharge the defendant, basing the motion on the ground that the judge, sitting as a magistrate, was without jurisdiction to inquire further into the offense after it had been determined that the offense committed was a gross misdemeanor. This motion was overruled whereupon the defendant, specially reserving his motion to the jurisdiction of the magistrate, moved that the cause be transferred to the nearest justice of the peace for further proceedings, basing this motion on the ground that, since the complaint charged a gross misdemeanor, a police court had jurisdiction, and that he had the right under the statute to be put to trial for the alleged offense before such a justice, who alone had authority to transfer the cause to the superior court if it should be determined on the trial that the punishment which the justice court could impose would be inadequate for the offense. This motion was likewise overruled. The defendant thereupon applied to this court for a writ directed to the judge, prohibiting him from proceeding further in the cause, or in the alternative from proceeding further than to transfer the cause to the nearest justice of the peace for trial. To the application the magistrate demurred: First, for want of jurisdiction in this court to issue the writ demanded; and, second, for want of sufficient facts. The cause is now before us on the questions suggested by the application and the demurrer thereto.

On the jurisdictional question, it is first urged that this court is without power to issue a writ of prohibition other than in aid of its appellate or revisory jurisdiction, and that this writ is not sought in aid of either. The power of this court to issue writs of prohibition is derived from the Constitution. Section 4 of article 4 of that instrument grants to this court 'original jurisdiction in habeas corpus and quo warranto and mandamus as to all state officers,' and 'power to issue writs of mandamus review, prohibition, habeas corpus, certiorari, and all other writs necessary and proper to the complete exercise of its appellate and revisory jurisdiction.' The power to issue writs of prohibition must of course be found in the latter of these clauses. From that clause it might be concluded as a matter of first impression that the power was restricted to instances where the writ was found necessary in aid of the court's appellate and revisory jurisdiction, but we early held that such was not its meaning. In State ex rel. v. Superior Court, 15 Wash. 668, 47 P. 31, 37 L. R. A. 111, 55 Am. St. Rep. 907, the writ was sought to prohibit a superior court from proceeding in a matter thought to be without and in excess of its jurisdiction, and it was contended that the court was without power to issue the writ because of the reason here suggested. The court held, however, that the qualifying clause was not intended to restrict or limit its power to issue the writs specifically enumerated, but was intended rather to confer on the court power to issue writs other than those specifically enumerated which might be found necessary to a complete exercise of its appellate and revisory jurisdiction. In the course of the opinion it was pointed out that to restrict the power as therein sought would leave the power of no practical value, as it is 'difficult ot conceive a case in which it would be necessary to issue the writ solely' in aid of a court's appellate or revisory jurisdiction. Subject to the restriction that writs of this sort will only be issued to restrain the exercise of an unauthorized judicial or quasi judicial act ( State ex rel. Bennett v. Taylor, 54 Wash. 150, 102 P. 1029), the case has not been departed from, but, on the contrary, announces the principle upon which this court has issued the writ in the numerous instances found in our records where no question of aiding its appellate or revisory jurisdiction was involved.

A second objection is that the writ will not lie against the judge of the superior court when sitting as a magistrate. The argument is that the judge of the superior court when sitting as a magistrate acts in a special capacity, and is not an officer against whom an original writ will lie from this court. The precise question seems never to have been determined by us. The nearest approach to it is perhaps the case of State ex rel. Romano v. Yakey, 43 Wash. 15 85 P. 990, 9 Ann. Cas. 1071, where a writ of mandamus was sought from this court to compel a judge of the superior court to entertain as a magistrate a complaint made before him charging the commission of a crime, jurisdiction over which he had declined. Among the objections urged against the issuance of the writ was that this court was without jurisdiction since a magistrate is not of the class of officers against whom it has original jurisdiction to issue the writ. The application for the writ was denied on other grounds urged, thus rendering it unnecessary to pass upon the particular objection; but the question was noticed in the course of the opinion, the court saying that the jurisdiction might be questioned. Notwithstanding this seeming dessent from the view, we are constrained on further consideration to hold that the writ of prohibition will lie from this court when the officer sought to be prohibited is a judge of the superior court. The examination of a person charged with crime is something more than the exercise of a more ministerial function. It includes an accusation, a warrant of arrest, an examination of witnesses, a finding of the probable guilt or innocence of the accused; and results in an order either discharging the accused or binding him over to the proper court to answer for the offense. The exercise of these functions is plainly the exercise of judicial functions. State ex rel. Long v. Keyes, 75 Wis. 288, 44 N.W. 13; Ex parte Gist, 26 Ala. 156; Beiser v....