State v. Taylor

• Decision Date: 17 June 2016
• Docket Number: No. 14–2075.,14–2075.
• Citation: 881 N.W.2d 72
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Deyawna Leanett TAYLOR, Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

881 N.W.2d 72

STATE of Iowa, Appellee,

v.Deyawna Leanett TAYLOR, Appellant.

No. 14–2075.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

June 17, 2016.

Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, Joseph A. Fraioli, Assistant Appellate Defender (until withdrawal), then Bradley M. Bender, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Alexandra Link, Assistant Attorney General (until withdrawal), Stephen H. Holmes, County Attorney, and Shean Fletchall, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.

APPEL, Justice.

In this case, we consider whether the State failed to prove waiver or good cause to avoid a speedy trial violation. Deyawna Taylor moved for dismissal of the charges against her on speedy trial grounds a few days prior to her scheduled trial. The State resisted, claiming Taylor impliedly waived her right to speedy trial by agreeing to a proffer agreement after the speedy trial deadline had passed. In the alternative, the State argued the assertion of speedy trial rights two days before the scheduled trial was untimely. The State further argued it had good cause for the delay because the defendant was incarcerated in Iowa and did not appear for her arraignment.

The district court denied Taylor's motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds. Taylor was subsequently convicted of the pending charges. The court of appeals upheld the conviction, and we granted further review. For the reasons expressed below, we reverse and remand to the district court for dismissal of the case.

I. Procedural and Factual Background.

On July 28, 2014, the State charged Deyawna Taylor with one count of driving while barred in violation of Iowa Code section 321.561 (2013) and one count of prostitution in violation of Iowa Code section 725.1. Arraignment was scheduled for August 11. Taylor failed to personally appear for arraignment because she was incarcerated in Polk County on unrelated charges. The district court then issued an order for a warrant.

On October 29 the State moved to have Taylor transported from the Mitchellville correctional facility to Story County for arraignment on the charges involved in this case. Taylor was not arraigned, however, until November 12. Trial was set for December 16. The State asserts that it entered into a proffer agreement with Taylor on November 12. Under the proffer agreement, the charges against Taylor would be reduced if Taylor agreed to cooperate in the prosecution of another defendant.

On December 8, Taylor filed a motion to dismiss. Taylor asserted that the State failed to try Taylor's case within ninety days of filing the trial information. The district court held a hearing on December 10. The district court opened the hearing by stating that it was the burden of the State to show good cause why the defendant was not brought to trial within ninety days of the filing of the trial information.

The State began the hearing with a professional statement by counsel that it was not until it filed a motion to transport Taylor from Mitchellville—on October 29—that the State realized the defendant was, in fact, incarcerated at Mitchellville. The State then called Assistant Story County Attorney Tiffany Meredith as a witness. She testified there were conversations with defense counsel on November 12 “to complete the proffer agreement.” Although the discussion was conducted in the presence of a court reporter and Meredith reviewed the transcript prior to the hearing, the transcript of the proffer discussions was not introduced at the hearing. According to Meredith, the conversation revolved around a couple of different items, with the majority of the discussion focusing on the length of time it would take for the trial to begin in which Taylor was to testify. Meredith testified that she was not the prosecutor in the case and therefore,

I didn't know if speedy trial had not been waived. So[, in discussing the length of time until Taylor was to testify,] I didn't specifically use the word “speedy trial”, but I did point out that it was going to take a number of months for [the other trial] to proceed....

Taylor did not present evidence at the hearing. Defense counsel did, however, refer to a letter filed with the court dated September 30, 2014, indicating that Polk County had advised the Story County Sheriff's Office of Taylor's arrest in Polk County and asked the court to take judicial notice of the Polk County filings in the cases against Taylor.

In arguing against dismissal, the State argued that whether good cause for delay exists depends exclusively on the reason for the delay. The State maintained, however, that courts will consider a weaker reason for delay to be sufficient depending on the resolution of a multifactored test including the shortness of the period of the delay, the failure of the defendant to demand speedy trial, and the absence of prejudice. Here, the State argued, the good cause for the delay was Taylor's incarceration in another county and her assent to a delay in the form of making the proffer agreement with the State.

The court questioned the State about its good cause argument. The district court stated it was the court's understanding that when Polk County arrests someone against whom there is an outstanding warrant elsewhere, Polk County sends a teletype to the other county regarding the arrest. The State responded that while “[i]t's possible that the sheriff's office received [the teletype], our office [the county attorney's office] did not.” The district court responded that the State should be careful with the argument, because “if the sheriff's office knew, the State knew.”

The State continued its argument, noting

[t]he defense counsel was contacted even prior to being brought here and an offer to testify against [the other defendant] was presented, and that, I think, suggests that the defendant could have had the opportunity to waive speedy trial or demand speedy trial.

As a result, the State argued that Taylor “acquiesced to this proffer agreement.”

At the close of the hearing, the court ruled on the motion to dismiss. The court stated that even though the speedy trial deadline may have “technically ran,” Taylor acquiesced to that waiver of speedy trial when she signed the proffer agreement on November 12. The court noted that there was a great deal of discussion about the delay that would result from the proffer agreement and that the court was not going to second-guess counsel. The district court ruled that Taylor “waived speedy trial on November 12 of 2014, and acquiesced to going past the speedy trial date before that by signing the proffer.”

Taylor then waived her right to a trial by jury and a trial on the minutes was held later that day. The court found Taylor guilty of driving while barred and prostitution. The court sentenced Taylor to two years imprisonment on each count, to be served concurrently, and a fine of $625 per count with costs.

Taylor appealed and we transferred the case to the court of appeals. The court of appeals affirmed Taylor's convictions. She applied for further review, which we granted. She asserts the State failed to bring her to trial within the speedy trial deadline. She argues that she did not waive her speedy trial rights, that there was not good cause for the delay, and that her assertion of her speedy trial rights was timely.

II. Standard of Review.

We review a district court's ruling on a motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds for abuse of discretion. State v. Winters, 690 N.W.2d 903, 907 (Iowa 2005). “When speedy trial grounds are at issue, however, the discretion given to the district court narrows.” Id. Statutes and rules implementing the right to a speedy trial receive “a liberal construction, designed to effectuate [their] purpose” of protecting citizens' liberty. 21A Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law § 930, at 187 (2016) ; accord Winters, 690 N.W.2d at 907–08.

III. Discussion.

A. Legal Framework for Speedy Trial. Article I, section 10 of the Iowa Constitution guarantees the right to a speedy trial. This constitutional command is implemented by Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.33(2) (2013). See Ennenga v. State, 812 N.W.2d 696, 701 (Iowa 2012). This rule provides in relevant part:

Speedy Trial. It is the public policy of the state of Iowa that criminal prosecutions be concluded at the earliest possible time consistent with a fair trial to both parties. Applications for dismissals under this rule may be made by the prosecuting attorney or the defendant or by the court on its own motion.

....

b. If a defendant indicted for a public offense has not waived the defendant's right to a speedy trial the defendant must be brought to trial within 90 days after indictment is found or the court must order the indictment to be dismissed unless good cause to the contrary be shown.

Iowa R.Crim. P. 2.33(2).

We have held that under the rule, a criminal charge must be dismissed if trial is not commenced within ninety days of the charging instrument “unless the State proves (1) defendant's waiver of speedy trial, (2) delay attributable to the defendant, or (3) ‘good cause’ for the delay.” Winters, 690 N.W.2d at 908 (quoting State v. Nelson, 600 N.W.2d 598, 600 (Iowa 1999) ). The burden of showing an exception to the speedy trial deadline “rests squarely with the State.” State v. Miller, 637 N.W.2d 201, 204 (Iowa 2001). The state at all times carries its burden—there is no requirement that the defendant show prejudice as a result of the delay. Ennenga, 812 N.W.2d at 705 ; State v. Sassman, 226 N.W.2d 808, 809 (Iowa 1975).

We require diligence from those seeking to prove good cause. Cf. State v. Campbell, 714 N.W.2d 622, 628–29 (Iowa 2006) (finding good cause when the state showed the multiple actions of the defendant that resulted in the delay of trial); Winters, 690 N.W.2d at 909–10 (finding no showing of good cause despite the state presenting evidence of defendant's pro se pretrial motions, discovery requests, and a joint trial with a codefendant because there...