State v. Taylor

• Decision Date: 23 December 2014
• Docket Number: No. 5285.,5285.
• Citation: 768 S.E.2d 71,411 S.C. 294
• Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals
• Parties: The STATE, Appellant, v. Bailey TAYLOR, Respondent. Appellate Case No. 2012–213018.

411 S.C. 294

768 S.E.2d 71

The STATE, Appellant

v.Bailey TAYLOR, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2012–213018.

No. 5285.

Court of Appeals of South Carolina.

Heard Nov. 3, 2014.

Decided Dec. 23, 2014.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, and Assistant Attorney General William M. Blitch, Jr., for Appellant, both of Columbia.

Travis Ashley Newton, of The Newton Law Firm, P.A., of Anderson, for Respondent.

Opinion

KONDUROS, J.

The magistrate court dismissed Bailey Taylor's charge for driving under the influence (DUI) because the required video recording of the incident site omitted Taylor from view for a period of time while the arresting officer repositioned his vehicle. The State appealed the circuit court's upholding of this dismissal. We reverse and remand.

FACTS

On July 22, 2011, South Carolina Highway Patrol Trooper E.S. Tolley charged Taylor with driving with unlawful alcohol concentration under section 56–5–2933 of the South Carolina Code (Supp.2013).¹ During the stop, as Tolley repositioned his patrol vehicle, the camera omitted Taylor from view for a period of time.

Taylor moved pretrial to dismiss the charge against her, arguing Tolley failed to comply with section 56–5–2953 of the South Carolina Code (Supp.2013)² because the video omitted her from view for several seconds and Tolley failed to submit an affidavit explaining why her actions were not recorded during that time. The State argued the officer was not required to capture all of the defendant's actions to satisfy the statute's requirements. The magistrate court dismissed Taylor's charge for driving with unlawful alcohol concentration. The magistrate court concluded the statute required the arresting officer to record all of Taylor's conduct at the incident site and required the submission of an affidavit explaining why all of her conduct was not video recorded. The magistrate court concluded dismissal of Taylor's charge was an appropriate remedy when the State did not comply with the statute because Taylor's actions while outside the view of the video constituted “conduct,” and Tolley failed to submit an affidavit. The magistrate's return does not contain any findings of fact other than stating Taylor's actions are omitted from view on the video for a period of time.³

The State appealed to the circuit court, arguing the magistrate court erred because the video recording captured all of the requirements of section 56–5–2953, even though the video omitted Taylor's actions at the incident site for several seconds. The State asserted the statute only specifically requires certain aspects of the defendant's conduct at the incident site be recorded and the word “conduct” in the statute is not meant to encompass every action of the defendant. The State also contended its production of a video recording that met the requirements of the statute rendered the submission of an affidavit unnecessary. The circuit court affirmed the magistrate court, concluding the omission of Taylor's actions from view for several seconds violated the statute and Tolley failed to submit an affidavit but, finding the video began upon activation of blue lights, continuously recorded the entire time, captured all of the field sobriety tests administered, included Taylor's arrest, and showed Tolley advising Taylor of her Miranda⁴ rights.⁵ This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“In criminal cases, the appellate court sits to review errors of law only.” State v. Baccus, 367 S.C. 41, 48, 625 S.E.2d 216, 220 (2006). Thus, an appellate court is bound by the trial court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Id.

“In criminal appeals from magistrate ... court, the circuit court does not conduct a de novo review, but instead reviews for preserved error raised to it by appropriate exception.” State v. Henderson, 347 S.C. 455, 457, 556 S.E.2d 691, 692 (Ct.App.2001) ; S.C.Code Ann. § 18–3–70 (Supp.2013) (“The appeal [from a magistrate in a criminal case] must be heard by the Court of Common Pleas upon the grounds of exceptions made and upon the papers required under this chapter, without the examination of witnesses in that court. And the court may either confirm the sentence appealed from, reverse or modify it, or grant a new trial, as to the court may seem meet and conformable to law.”). This court will review the decision of the magistrate court for errors of law only. City of Rock Hill v. Suchenski, 374 S.C. 12, 15, 646 S.E.2d 879, 880 (2007) ; Henderson, 347 S.C. at 457, 556 S.E.2d at 692.

In criminal appeals from the magistrate court, the circuit court is bound by the magistrate court's findings of fact if any evidence in the record reasonably supports them. See City of Greer v. Humble, 402 S.C. 609, 613, 742 S.E.2d 15, 17 (Ct.App.2013). “Moreover, [q]uestions of statutory interpretation are questions of law, which are subject to de novo review and which we are free to decide without any deference to the court below.” Id. (alteration by court).

LAW/ANALYSIS

The State contends the magistrate court and circuit court erred in dismissing the DUI charge under section 56–5–2953(A) of the South Carolina Code (Supp.2013) when the video recording briefly omitted Taylor from its view at the incident site but otherwise complied with the statute's requirements and when Tolley did not submit an affidavit explaining Taylor's omission from view. We agree.

“The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature.” State v. Elwell, 403 S.C. 606, 612, 743 S.E.2d 802, 806 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). “What a legislature says in the text of a statute is considered the best evidence of the legislative intent or will.” Id. “Therefore, [i]f a statute's language is plain, unambiguous, and conveys a clear meaning[,] the rules of statutory interpretation are not needed and the court has no right to impose another meaning.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Pittman, 373 S.C. 527, 561, 647 S.E.2d 144, 161 (2007) (“All rules of statutory construction are subservient to the maxim that legislative intent must prevail if it can be reasonably discovered in the language used.”). “However, penal statutes will be strictly construed against the [S]tate.” Elwell, 403 S.C. at 612, 743 S.E.2d at 806.

“If the statute is ambiguous, however, courts must construe the terms of the statute.” Town of Mt. Pleasant v. Roberts, 393 S.C. 332, 342, 713 S.E.2d 278, 283 (2011). “A statute as a whole must receive a practical, reasonable, and fair interpretation consonant with the purpose, design, and policy of the lawmakers.” State v. Sweat, 379 S.C. 367, 376, 665 S.E.2d 645, 650 (Ct.App.2008), aff'd as modified, 386 S.C. 339, 688 S.E.2d 569 (2010). “In interpreting a statute, the language of the statute must be read in a sense that harmonizes with its subject matter and accords with its general purpose.”

Town of Mt. Pleasant, 393 S.C. at 342, 713 S.E.2d at 283. “Any ambiguity in a statute should be resolved in favor of a just, equitable, and beneficial operation of the law.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “Courts will reject a statutory interpretation that would lead to a result so plainly absurd that it could not have been intended by the Legislature or would defeat the plain legislative intention.” Id. at 342–43, 713 S.E.2d at 283.

A person who commits a DUI offense “must have his conduct at the incident site ... video recorded.” § 56–5–2953(A). “The video recording at the incident site must: (i) not begin later than the activation of the officer's blue lights; (ii) include any field sobriety tests administered; and (iii) include the arrest of a person for a violation of ... [s]ection 56–5–2933⁶ [of the South Carolina Code (Supp.2013) ], ... and show the person being advised of his [Miranda ] rights.” § 56–5–2953(A)(1)(a)(i–iii). A violation of this section may result in dismissal of the DUI charges. S.C.Code Ann. § 56–5–2953(B) (Supp.2013); see also City of Rock Hill v. Suchenski, 374 S.C. 12, 17, 646 S.E.2d 879, 881 (2007) (holding dismissal of DUI charge is an appropriate remedy if the officer fails to produce a satisfactory video recording unless an exception applies).

In Suchenski, our supreme court affirmed the reversal of the defendant's DUI conviction when the video stopped recording before the officer administered a third field sobriety test and before the defendant was arrested. 374 S.C. at 14, 646 S.E.2d at 879. The City conceded the officer did not comply with the video recording requirement but asserted it was excused under section 56–5–2953(B). Id. at 14–15, 646 S.E.2d at 879–880. The court found the applicability of the exceptions unpreserved because the City failed to seek a post- judgment ruling after the circuit court did not address section 56–5–2953(B) in its order. Id. at 15–16, 646 S.E.2d at 880. In applying the prior version of the statute, which required video recording to begin upon activation of blue lights and conclude after the defendant's arrest but did not specifically require video recording of field sobriety tests, the court held the City's failure to comply with the statute required dismissal of the charges. Id. at 14, 17, 646 S.E.2d at 879, 881 ; see also S.C.Code Ann. § 565–2953(A)(1) (2006).

In Murphy v. State, which the State asserts is controlling in this case, this court affirmed the defendant's DUI conviction under the prior version of the statute even though she conducted the horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN)⁷ test with her back to the vehicle camera and even though the video only recorded the defendant from the knees up as she performed the walk and turn test⁸ , occasionally only displaying half of her body. 392 S.C. 626, 628–29, 709 S.E.2d 685, 686–87 (Ct.App.2011). The defendant argued “the videotape of the incident [s]ite d[id] not comply with the statute because it fail[ed] to ‘record most of the field sobriety tests.’ ” Id. at 631, 709 S.E.2d at 688. The court found “the plain language of ...