State v. Teague

• Decision Date: 27 March 1995
• Parties: STATE of Tennessee, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Raymond Eugene TEAGUE, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Page 248

897 S.W.2d 248

STATE of Tennessee, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Raymond Eugene TEAGUE, Defendant-Appellant.

Supreme Court of Tennessee,

at Nashville.

March 27, 1995.

Charles W. Burson, Atty. Gen. and Reporter, Kathy M. Principe, Deputy Atty. Gen., Victor S. Johnson, III, Dist. Atty. Gen., James W. Milam, Asst. Dist. Atty. Gen., Nashville, for plaintiff-appellee.

William P. Redick, Jr., James L. Weatherly, Nashville, for defendant-appellant.

John G. Oliva, Rebecca Freeman, Tennessee Ass'n of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Nashville, amicus curiae.

OPINION

REID, Justice.

This case presents an appeal from the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals, on an interlocutory appeal under Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, granting the State's motion to exclude certain evidence found to be admissible by the trial court in a pending capital resentencing hearing.

This is the third resentencing hearing for the defendant, Raymond Eugene Teague, who was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the conviction but ordered a resentencing hearing. State v. Teague, 645 S.W.2d 392 (Tenn.1983) (Teague I ). The defendant was convicted in Teague I of the premeditated murder of his former wife, Terri Teague. The sentence was set aside because the court admitted into evidence, in support of the aggravating circumstance "the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution," a State warrant which had been dismissed on the recommendation of the State. The warrant had charged the defendant with conspiring with John Edmonds and another to murder James Lowe, Jr. The State's theory in Teague I was that, even though Lowe was actually killed by Terri Teague, Teague was murdered by the defendant to prevent her from cooperating with the State in the prosecution of the defendant for conspiring with Edmonds to have Teague murder Lowe. Soon after Terri Teague was murdered, the defendant was arrested on a weapons charge near her apartment while riding in a truck with Jimmy Cook and Marshall Skinner. The defendant's conviction was based on physical evidence contained in a bag found in the truck, which apparently implicated the three occupants equally, and the testimony of Skinner and Cook that the defendant told them he killed Teague. Subsequent to the defendant's conviction and sentence, Cook and Skinner entered pleas to lesser offenses.

The defendant's assertion in the appeal of Teague I that the State withheld material evidence favorable to him in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), which is raised again on this appeal, was found to be without merit.

At the resentencing trial, the defendant again was sentenced to death. The State relied upon a new aggravating circumstance, the defendant's conviction, upon a plea of nolo contendere, as an accessory before the fact to the second degree murder of John Edmonds. The sentence was affirmed by this Court on appeal. State v. Teague, 680 S.W.2d 785 (Tenn.1984), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 911, 105 S.Ct. 3538, 87 L.Ed.2d 662 (1985) (Teague II ).

In Teague III, a post-conviction proceeding, the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the trial court and granted the defendant another sentencing hearing on the ground that, in a separate proceeding, the defendant's conviction for being an accessory before the fact to the second degree murder of John Edmonds had been declared void. Teague v. State, 772 S.W.2d 915, 929-930 (Tenn.Crim.App.1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 874, 110 S.Ct. 210, 107 L.Ed.2d 163 (1989). In Teague III, the Court of Criminal Appeals denied relief on the defendant's assertion, among many, that his original conviction was procured by fraud and misrepresentation. Id. at 922. Permission to appeal was denied by this Court.

The issue presently before the Court arose in the resentencing hearing in the trial court. The trial court granted the defendant's motion, pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, that the State disclose "any exculpatory evidence of which it was aware relating to the defendant's role in or non-involvement in the killing of Terri Teague." The court denied the State's motion in limine to disallow the admission of any evidence "which could fairly be considered to contest or question" the defendant's guilt, including the Brady material and any evidence discovered subsequent to the prior sentencing hearing. The precise nature of the evidence held by the State does not appear, but the defendant's position apparently is that evidence held by the State and also newly discovered evidence will implicate Marshall Skinner ¹ in the murder of Terri Teague and mitigate the defendant's culpability or perhaps even exonerate him altogether.

The Court of Criminal Appeals found the defendant's position on the motion in limine to be "persuasive," but considered that it was required by this Court's decisions in State v. Hartman, 703 S.W.2d 106 (Tenn.1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1010, 106 S.Ct. 3308, 92 L.Ed.2d 721 (1986) and State v. Adkins, 725 S.W.2d 660 (Tenn.1987), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 909, 107 S.Ct. 2491, 96 L.Ed.2d 383 (1987), to reverse the trial court's finding that evidence of the defendant's innocence was admissible. The Court of Criminal Appeals rejected the State's insistence that discovery of the Brady material would be moot if the evidence is not admissible under Hartman and Adkins and affirmed the trial court's order that the State disclose any exculpatory evidence.

The issue of the defendant's guilt is not before the Court. The conviction for first degree murder was affirmed by this Court on direct appeal, Teague I, and, permission to appeal the denial of post-conviction relief with regard to the conviction was denied in Teague III. Regardless of the nature or probative value of any evidence adduced, the only issue to be determined at the resentencing hearing is the defendant's punishment, life in prison or death, and the only question presented by this appeal is the nature of evidence admissible at a capital resentencing hearing.

For the resolution of this issue, we need only refer to our statute and prior decisions.

The statute applicable to this issue, Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-2404(c) (Supp.1980), ² provides:

In the sentencing proceeding, evidence may be presented as to any matter that the court deems relevant to the punishment and may include, but not be limited to, the nature and circumstances of the crime; the defendant's character, background history, and physical condition; any evidence tending to establish or rebut the aggravating circumstances enumerated in subsection (i) below; and any evidence tending to establish or rebut any mitigating factors. Any such evidence which the court deems to have probative value on the issue of punishment may be received regardless of its admissibility under the rules of evidence, provided that the defendant is accorded a fair opportunity to rebut any hearsay statements so admitted....

See also Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-204(c) (Supp.1994). The substance of this statute as it relates to this case, is that any evidence relating to the circumstances of the murder, the aggravating circumstances relied upon by the State, or the mitigating circumstances, which has probative value in the determination of punishment, is admissible.

Where the same jury determines guilt and punishment, it is instructed to consider statutory aggravating circumstances and any mitigating circumstances raised by the evidence at either the guilt or sentencing hearing. Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-2404 (Supp.1980); Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-204(e) (Supp.1994). Obviously, in those cases, when the jury deliberates regarding punishment it will have heard evidence on the issue of guilt or innocence, and it may, in determining the sentence, consider such evidence that has probative value as to punishment. On a resentencing hearing, the rule of evidence with regard to the only issue before the jury remains the same--both the State and the defendant may introduce any evidence relating to the circumstances of the crime, relevant aggravating circumstances or any mitigating circumstances, so that the jury will have complete information relevant to punishment. See State v. Bigbee, 885 S.W.2d 797, 813 (Tenn.1994). Simply stated, if the offered evidence bears on punishment, it is admissible.

This Court has allowed the State to present at resentencing hearings, over the objection of the defendant, evidence showing the commission of the offense as well as evidence in support of aggravating circumstances. At this defendant's resentencing hearing in Teague II, he opposed the State's introduction of evidence concerning the murder. In response, the Court stated:

The defendant questions the introduction of background evidence concerning the murder, insisting that in the sentencing proceeding only evidence relevant to aggravating and mitigating circumstances should have been allowed at the hearing. Guidelines for re-sentencing hearings in general have been set out in Farris v. State, 535 S.W.2d 608, 621 (Tenn.1976); Hunter v. State, 496 S.W.2d 900, 903 (Tenn.1972); and in Huffman v. State, 200 Tenn. 487, 292 S.W.2d 738, 743 (1956). Under these guidelines evidence of how the crime was committed, the injuries, and aggravating and mitigating factors are admissible. There appears to be no reason why such guidelines, carefully limiting evidence to the essential background, should not apply in capital cases in order to ensure that the jury acts from a base of knowledge in sentencing the defendant. See e.g. Blankenship v. State, 251 Ga. 621, 308 S.E.2d 369, 371 (1983) (parties at capital re-sentencing are entitled to offer evidence relating to circumstances of crime.).

State v. Teague, 680 S.W.2d at 787-88. "Essential background" which the State was allowed to prove on resentencing in that case included "how the crime was...