State v. Thomas

• Decision Date: 30 October 2008
• Docket Number: No. CR-08-0051-PR.,CR-08-0051-PR.
• Citation: 219 Ariz. 127,194 P.3d 394
• Parties: STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Marcel Barry THOMAS, Appellant.
• Court: Arizona Supreme Court

194 P.3d 394

219 Ariz. 127

STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Marcel Barry THOMAS, Appellant.

No. CR-08-0051-PR.

Supreme Court of Arizona, En Banc.

October 30, 2008.

Terry Goddard, Arizona Attorney General By Kent Catanni, Chief Counsel, Criminal Appeals Section, Phoenix, Diane L. Hunt, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson, Attorneys for State of Arizona.

Dana P. Hlavac, Mohave County Public Defender By Jill L. Evans, Kingman, Attorney for Marcel Barry Thomas.

OPINION

McGREGOR, Chief Justice.

¶ 1 We granted review to determine whether a felony conviction resulting from an offense committed after the defendant committed the sentencing offense qualifies as a historical prior felony conviction under Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) section 13-604.W.2(a) (Supp.2007). We hold that, for those felonies enumerated in § 13-604.W.2(a), conviction for the enhancing offense must occur before conviction for the sentencing offense, but the statute imposes no requirement as to the timing of the commission of the offenses.

I.

¶ 2 In June 2005, Marcel Barry Thomas was convicted on four drug-related charges arising out of acts committed in December 2002. In June 2004, Thomas was convicted of aggravated assault, unlawful imprisonment, and hindering prosecution for acts committed in January 2003. The assault-related convictions thus preceded the drug-related convictions, although the assault-related acts occurred after the drug-related acts.

¶ 3 When the trial court sentenced Thomas on the drug-related convictions, it treated Thomas's aggravated assault conviction as a "historical prior felony conviction" under § 13-604.W.2(a)(i), making Thomas eligible for an enhanced sentence. Rejecting Thomas's argument that the aggravated assault conviction is not a historical prior felony conviction because he committed the assault after he committed the drug-related offenses, the trial court sentenced him to enhanced presumptive concurrent sentences on all four drug-related offenses.¹

¶ 4 A divided court of appeals vacated Thomas's enhanced sentences. State v. Thomas, 217 Ariz. 413, 415 ¶ 5, 175 P.3d 71, 73 (App.2008). The majority held that Thomas's prior felony conviction for aggravated assault could not be used to enhance his sentences because he committed that offense after he committed the drug-related offenses. Id. In dissent, Judge Barker argued that, under the plain language of § 13-604.W.2(a), whether a conviction qualifies as a historical prior felony conviction depends solely upon the date of the conviction "if the felony conviction falls within one of the specified categories under [§ 13-604.W.2(a)]." Id. at 421 ¶ 34, 175 P.3d at 79 (Barker, J., dissenting).

¶ 5 We granted review to decide this recurring issue of statewide importance. See Ariz. R.Crim. P. 31.19(c)(3). We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6, Section 5.3 of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. § 13-4031 (2001).

II.

¶ 6 When resolving questions of statutory interpretation, we first consider the language of the statute, which provides "the best and most reliable index of a statute's meaning." Janson v. Christensen, 167 Ariz. 470, 471, 808 P.2d 1222, 1223 (1991); see also State v. Thompson, 200 Ariz. 439, 440 ¶ 6, 27 P.3d 796, 797 (2001). Our primary "goal is `to fulfill the intent of the legislature that wrote [the statute].'" Zamora v. Reinstein, 185 Ariz. 272, 275, 915 P.2d 1227, 1230 (1996) (quoting State v. Williams, 175 Ariz. 98, 100, 854 P.2d 131, 133 (1993)). "When the plain text of a statute is clear and unambiguous there is no need to resort to other methods of statutory interpretation to determine the legislature's intent because its intent is readily discernable from the face of the statute." State v. Christian, 205 Ariz. 64, 66 ¶ 6, 66 P.3d 1241, 1243 (2003).

¶ 7 Section 13-604.W.2 defines four categories of "historical prior felony convictions."² The first category, defined in subdivision (a), "lists six types of offenses that can be alleged as historical prior felony convictions no matter when they occurred." Christian, 205 Ariz. at 66-67 ¶ 7, 66 P.3d at 1243-44; § 13-604.W.2(a). The second category, defined in subdivision (b), includes "[a]ny class 2 or 3 felony" not listed in subdivision (a) "that was committed within the ten years immediately preceding the date of the present offense." § 13-604.W.2(b). The third category, defined in subdivision (c), includes "[a]ny class 4, 5, or 6 felony" not listed in subdivision (a) "that was committed within the five years immediately preceding the date of the present offense." § 13-604.W.2(c). The final category, defined in subdivision (d), includes "[a]ny felony conviction that is a third or more prior felony conviction." § 13-604.W.2(d).

¶ 8 One of the six types of offenses that can be alleged as historical prior felony convictions under subdivision (a) is "[a]ny prior felony conviction for which" a term of imprisonment is mandated. § 13-604.W.2(a)(i). Thomas concedes that his conviction for aggravated assault mandated a term of imprisonment; therefore, as the court of appeals recognized, if Thomas's aggravated assault conviction is "a prior felony conviction," then it is a "historical prior felony conviction" for purposes of the statute. See Thomas, 217 Ariz. at 416 ¶ 10, 175 P.3d at 74.

¶ 9 Thomas's conviction for aggravated assault occurred nearly one year prior to his conviction for the drug-related offenses. Therefore, when Thomas was convicted for his drug offenses, he had a prior conviction for an offense that mandated imprisonment. The statutory language requires no more to bring Thomas's aggravated assault conviction within the terms of subdivision (a).

¶ 10 The court of appeals, however, interpreted the statute as imposing the additional requirement that the enhancing offense be committed before the offense set for sentencing was committed. We reject that interpretation of the statute because the statutory language includes "no requirement as to the timing of the commission of the enhancing offense with respect to the commission of the [sentencing] offense." Id. at 422 ¶ 37, 175 P.3d at 80 (Barker, J., dissenting). The absence of such a timing requirement means that "[a] `prior felony conviction' may in fact be a [conviction for a] felony offense that was committed subsequently." Id.

¶ 11 The language chosen by the legislature for subdivisions (b) and (c), which differs significantly from that in subdivision (a), bolsters our conclusion. See § 13-604.W.2(b)-(c). Subdivisions (b) and (c) apply only if the enhancing felony was committed within the five- or ten-year period "immediately preceding" commission of the offense set for sentencing. Had the legislature intended to apply a comparable time-of-commission limitation to felony convictions that fall within subdivision (a), it surely would have used the same clear language that it included in subdivisions (b) and (c).³

III.

¶ 12 Because the language of § 13-604.W.2(a) is clear, we "`apply it without resorting to other methods of statutory interpretation,' ... unless application of the plain meaning would lead to impossible or absurd results." Bilke v. State, 206 Ariz. 462, 464 ¶ 11, 80 P.3d 269, 271 (2003) (quoting Hayes v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 178 Ariz. 264, 268, 872 P.2d 668, 672 (1994)). Reading subdivision (a) as imposing a timing-of-conviction requirement and no timing-of-commission requirement, however, does not "lead to impossible or absurd results."

¶ 13 In § 13-604, the legislature

differentiate[d] the treatment of repeat offenders based on four factors: whether the prior convictions were serious in nature, whether the prior crimes for less serious offenses were committed relatively recently with respect to the present offense, whether the prior conviction was a third [or more] felony conviction, or whether the crimes committed on different occasions were consolidated for trial.⁴

Christian, 205 Ariz. at 69 n. 11 ¶ 15, 66 P.3d at 1246 n. 11. Under this scheme, as the seriousness of the offense underlying the prior felony conviction increases, the restrictions on the use of that conviction to enhance the sentence for a later conviction decrease.⁵ The legislative decision to allow a prior felony conviction for the more serious offenses identified in subdivision (a) to enhance the sentence for a later offense, regardless of when the defendant committed the enhancing offense, does not lead to an impossible or absurd result.

IV.

¶ 14 Although we have never directly addressed the precise issue presented today, our holding is consistent with previous decisions interpreting § 13-604.W.2 and its predecessor statutes.⁶

¶ 15 In State v. Thompson, we discussed the relationship between time of offense and time of conviction for offenses that fall under subdivision (c). 200 Ariz. at 440-41 ¶ 6, 27 P.3d at 797-98. There, we specifically considered whether conviction for an enhancing offense must precede commission of the sentencing offense if the enhancing offense is to be considered a prior felony conviction.⁷ Id. at 440-41 ¶¶ 5-6, 27 P.3d at 797-98. We held that subdivision (c), which includes timing-of-commission language, requires that commission of "the prior offense must precede the present offense." Id. at 441 ¶ 6, 27 P.3d at 798. Although we did not directly address subdivision (a), we observed in dicta that the term "prior felony conviction" means that "the conviction on the prior offense must precede the conviction on the present offense" and that the definitions of "historical prior felony conviction" in subdivisions (a) and (d) "presuppose a conviction on the prior offense." Id.

¶ 16 In State v. Phillips, we more directly addressed the issue of whether subdivision (a) requires that a conviction for the enhancing offense must precede commission of the sentencing offense. 202 Ariz. 427, 441 ¶¶ 77-78, 46 P.3d 1048, 1062 (2002).⁸ Phillips and an accomplice committed a series of robberies on April 12, 24, and 28. Id. at ...