State v. Todd

Decision Date27 February 1985
Docket NumberNo. 523A83,523A83
Citation326 S.E.2d 249,313 N.C. 110
PartiesSTATE of North Carolina v. Ricky Clyde TODD.
CourtNorth Carolina Supreme Court

Rufus L. Edmisten, Atty. Gen. by H.A. Cole, Sp. Deputy Atty. Gen., Raleigh, for the State.

Thomas M. Johnson, Elizabethtown, for defendant-appellant.

MEYER, Justice.

At trial the State's evidence tended to show that on 12 February 1983, at approximately 7:00 p.m., Tom Rising returned to his Bladenboro home to discover that it had been broken into. A television set, a 12 gauge shotgun and a .22 Remington rifle were missing. The next day, Mr. Rising recovered the missing items which were concealed in briars in a wooded area approximately forty feet from his house.

Jerome Alton Stevens, the State's chief witness, testified that he, Gary Wilson, and William Wilson spent the afternoon of 12 February with the defendant. Stevens had agreed to drive the defendant from Whiteville to Bladenboro. Stevens testified that late in the afternoon, after visiting a friend of Gary Wilson's, the defendant directed Stevens to an area located beyond the intersection of Highway 211. Defendant instructed Stevens to stop the car. Defendant and Gary Wilson then left and went into the woods. After four or five minutes, Stevens heard gunshots. When the defendant returned to the car, he stated that he had broken into a house, and had taken some guns and a TV set which he had left in the woods and for which he would return later. Mr. Rising's house was approximately one hundred and thirty yards from where Stevens had stopped his car. Stevens, the defendant and Gary Wilson then went to a poolroom after which they picked up William Wilson from a friend's trailer and returned to Whiteville.

Tim Rising testified that on 13 February, shortly after he had discovered his property in the woods behind his house, he saw a car stopped on the road approximately fifteen to twenty feet from where the TV and guns had been left. He watched the defendant leave the car and walk to within six feet of the items. Rising confronted the defendant and his brother, who was ostensibly checking the oil in the car. Rising told the pair that his house had been broken into and asked them to await the arrival of the sheriff. Defendant stated he would not get involved, threatened to beat Rising, and the two left immediately.

Defendant offered the testimony of his brother who stated that although he had no trouble starting his car or leaving the area after their encounter with Rising, he was in fact repairing a broken carburetor or alternator at the time they were confronted by Rising. Randy Todd also testified that the defendant never left the car. Defendant's mother testified that defendant arrived at her home in Bladenboro at approximately 5:00 p.m. on 12 February and remained there until after dark.

Defendant testified that he had gone to Bladenboro with Jerome Stevens on 12 February and they had shot pool until close to 5:00 p.m. when Stevens had taken the defendant to his mother's house. Defendant denied knowing William Wilson and knew Gary Wilson "from him being in the jailhouse." He testified that neither Gary nor William Wilson were with him and Stevens on 12 February.

When asked by his attorney whether he had been cutting wood sometime prior to 12 February, defendant responded that he had a few scratches on his hand. From this it could be inferred that the scratch marks on defendant's hands and arms which were observed by a sheriff's deputy on 13 February, were wounds incurred from cutting wood rather than from attempting to hide a TV set and guns in the briars behind Tim Rising's house. Defendant denied any involvement in the breaking or entering or larceny. Defendant had been out of prison less than a month when these crimes occurred.

With respect to the State's case against the defendant as an habitual felon, the evidence disclosed the following: On 8 June 1977 defendant was convicted in Superior Court, Columbus County, of the felony offense of larceny of a firearm. On 14 May 1979 defendant was convicted in Superior Court, Caldwell County, of the felony offense of larceny of more than $200.00. On 21 November 1980 defendant was convicted in Superior Court, Scotland County, for the felony possession of a controlled substance. In addition, for sentencing purposes, there was evidence that defendant had been convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon; possession with intent to sell or deliver a controlled substance; simple possession of marijuana; carrying a concealed weapon; possession of diazepam; and damage to real property.

During the sentencing hearing, held pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-1340.1 et seq., the State introduced the testimony of Russell Brown to the effect that defendant suffers from an antisocial personality disorder described as sociopathic. Crime is usually a predominant characteristic of the disorder. Other characteristics are the tendency to focus on one's own needs and to disregard the needs of others; manipulative behavior; and an absence of significant relationships. Treatment of sociopathic personality disorders has not been successful.

The State also introduced the testimony of a Bladen County deputy sheriff who advised the Court that defendant, after the guilty verdict had been returned, stated that although he might be forty years old, when he got out of prison he was going to kill every law enforcement officer that he saw. The record discloses that the defendant, over his attorney's protestations, then interrupted the proceedings by stating "I called him a ----headed son-of-a bitch." The record also discloses the following entry made by the Court during the sentencing proceedings:

Let the record show that these proceedings were interrupted by what the Court observed to be and was most obviously an attempt to escape by the defendant from the courtroom. The defendant was arrested and taken into custody before he could get out of the building, but he did get out of the courtroom. The Court took a recess at the point in time, in order to calm the situation down and give counsel for the defendant a chance to converse with any and all that he desired to converse to [sic], about that or anything else.

Defendant's evidence at the sentencing hearing consisted of the testimony of his mother and father both of whom were of the opinion that long-term incarceration would be detrimental to the defendant. Following defendant's attempted escape, the defense was permitted to reopen the evidence to present testimony of defendant's parents concerning defendant's good character and reputation in the community.

Defendant first contends that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence Jerome Stevens' testimony concerning defendant's statement that he had just broken into a house and taken a TV set and two guns. It is defendant's position, with no citation of authority, that because Stevens had pled guilty to the same charges for which defendant was being tried, and he was awaiting sentencing, his testimony, "unsupported by other evidence," was inadmissible.

The record belies the defendant's contention that Stevens' testimony was unsupported by other evidence. Certainly defendant's presence within six feet of the stolen items the day after the theft, and the scratches on his arms support Stevens' version of the events. Furthermore, in State v. Tilley, 239 N.C. 245, 249, 79 S.E.2d 473, 476 (1954) we stated that:

It is well settled in this jurisdiction that although the jury should receive and act upon such testimony with caution, the unsupported testimony of an accomplice is sufficient to sustain a conviction if it satisfies the jury beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused.

Accord State v. Martin, 309 N.C. 465, 308 S.E.2d 277 (1983); State v. Bindyke, 288 N.C. 608, 220 S.E.2d 521 (1975); State v. Carey, 285 N.C. 497, 206 S.E.2d 213 (1974); State v. McNair, 272 N.C. 130, 157 S.E.2d 660 (1967). This assignment of error is without merit.

Defendant next contends that under the authority of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), his constitutional rights were violated by the admission of testimony concerning statements he made to a law enforcement officer. The officer testified that the day before he had been putting gas in his patrol car when the defendant had yelled down to him from his jail cell and indicated that he wanted to talk to the officer. The officer testified that after he had taken care of his car, he went into the jail to see the defendant. Prior to allowing the officer to testify further, the court conducted the following exchange with defense counsel in response to counsel's objection:

MR. JOHNSON: Judge, I'm afraid we are getting into hearing evidence of the defendant--

COURT: Pardon?

MR. JOHNSON: --evidence about the defendant that has not been sworn. There is no testimony as to any giving of any constitutional rights in the statements that may be made on behalf of conversation with the defendant that may be damaging without the proper introduction of any Miranda warnings.

COURT: Counsellor, you are not getting ready to tell me that when somebody is standing up in the jail cell yelling out the window that the folks on the sidewalk have to look up and pull out their Miranda card and start going through that four--or five part written area?

MR. JOHNSON: No, sir. Your Honor, I would like for you to believe that though.

COURT: No....

MR. JOHNSON: Yes, sir.

COURT: I take it though that is the basis of your objection, that as the officer sat there putting gas in his car, he didn't pull out his Miranda card and go through the litany with your client sitting up in the jail, right?

MR. JOHNSON: Thank you, your Honor.

COURT: .... On the basis given, the OBJECTION is OVERRULED. Let the jury come on back. There being no interrogation. Miranda requires not only custody, but interrogation, too, or its functional equivalent, neither...

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