State v. Trujillo

Decision Date19 May 2020
Docket NumberDA 18-0346
Citation464 P.3d 72,400 Mont. 124,2020 MT 128
Parties STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Stacy Michael TRUJILLO, Defendant and Appellant.
CourtMontana Supreme Court

For Appellant: Chad Wright, Appellate Defender, Michael Marchesini, Assistant Appellate Defender, Helena, Montana

For Appellee: Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General, Roy Brown, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana, Joshua A. Racki, Cascade County Attorney, Kory Larsen, Deputy County Attorney, Great Falls, Montana

Justice Dirk Sandefur delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 Stacy Michael Trujillo appeals his judgment of conviction in the Montana Eighth District Court, Cascade County, on the offenses of attempted deliberate homicide, a felony in violation of §§ 45-4-103 and 45-5-102(1)(a), MCA, and evidence tampering, a felony in violation of § 45-7-207(1)(a), MCA. The dispositive issues are:

1. Whether the District Court committed plain error in violation of § 45-3-110, MCA, by allowing the State's closing argument that Trujillo's failure to retreat or summon police prior to using deadly force was unreasonable?
2. Whether the District Court committed plain error in violation of Trujillo's constitutional right to remain silent by allowing the State's closing and rebuttal argument references to his post -Miranda silence?
3. Whether the State's closing argument regarding an alternative factual basis for the evidence tampering charge effected an improper de facto amendment of the charging Information?

¶2 We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶3 On February 2, 2017, the State charged Trujillo with attempted deliberate homicide after he repeatedly stabbed Omer Carbajal with a knife in the lobby of the Great Falls Rescue Mission. The State also charged him with evidence tampering based on a witness statement that Trujillo later threw something believed to be a knife over a fence into a neighboring auto-repair yard.

¶4 A video surveillance camera clearly captured the stabbing incident. It showed Trujillo calmly approach Carbajal from behind where he was sitting at a table talking with another man, tap him on the shoulder, whisper in his ear, and then suddenly step back, produce a knife, and repeatedly stab the unsuspecting Carbajal about the face and head. A responding Great Falls police officer (Officer Torres) later arrested Trujillo on the street a block away. After returning to the Mission to view the surveillance video and confirm that he had the right man, the officer took Trujillo to the police station, advised him of his Miranda rights, and requested that he submit to questioning. After initially signing a Miranda waiver, Trujillo declined to speak further.

¶5 At trial, Trujillo acknowledged that he stabbed Carbajal but asserted that he acted in self-defense. He testified and argued to the jury that he reasonably feared that Carbajal would shoot him based on his uncorroborated testimony that Carbajal had minutes before threatened to shoot him with a gun outside on the sidewalk.1 Contrary to witness testimony that he threw what appeared to be the subject knife over a neighboring fence, Trujillo testified that the knife he used was the knife that police later found on the sidewalk outside the Mission.2 After a three-day trial, the jury found Trujillo guilty of both offenses. The District Court later sentenced him to 60 years in prison without parole—50 years for attempted deliberate homicide and 10 for evidence tampering. Trujillo timely appealed.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶6 Whether an unpreserved error warrants plain error review is a question of law reviewed de novo. State v. Stratton , 2017 MT 112, ¶ 7, 387 Mont. 384, 394 P.3d 192. The failure to preserve an assertion of error by contemporaneous objection generally waives the right to subsequent appellate review. Section 46-20-104(2), MCA. See also State v. Long , 2005 MT 130, ¶ 35, 327 Mont. 238, 113 P.3d 290 (we generally will not review issues raised for the first time on appeal due to unfairness of faulting a lower court for failure to correctly rule on an unraised issue). As a narrow exception to the waiver rule, we may, in our discretion, review an unpreserved objection if it implicates a fundamental constitutional right and plain error review is necessary to avoid a manifest miscarriage of justice, leaving an unsettled question regarding the fundamental fairness of the proceeding, or otherwise compromising the integrity of the judicial process. State v. Dahlin , 1998 MT 113, ¶ 14, 289 Mont. 182, 961 P.2d 1247 ; State v. Finley , 276 Mont. 126, 137-38, 915 P.2d 208, 215 (1996) (distinguishing common law plain error doctrine from limited statutory plain error review), overruled on other grounds by State v. Gallagher , 2001 MT 39, ¶ 21, 304 Mont. 215, 19 P.3d 817. We thus exercise plain error review only under extraordinary circumstances. State v. Mitchell , 2012 MT 227, ¶ 10, 366 Mont. 379, 286 P.3d 1196 ; Finley , 276 Mont. at 138, 915 P.2d at 215. Mere assertion that an asserted error implicates a constitutional right or that a manifest miscarriage of justice will result absent review is insufficient—the appellant must affirmatively demonstrate the criteria for plain error review. State v. Gunderson , 2010 MT 166, ¶ 100, 357 Mont. 142, 237 P.3d 74. Whether an asserted error implicates a fundamental constitutional right is a question of law subject to plenary review. State v. Charlie , 2010 MT 195, ¶ 21, 357 Mont. 355, 239 P.3d 934 ; State v. Brander , 280 Mont. 148, 150-51, 930 P.2d 31, 33 (1996).

¶7 Whether a prosecutor's closing argument comment effects a de facto substantive amendment of a charging Information is a question of law reviewed de novo. See State v. Bianca Wilson , 2007 MT 327, ¶¶ 21-32, 340 Mont. 191, 172 P.3d 1264.

DISCUSSION

¶8 1. Whether the District Court committed plain error in violation of § 45-3-110, MCA , by allowing the State's closing argument that Trujillo's failure to retreat or summon police prior to using deadly force was unreasonable?

¶9 Tracking a related line of cross-examination of Trujillo, the State essentially argued during closing that his asserted self-defense theory was not credible because it was unreasonable under the circumstances for him to stab Carbajal rather than leave, call the police, or seek assistance from the attending front desk clerk at the Mission. Trujillo did not contemporaneously object to this line of cross-examination or the State's corresponding closing argument. He now asserts, however, that the argument was plain error contrary to § 45-3-110, MCA, thereby "punishing him for invoking" his statutory right to self-defense in violation of his federal and state constitutional rights to due process of law. We disagree.

¶10 As pertinent here, a "person is justified in the use of force likely to cause death or serious bodily harm only if the person reasonably believes that the force is necessary" to protect him or herself from "imminent death or serious bodily harm." Section 45-3-102, MCA. A person lawfully present "who is threatened with bodily injury or loss of life has no duty to retreat ... or summon law enforcement ... prior to using force." Section 45-3-110, MCA. Under § 45-3-102, MCA, whether a person reasonably believed that deadly force was necessary for self-protection under the circumstances is a question of fact for jury determination.

¶11 Trujillo does not dispute that the District Court properly instructed the jury on the pertinent law of self-defense. He further acknowledges that, in closing, the State specifically acknowledged that he had no duty to flee or summon police prior to using force in self-defense. The trial record clearly indicates that the State merely argued to the jury that it was not reasonable as a matter of fact under the circumstances for Trujillo to approach Carbajal from behind and stab him, rather than leave, summon the police, or seek assistance from the attending Rescue Mission clerk. We hold that Trujillo has failed to demonstrate that the District Court committed plain error in not intervening sua sponte to limit or cure the State's closing or rebuttal argument references to the reasonableness of his conduct under the circumstances.

¶12 2. Whether the District Court committed plain error in violation of Trujillo's constitutional right to remain silent by allowing the State's closing and rebuttal argument references to his post -Miranda silence?

¶13 Though cherry-picked out of context on appeal, Trujillo correctly asserts that the State's closing and rebuttal arguments referenced the fact that he ultimately exercised his right to remain silent at the police station after his arrest. As with his other assertion of plain error, he did not contemporaneously object. Pursuant to Doyle v. Ohio , 426 U.S. 610, 618-19, 96 S. Ct. 2240, 2244-45, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976), and conforming Montana authority, he now asserts that the State's reference to his post- Miranda silence was a plain error violation of his federal and state constitutional right to remain silent. We disagree.

¶14 A criminally accused has the right to remain silent and require the State to affirmatively prove his or her guilt. See U.S. Const. amend. V and XIV ; Mont. Const. art. II, § 25 ; § 46-16-204, MCA. As a procedural safeguard of this fundamental right, law enforcement officers may not subject an accused to custodial interrogation absent an advisory and knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of the person's constitutional rights to remain silent and the assistance of counsel. State v. Morrisey , 2009 MT 201, ¶¶ 28-29, 351 Mont. 144, 214 P.3d 708 ; Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436, 467-77, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1624-30, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

¶15 In turn, except where first introduced, elicited, or referenced by the accused as proof of innocence,3 the State generally may not introduce, elicit, or otherwise reference the post- Miranda silence of an accused as evidence of guilt...

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6 cases
  • State v. Abel
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Montana
    • November 9, 2021
    ...or other error of law was plain error is a question of law subject to de novo review. State v. Trujillo, 2020 MT 128, ¶ 6, 400 Mont. 124, 464 P.3d 72 State v. Stratton, 2017 MT 112, ¶ 7, 387 Mont. 384, 394 P.3d 192). DISCUSSION ¶5 Criminal defendants have fundamental federal and Montana con......
  • State v. Abel
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Montana
    • November 9, 2021
    ...79. Whether an asserted constitutional or other error of law was plain error is a question of law subject to de novo review. State v. Trujillo , 2020 MT 128, ¶ 6, 400 Mont. 124, 464 P.3d 72 (citing State v. Stratton , 2017 MT 112, ¶ 7, 387 Mont. 384, 394 P.3d 192 ).DISCUSSION ¶5 Criminal de......
  • State v. Corena Marie Mountain Chief
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Montana
    • August 1, 2023
    ...... fair trial was violated. As discussed in this opinion,. whether the issue was preserved, we agree with the State that. Mountain Chief has failed to establish the fundamental. fairness of her trial was compromised. See State v. Trujillo , 2020 MT 128, ¶ 6, 400 Mont. 124, 464 P.3d. 72. . . [ 4 ] In Champagne , the State. elicited testimony from a forensic interviewer to demonstrate. that interviewer had training to identify whether a victim. had been coached and permitted the interviewer "to. testify about a matter to ......
  • State v. Sedler
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Montana
    • October 2, 2020
    ...is often referred to, both colloquially and in court opinions, as a "waiver" of the issue for purposes of appellate review. See State v. Trujillo , 2020 MT 128, ¶ 6, 400 Mont. 124, 464 P.3d 72 ("The failure to preserve an assertion of error by contemporaneous objection generally waives the ......
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