State v. Tucker
Decision Date | 04 January 1926 |
Docket Number | 19546. |
Citation | 137 Wash. 162,242 P. 363 |
Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Parties | STATE v. TUCKER. |
Department 2.
Appeal from Superior Court, Snohomish County; Bell, Judge.
George Tucker was convicted of possessing intoxicating liquors, and he appeals. Affirmed.
O. T Webb and Louis A. Merrick, both of Everett, for appellant.
C. T Roscoe, John C. Richards, and Charles R. Denney, all of Everett, for the State.
The appellant was found guilty of possessing intoxicating liquor and has appealed.
The most important point on this appeal is raised by the appellant's plea of autrefois acquit. This prosecution was under a state statute, and it appears from the record that previously the appellant had been charged by a complaint in the police court of the city of Everett with the possession of intoxicating liquor, being the exact liquor which he, in the information, is charged with having possessed, and both the complaint and information relate to the same time and concededly cover the same incident. Upon the complaint charging violation of the ordinance, the appellant was tried and acquitted. The question is: Can one be punished for violation of a statute of a state where, for the identical act, he has been prosecuted and acquitted under a city ordinance? This exact question has never been presented to this court before. We have held that as an act may constitute a violation of both a federal statute and a state law, a conviction or acquittal under a federal law for the violation of its statute is no bar to subsequent prosecution by the state for the violation of its law; that the same act may constitute two offenses, one against each of the sovereigns to whose laws the defendant is amenable. State v. Coss, 12 Wash. 673, 42 P. 127; State v. Kenney, 83 Wash. 441, 145 P. 450; State v. Turner, 115 Wash. 170, 196 P. 638; State v. Woods, 116 Wash. 140, 198 P. 737; State v. Gibbons, 118 Wash. 171, 203 P. 390; State v. Jewett, 120 Wash. 36, 207 P. 3. We have also held that a municipality may provide, by ordinance, punishment for acts which are also punishable under the state law. Seattle v. Chin Let, 19 Wash. 38, 52 P. 324; Seattle v. MacDonald, 47 Wash. 298, 91 P. 952, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 49; State v. Hagimori, 57 Wash. 623, 107 P. 855; State v. Larkin, 130 Wash. 531, 228 P. 289. But in none of these cases has the situation presented itself which is here present. The nearest approach to it, in any decision of this court to which our attention has been called, is in the case of State v. Cole, 118 Wash. 511, 203 P. 942, where it appears that the defendant had been convicted under both a city ordinance and a state statute. But that case is not decisive of the matter, for, as was there stated, the prior conviction in the municipal court 'was not pleaded as a defense or bar in the present case [prosecution under the statute], and besides, upon stipulation, it was tried with this case as a separate offense, and it was, indeed, a separate and distinct offense.' But this last phrase was, as appears from the portion of the sentence preceding it, above quoted, unnecessary to the opinion, so that it may be positively stated that the question has never been squarely before us heretofore.
We are therefore to determine it upon principle or authorities, and an investigation of the books shows that the question has received consideration in many jurisdictions and that contrary answers have been made. Where the question has arisen as between prosecutions under federal statutes and state statutes, the authorities seem universally agreed that a prosecution under one is not a bar to a prosecution under the other; and this for the fundamental reason that there are two separate sovereignties involved and that one act may be at the same time an assault upon both sovereigns. The argument of those courts which have held that the same rule does not obtain in prosecutions under a state law and a city ordinance finds its support in the view that all the right that a municipality has to define and punish crime arises from the delegation to it by its superior sovereign, the state, and that in the prosecution of such crimes under this delegated authority the municipality is acting as an agent of or for the state itself, and to allow double prosecution would be to allow the state, once directly and once through an agency, to prosecute for the same act. This view finds expression in State v. Welch, 36 Conn. 215; State v. Flint, 63 Conn. 248, 28 A. 28; People v. Hanrahan, 75 Mich. 611, 42 N.W. 1124, 4 L. R. A. 751; United States v. Perez, 3 Hawaii U.S. Dist. Rep. 295; United States v. Colley, 3 Philippine Rep. 58; and in State v. Cowan, 29 Mo. 330, where the court said:
The idea probably finds its best expression in the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States in Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333, 27 S.Ct. 749, 51 L.Ed. 1084, 11 Ann. Cas. 640, where the court was considering the question of whether a prosecution under a federal statute could be had after the defendant had been prosecuted in a territorial court; the territory, of course, being different from a state and being only a subordinate of the federal government.
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