State v. Tyler

• Decision Date: 15 August 2016
• Docket Number: No. 73564–1–l,73564–1–l
• Citation: 382 P.3d 699,195 Wash.App. 385
• Parties: The State of Washington, Respondent, v. Robert Lee Tyler, Appellant.
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals

195 Wash.App. 385

382 P.3d 699

The State of Washington, Respondent,

v.Robert Lee Tyler, Appellant.

No. 73564–1–l

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 1.

FILED: August 15, 2016

Dana M. Nelson, Nielsen Broman & Koch PLLC, 1908 E. Madison St., Seattle, WA, 98122–2842, Jennifer L. Dobson, Attorney at Law, P.O. Box 15980, Seattle, WA, 98115–0980, for Appellant.

Mary Kathleen Webber, Snohomish County Prosecutor's Office, MSC 504, 3000 Rockefeller Ave., Everett, WA, 98201–4061, for Respondent.

Dwyer, J.

The strictures of the Fourteenth Amendment, enacted in 1868, have applied to the state of Washington since its admittance into the Union on November 11, 1889. The standard of proof guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause provides the sole basis upon which Washington courts review criminal convictions for evidentiary sufficiency. Recently, the United States Supreme Court clarified this federal constitutional standard as it applies to assessing the government's proof of “additional elements” set forth in a to-convict instruction—those that are not essential elements of the charged crime. The Court instructs that these “additional elements” are to be disregarded and that the evidentiary sufficiency of the government's proof must be assessed solely against the essential elements of the charged crime.

¶ 2 In this case, Robert Tyler was charged with possession of a stolen vehicle. The trial court's to-convict instruction unnecessarily included definitional terms that are not essential elements of that crime. Tyler contends on appeal that the to-convict instruction thereby created alternative means of committing the offense and that (given Washington's requirement of jury unanimity) the charges against him must be dismissed with prejudice unless the State proved each of the “false alternative means” beyond a reasonable doubt.

¶ 3 The United States Supreme Court is the paramount authority on the federal constitution. Given that Court's explication on the interplay between the due process clause's reasonable doubt requirement and trial court-created “additional elements” of crimes, it is apparent that prior Washington case authority on this subject no longer properly states the law. Instead, as the United States Supreme Court and the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause command, the government's proof must be assessed against the essential elements of the charged crime, not against “additional elements” or “false alternative means” created by a trial judge and inserted into a to-convict instruction. Pursuant to this understanding, the State adduced sufficient evidence to support Tyler's conviction and that conviction was reached by a unanimous jury. Accordingly, we affirm.

I

¶ 4 Bruce Champagne found that his car, a white Honda Accord sedan, was stolen from his driveway. Around 2:30 a.m. the following early winter morning, Deputy Sheriff Scott Stich was patrolling near a service road surrounded by deep forest near Darrington, Washington. About one-half mile up a gravel roadway, the deputy encountered two vehicles parked 20 feet apart, a white Honda sedan and a pick-up truck. The deputy saw that the sedan was lifted up on a jack such that its driver's side wheels were in the air.

¶ 5 Upon approaching the pick-up truck, the deputy found four people located thusly: Robert Tyler and Rebekah Nicholson were inside the truck's passenger cabin; Tyson Whitt was partially covered by a tarp in the bed of the pick-up; and Anthony Coleman was standing outside of the truck.

¶ 6 The deputy, from outside the truck, spoke with Tyler, who was inside the passenger cabin. Tyler stated that he owned the truck and produced a corresponding bill of sale. Looking inside the truck's passenger cabin, the deputy observed what appeared to be parts stripped from a car (a disconnected car stereo and disconnected speakers). Upon an inquiry by the deputy, Tyler stated that he did not know anything about the items, neither how they happened to be in his truck nor to whom they belonged. Tyler further stated that he was there helping a friend, but did not specify who he was helping or where the friend was located. Additionally, when asked who owned the Honda, Tyler stated that he did not know.

¶ 7 Upon inspection of the sedan, the deputy observed that it appeared as if it was being stripped of parts. The bolts on the suspended wheels were partially loosened. Looking inside the sedan's passenger cabin, the deputy noticed that it was missing its stereo and front door speakers. In the sedan's ignition, the deputy found a key with a Chrysler manufacturer's logo thereon and noted that the key had been “shaved,” a modification commonly associated with vehicle theft.

¶ 8 The deputy then conducted a computer search of the sedan's license plate number. He learned that the sedan had been reported stolen. He then contacted Champagne, the vehicle's owner. During their discussion, the deputy determined that the brand of car stereo that Champagne said had been in his sedan matched that of the disconnected car stereo now located in the passenger cabin of Tyler's truck.

¶ 9 The deputy again spoke with Tyler. When Tyler failed to give the deputy direct answers regarding the items in his truck's cabin, the deputy arrested him.

¶ 10 During a subsequent interrogation, Tyler explained that he had followed Whitt to the service road as a favor to Whitt's parents. Tyler also said that he saw Whitt taking parts out of the sedan. From this, Tyler reasoned that the sedan Whitt was driving had been stolen.¹ Tyler reiterated, however, that he himself did not steal the vehicle.

¶ 11 Tyler was charged with one count of possession of a stolen vehicle.²

¶ 12 The trial court's to-convict instruction read, in part, as follows:

To convict the defendant of the crime of possessing a stolen motor vehicle, each of the following elements of the crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt:

(1) That on or about the 10th day of January, 2014, the defendant knowingly received, retained, possessed, concealed, disposed of a stolen motor vehicle.

Jury Instruction 4.

¶ 13 The jury found Tyler guilty. He was sentenced to 45 days of confinement. The court also imposed the mandatory $100 DNA fee and $500 victim penalty assessment.

II

A

¶ 14 The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment mandates that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. In a criminal prosecution, “the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.” In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). On an appeal from a criminal conviction, due process further guarantees a defendant the right to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence proffered by the government. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 314–16, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).

¶ 15 Washington's constitution has never been interpreted to include a proof beyond a reasonable doubt guarantee. Instead, prior to Winship, “[t]he requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt ha[d] ... only common law and statutory origins.” State v. Odom, 83 Wash.2d 541, 546, 520 P.2d 152 (1974), see former RCW 9A.04.100(1) (1975) (“No person may be convicted of a crime unless each element of such crime is proved by competent evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.”); REM. & BAL. CODE § 2308 (1910) (“Every person charged with the commission of a crime shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved by competent evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.”).³

¶ 16 Washington courts apply the federal constitutional standard for appellate review of the evidentiary sufficiency of the government's proof in a criminal case. This is best evidenced by our Supreme Court's alteration of its evidentiary sufficiency analysis in State v. Green, 91 Wash.2d 431, 588 P.2d 1370 (1979) (Green I), as reconsidered in State v. Green, 94 Wash.2d 216, 616 P.2d 628 (1980) (Green II).

¶ 17 In Green I, the court reviewed a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence of the element of kidnapping necessary to support a conviction for aggravated murder in the first degree. 91 Wash.2d at 442–43, 588 P.2d 1370. In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, the court applied the then-prevailing “substantial evidence” test, limiting its review “to a determination of whether the State has produced substantial evidence tending to establish circumstances from which a jury could reasonably infer the fact to be proved.” Green I, 91 Wash.2d at 442, 588 P.2d 1370. The court concluded that there existed “substantial evidence from which the jury could infer appellant killed while in the course of or in furtherance of the statutorily defined offense of kidnapping.” Green I, 91 Wash.2d at 444, 588 P.2d 1370.

¶ 18 Soon after the filing of the Green I decision, the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in Jackson.

¶ 19 Prior to Jackson, the applicable federal standard was the then-prevailing “no evidence” criterion of Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199, 80 S.Ct. 624, 4 L.Ed.2d 654 (1960), which held that “a conviction based upon a record wholly devoid of any relevant evidence of a crucial element of the offense charged is constitutionally infirm.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 314, 99 S.Ct. 2781.

¶ 20 In Jackson, the Court's task was to decide whether the Fourteenth Amendment due process standard recognized in Winship“constitutionally protects an accused against conviction except upon evidence that is sufficient fairly to support a conclusion that every element of the crime has been established beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 313–14, 99 S.Ct. 2781.

¶ 21 The Court held that “an essential of the due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment” is that “no person shall be made to suffer the onus of a criminal conviction except upon sufficient proof—defined as evidence...