State v. Vantage Bridge Co.

• Decision Date: 22 May 1925
• Docket Number: 19112.
• Citation: 236 P. 280,134 Wash. 568
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE v. VANTAGE BRIDGE CO. et al.

236 P. 280

134 Wash. 568

STATE v. VANTAGE BRIDGE CO. et al.

No. 19112.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

May 22, 1925

Appeal from Superior Court, Thurston County; Wright, Judge.

Suit for injunction by the State of Washington against the Vantage Bridge Company and the Commissioners of Grant and Kittitas Counties. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants appeal. Affirmed.

Tolman C.J., dissenting.

Kelly &amp MacMahon, of Tacoma, Carroll B. Graves, and Hartman &amp Hartman, all of Seattle, N.W. Washington, of Ephrata, and Arthur McGuire, of Ellensburg, for appellants.

John H. Dunbar and Tom W. Holman, both of Olympia, for the State.

MAIN, J.

This action was commenced in the superior court for Thurston county in the name of the state by the Attorney General and the state highway engineer seeking a decree enjoining the defendants from proceeding with the construction of a toll bridge over the Columbia river in pursuance of a franchise granted by the commissioners of Kittitas and Grant counties. A trial upon the merits resulted in the injunctive relief sought by the state, and from the judgment entered this appeal is prosecuted.

The Columbia river is a navigable interstate stream. It forms the boundary between Kittitas and Grant counties. On June 7, 1924 (43 Stat. 660), the Congress of the United States gave its consent to those counties, or their assigns----

'to construct, maintain, and operate a bridge and approaches thereto across the Columbia river at a pont suitable to the interests of navigation, at or near Vantage Ferry, Washington, and along the route of and continuous with the North Central Highway as officially designated by the State highway commissioner of the State of Washington. * * *' Section 1.

Section 2 of the act of Congress provides that the state----

'may at any time acquire all right, title, and interest in said bridge and the approaches thereto constructed under the authority of this act, for the purpose of maintaining and operating such bridge as a free bridge, by the payment to the owners of the reasonable value thereof, not to exceed in any event the construction cost thereof. * * *'

After the consent of Congress had been obtained, the commissioners of the two counties on August 1 and 2, 1924, acting separately but concurrently, granted to Elbert M. Chandler a franchise----

'to construct, operate and maintain a toll bridge and approaches thereto over and across the Columbia river in the state of Washington, at or near the present ferry crossing point known as Vantage Ferry, and along the route of the to connect and be continuous with the existing public highway now known and officially designated as the North Central Highway. * * *'

The state through its properly constituted officials objected to the granting of consent by Congress and the franchise by the counties because it would interfere with the state's highway program, in that the toll bridge, if constructed would operate as a connecting link in a primary state highway. After the consent had been given and the franchise granted and negotiations had been conducted with other parties with reference to the construction of the bridge, the state in its own name brought this action for the purpose above stated.

The appellants first contend that the action is not properly brought. They say that it is an action of quo warranto and can only be brought on the relation of some one authorized by statute to bring such an action. Little need be said upon this question. In State v. Camp Lewis Service & Garage Co., 129 Wash. 166, 224 P. 584, an action was brought by the state in its own name for the purpose of requiring the removal of obstructions from the Pacific Highway, which is a state primary highway. That action was sustained. The general purposes of the two actions are the same. In that case the state sought to require the removal of an obstruction. In the case now before us the purpose is to prevent unlawful interference with a state highway. The case of State ex rel. Attorney General v. Seattle Gas Co., 28 Wash. 488, 68 P. 946,

70 P. 114, is upon an entirely different state of facts. It was there held that the state on the relation of the Attorney General did not have authority under the statute to litigate the validity of a franchise granted for the purpose of laying gas pipes in a city street. Here the action is not brought on the relation of the Attorney General but in the name of the state itself for the purpose of preventing interference with the state's road program as defined by the Legislature. The questions in the cases are different.

The real question in this case is whether the county commissioners of Kittitas and Grant counties have authority to grant a franchise for the construction of a toll bridge which will operate as the connecting link in one of the state's primary highways.

Section 1 of chapter 93 of the Laws of 1919 provides:

'Boards of county commissioners are hereby authorized to grant franchises to persons or corporations for the construction, operation and maintenance of toll bridges, outside of incorporated cities and towns, over and across streams within their respective counties, and over and across streams which are boundaries of counties.'

Section 3 of the same act further defines the procedure when the stream to be bridged in the boundary between two counties.

Section 1 1/2 of chapter 110 of the Laws of 1919 provides:

'A primary state highway is established as follows: A highway starting from a connection with the Sunset Highway at Ellensburg; thence by the most feasible route * * * to the Columbia river near Vantage; crossing the same and continuing thence northeasterly by the most feasible route. * * *'

Prior to the passage of this act the North Central Highway had been designated as is provided in section 15 of chapter 164 of the Laws of 1915.

The question more definitely stated is whether under section 1 of the act of 1919 the commissioners are given the power to grant franchises for the construction and operation of toll bridges upon a primary state highway. The counties are but local subdivisions of the state and are created by the sovereign power of the state, without the consent or concurrent action of the people who inhabit them. They are created with a direct and exclusive reference to the general policy of the state, and are in fact but a branch of the general administration of that policy. In State ex rel. Board of Commissioners v. Clausen, 95 Wash. 214, 163 P. 744, it was said:

'Our Constitution makes no special reference to county organizations as such other than to recognize them as legal subdivisions of the state, recognizing those counties existing at the time of the adoption of the Constitution and providing for the organization of new counties by the Legislature under certain restrictions. As

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