State v. Vareen, 16700
| Decision Date | 08 January 1953 |
| Docket Number | No. 16700,16700 |
| Citation | 223 S.C. 34,74 S.E.2d 223 |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE v. VAREEN. |
John Grimball, Columbia, for appellant.
T. Pou Taylor, Sol., Columbia, for respondent.
The appellant was convicted in the Court of General Sessions for Richland County upon an indictment which contained two counts, namely, larceny and privily stealing from the person, which latter is defined by section 1147 of the Code of 1942. There was motion for directed verdict of not guilty and one of the questions on appeal involves the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict; and the other question relates particularly to venue, the contention being that the evidence was not susceptible of reasonable inference that the crimes were committed in Richland County.
However, the questions were not seriously argued with respect to the larceny count. It is well-settled that one may be indicted for larceny in the county where he commits a theft or in that to which he takes the stolen goods. State v. Bryant, 9 Rich. 113. The principle has also been extended by this court to cover the case of property stolen in another State and brought to this. State v. Hill, 19 S.C. 435, opinion by Justice McIver. See State v. McCann, 167 S.C. 393, 166 S.E. 411.
Conceding for the purpose of this decision only, and without deciding, the soundness of appellant's contention that the statutory crime of privily stealing from the person is unlike larceny, not of its continuing nature, is complete at the time of taking and the accused must be indicted in the county thereof, State v. McCoy, 98 S.C. 133, 82 S.E. 280, it is unavailing to him under the evidence which will be stated. Incidentally, the jury were instructed, in substance, in accord with appellant's foregoing contention, and upon the request of his trial counsel. The issue was thus submitted in conformity with the contention, and concluded adversely to appellant by the verdict of guilty.
The prosecuting witness was an army enlisted man who was stationed at Fort Jackson, near the city of Columbia in Richland County. He engaged appellant, who was the driver of a taxicab, to transport him in and about the city on the night of October 24, 1951. He was drinking and "passed out" in the cab and next came to his senses across the Congaree River bridge, which is at the foot of Gervais Street in the city. Missing his money, which was upwards of $200., he called the criminal investigation office at the Fort which resulted in the arrest of appellant by city officers at about 2:00 A.M. on the same night. Appellant was identified by the prosecutor which was made certain by the finding of a memorandum of addresses which the prosecutor left in the cab. Upon arrest, appellant denied to the officers that he had any money in his possession except a comparatively small amount which he said belonged to the cab company, and handed it over. However, upon search of him by the officers, $190. in currency was found in his sock which he then contended was his money which he said he was saving to obtain a divorce from his wife, from whom he was separated.
The prosecutor admitted in his testimony that during the latter part of his ride in the cab of appellant he was intoxicated to the extent of unconsciousness and he was unable to say whether the money was taken from him before or after the cab crossed the river (by way of the Gervais Street bridge) which separates Richland and Lexington Counties. However, the army criminal investigator testified that on November 2, 1951, about a week after the arrest of appellant and the finding of the money in his sock, he talked to him at the county jail in the presence of Deputy Sheriff Brown and appellant admitted that he took $162. from the prosecutor, added $28. of his own, making the $190. which was found in his sock. The following is quoted from the testimony of this State's witness: "Mr. Brown asked him where he had taken the money, and he said he had taken it before he got to the bridge; that after leaving the Roadside Inn, on Farrow Road, that he was headed for the bridge, and took it before he reached the bridge."
On October 25,...
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