State v. Vasquez
| Decision Date | 19 December 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 71984-5.,71984-5. |
| Parties | STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Ramiro Corona VASQUEZ, Petitioner. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Paul Wasson, Spokane, for Petitioner.
John Knodell, Grant County Prosecutor, Edward Owens, Deputy, Ephrata, for Respondent.
Petitioner, Ramiro Vasquez, seeks review of his conviction for driving while under the influence and possession of cocaine. In an administrative license suspension hearing that preceded Vasquez's criminal prosecution, a hearing officer found that the arresting officer did not have probable cause to stop Vasquez. Vasquez argues that in the subsequent criminal prosecution the State was collaterally estopped from revisiting the issue of probable cause and, therefore, his criminal conviction should be dismissed. We disagree.
Quincy Police Sergeant Scott Jones observed two vehicles making simultaneous u-turns at 1:50 a.m. on April 2, 2000. One of the vehicles drove up along the curb, kicking up debris. Sergeant Jones followed this car and paced it at 38 mph, which is above the posted speed limit of 25 mph. Once the vehicle stopped and parked in a Jackpot parking lot, Sergeant Jones contacted the vehicle and its occupants.
Vasquez was the driver of the vehicle. Sergeant Jones smelled alcohol on Vasquez and noticed that his eyes were bloodshot and watery. Sergeant Jones also saw a partially consumed six-pack of beer at the feet of the front seat passenger. After being questioned, Vasquez acknowledged that he had consumed two or three beers. Sergeant Jones then asked Vasquez to step from the vehicle for field sobriety tests, which Vasquez did. A portable breath test that measures alcohol concentration was administered on Vasquez. His breath alcohol content was measured at .141. Since this measurement is above the legal limit of .08 and was taken within two hours after driving, Sergeant Jones arrested Vasquez for driving under the influence.1 Prior to his placement in a holding cell at the police department, a search incident to arrest was conducted on Vasquez's person. Sergeant Jones found two folded one dollar bills containing a white powder that field-tested positive for cocaine. Following the search, Vasquez was charged with driving while under the influence (DUI) and possession of cocaine.
An administrative license revocation hearing was conducted before the conclusion of Vasquez's criminal prosecution. The hearing officer found that the evidence admitted "fail[ed] to establish there existed sufficient reason to stop Mr. Vasquez'[s] vehicle in the first instance."2 Therefore, an order of dismissal was entered in favor of Vasquez. At the subsequent criminal prosecution, Vasquez moved to dismiss the criminal charges, arguing that the trial court was estopped from revisiting the question of probable cause. Vasquez also claimed, assuming arguendo collateral estoppel did not apply, that Sergeant Jones still did not have probable cause to stop Vasquez. The trial court denied Vasquez's motion to dismiss. Subsequently, Vasquez orally waived his right to a jury trial. The trial court found Vasquez guilty as charged.
Vasquez appealed his conviction to Division Three of the Court of Appeals, raising three issues: (1) collateral estoppel based on a finding by the administrative hearing officer, (2) lack of probable cause to stop, and (3) insufficiency of oral waiver of trial by jury.3 The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.4 Vasquez petitioned to this court on a single issue for discretionary review—whether the probable cause determination in his license suspension hearing collaterally estopped the superior court from revisiting the same issue in the criminal prosecution. We granted Vasquez's petition for review.5
The doctrine of collateral estoppel is founded on the Fifth Amendment's guaranty against double jeopardy. State v. Williams, 132 Wash.2d 248, 253, 937 P.2d 1052 (1997). Under this doctrine, when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot be relitigated between the same parties in any future litigation. Id. at 254, 937 P.2d 1052 (citing Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970)). The party asserting collateral estoppel bears the burden of proving:
Vasquez has met the first three requirements of collateral estoppel. The issue of probable cause was adjudicated in the administrative license suspension hearing as well as being presented as an issue in the criminal prosecution. The administrative license suspension hearing ended in a final judgment on the merits. And, Vasquez and the State were both parties in the suspension hearing and criminal prosecution.
The fourth requirement of collateral estoppel, whether the application of the doctrine works an injustice, is the focus of this case.
In Thompson, we resolved an apparent discord in our cases on the meaning of the injustice prong of the collateral estoppel doctrine. 138 Wash.2d at 795, 982 P.2d 601. The injustice element is Id. at 795-96, 982 P.2d 601 (quoting In re Marriage of Murphy, 90 Wash.App. 488, 498, 952 P.2d 624 (1998)). In previously decided cases, we have noted the "unfairness of permitting an adjudication in an informal administrative setting, for example, to bar later criminal prosecutions." Id. at 796, 982 P.2d 601. The injustice factor recognizes the significant role of public policy. Williams, 132 Wash.2d at 257, 937 P.2d 1052. Thus, we may qualify or reject collateral estoppel when its application would contravene public policy. State v. Dupard, 93 Wash.2d 268, 275-76, 609 P.2d 961 (1980).
The question whether determinations made in an administrative license suspension hearing should bar relitigation of those determinations in subsequent criminal prosecutions is a case of first impression in Washington. However, other states have addressed this specific question and have ruled it does not.
In State v. Higa, 79 Hawai'i 1, 897 P.2d 928 (1995),6 the Supreme Court of Hawaii declined to give license suspension hearings preclusive effect. In reaching its decision, the court noted that the State had not had an adequate opportunity to litigate the DUI charge at the administrative level. Id. at 936. It also opined that applying the collateral estoppel doctrine in this instance would defeat the very purpose of the administrative hearings "insofar as the prosecution would then seek to intervene and fully litigate [administrative] hearings." Id. If complete litigation were to be allowed in administrative hearings, it would prevent those proceedings from achieving their remedial goal—"to protect the public by expeditiously removing potentially dangerous drivers from the state's highways." Id.
In State v. Gusman, 125 Idaho 810, 874 P.2d 1117 (1993),7 the Idaho Supreme Court likewise refused to allow administrative license revocation hearings to preclude revisiting the same issues in subsequent criminal prosecutions. Idaho found that the license suspension hearing is part of a civil scheme that serves a governmental purpose, which is different from the criminal procedure. Id. at 1119. The legislative purpose behind the driver's license suspension hearing is "`to determine the status of driving privileges as swiftly as possible.'" Id. at 1120 (quoting Heth v. State, 114 Idaho 893, 894, 761 P.2d 1245 (Ct.App.1988)). Therefore, the Idaho court concluded that the administrative hearing did not put the driver in jeopardy because "no criminal punishment is implicated, nor is the proceeding designed to vindicate public justice in connection with the crime of DUI." Id. The facts of an Illinois case, People v. Moore, 138 Ill.2d 162, 561 N.E.2d 648, 149 Ill.Dec. 278 (1990), are quite similar to the case at hand. Moore was observed making two wide right turns by officers. When the officers approached Moore's vehicle, they detected a strong odor of alcohol on his breath and noticed that his eyes were bloodshot. Moore was arrested and given a Breathalyzer test, which showed he had a blood-alcohol content above the State's legal limit. At his administrative hearing, the hearing officer ruled that the police officers did not have probable cause to stop Moore. Moore then filed a motion to suppress in the criminal prosecution, alleging that the issue of probable cause had already been determined. The Supreme Court of Illinois held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel could not be used to bar litigation in the criminal proceeding. As in Higa, the Illinois statute directed that the license suspension hearing be swift and of limited scope. Id. at 651. If the administrative hearings were given preclusive effect, Illinois concluded that it would "render meaningless [the] legislative purpose." Id.
Although we have never addressed the question of whether an administrative license suspension hearing may have preclusive effect on a subsequent criminal proceeding, we have refused to apply collateral estoppel to criminal prosecutions following decisions in other types of administrative hearings. In Dupard, we held that the State is...
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