State v. Washington

• Decision Date: 27 June 2012
• Docket Number: No. 3D11–2244.,3D11–2244.
• Citation: 114 So.3d 182
• Parties: The STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Robert WASHINGTON, et al., Appellees.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

114 So.3d 182

The STATE of Florida, Appellant,

v.Robert WASHINGTON, et al., Appellees.

No. 3D11–2244.

District Court of Appeal of Florida,

Third District.

June 27, 2012.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Richard L. Polin, Chief Assistant Attorney General, for appellant.

Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and John Eddy Morrison and Daniel Tibbitt, Assistant Public Defenders, for appellees.

Greenberg Traurig and Elliot H. Scherker; and Karen M. Gottlieb for Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and the Miami Chapter of the Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, as amicus curiae.

Before SUAREZ, ROTHENBERG, and EMAS, JJ.

ROTHENBERG, J.

On May 17, 2006, this Court issued its opinion in Taylor v. State, 929 So.2d 665 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006), review denied,952 So.2d 1191 (Fla.2007), rejecting Taylor's facial constitutional challenge to section 893.13, Florida Statutes (2003), as amended by section 893.101, Florida Statutes (2003). Nearly five years later, the trial court below dismissed criminal felony charges against thirty-nine defendants and issued a lengthy order attempting to justify its decision to ignore Taylor, as well as other binding decisions from the district courts of appeal in this state, and instead, to adopt a contrary, non-binding decision issued by a federal trial court judge. In reversing the order under review, we reject the trial court's contention that the issues raised in the instant cases were not previously raised and decided by this Court; reject the trial court's conclusion that it was bound by the federal trial court's decision; and agree with counsel for both the appellant and the appellees that the trial court's analysis and reasoning is flawed.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Section 893.13 prohibits the unauthorized possession, purchase, sale, manufacture, or delivery of a controlled substance; and the possession with intent to purchase, sell, manufacture, or deliver a controlled substance. In 2002, in response to the Florida Supreme Court's interpretation of the statute in Chicone v. State, 684 So.2d 736 (Fla.1996), and later in Scott v. State, 808 So.2d 166 (Fla.2002), in which it held that knowledge of the nature of the substance was an element of these drug offenses, the Florida legislature enacted section 893.101.

893.101 Legislative findings and intent.—

(1) The Legislature finds that the cases of Scott v. State, Slip Opinion No. SC94701 (Fla.2002) and Chicone v. State, 684 So.2d 736 (Fla.1996), holding that the state must prove that the defendant knew of the illicit nature of a controlled substance found in his or her actual or constructive possession, were contrary to legislative intent.

(2) The Legislature finds that knowledge of the illicit nature of a controlled substance is not an element of any offense under this chapter. Lack of knowledge of the illicit nature of a controlled substance is an affirmative defense to the offenses of this chapter.

(3) In those instances in which a defendant asserts the affirmative defense described in this section, the possession of a controlled substance, whether actual or constructive, shall give rise to a permissive presumption that the possessor knew of the illicit nature of the substance. It is the intent of the Legislature that, in those cases where such an affirmative defense is raised, the jury shall be instructed on the permissive presumption provided in this subsection.

After the legislature's clarification of its legislative intent, that knowledge of the nature of the substance is not an element of the offense, but rather an affirmative defense that may be raised by the defendant, constitutional due process challenges were raised and ultimately rejected by the appellate courts across the state. See e.g., Williams v. State, 45 So.3d 14 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010); Johnson v. State, 37 So.3d 975 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010); Harris v. State, 932 So.2d 551 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006); Taylor, 929 So.2d at 665;Tolbert v. State, 925 So.2d 1148 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006); Wright v. State, 920 So.2d 21 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005); Smith v. State, 901 So.2d 1000 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005), review denied,928 So.2d 336 (Fla.2006); Burnette v. State, 901 So.2d 925 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005).

On July 27, 2011, a federal trial court judge issued a ruling in Shelton v. Department of Corrections, 802 F.Supp.2d 1289 (M.D.Fla.2011), finding that although lack of knowledge is an affirmative defense to the offenses in section 893.13, because the statute does not include knowledge of the illicit nature of the substance as an element of the offense, the statute creates strict liability crimes. Thus, the federal district court analyzed the statute's constitutionality under the three-part test established in Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 114 S.Ct. 1793, 128 L.Ed.2d 608 (1994), and concluded the statute violated federal constitutional due process.

Although the challenges raised by the thirty-nine defendants below were raised in Taylor and other cases decided across the state, the trial judge, who “presumed” these cases were decided on state constitutional due process grounds, not federal constitutional due process grounds, concluded they were not binding on him. Instead, the trial judge concluded he was bound by the federal district court's decision in Shelton. The record, however, reflects that the trial judge's assumption was incorrect, and counsel for the defendants concedes on appeal that the only federal court whose decisions bind state courts is the United States Supreme Court. See State v. Dwyer, 332 So.2d 333, 335 (Fla.1976) (“A decision of a Federal District Court, while persuasive if well reasoned, is not by any means binding on the courts of the state.”); see also Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 11, 107 S.Ct. 1519, 95 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (“When federal courts interpret state statutes in a way that raises federal constitutional questions, ‘a constitutional determination is predicated on a reading of the statute that is not binding on state courts and may be discredited at any time.’ ”) (citation omitted); Zakrzewska v. New Sch., 574 F.3d 24, 27 (2d Cir.2009) (stating that “a decision from our Court is binding only within the federal courts of our Circuit”); Doe v. Pryor, 344 F.3d 1282, 1286 (11th Cir.2003) (“The only federal court whose decisions bind state courts is the United States Supreme Court.”); People v. Williams, 16 Cal.4th 153, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 123, 940 P.2d 710, 736 (1997) (holding that decisions of lower federal courts interpreting federal law are not binding on state courts).

THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER

A. The trial court's failure to follow the law

Counsel for the defendants candidly concedes on appeal that the trial court's presumptions, analysis, and conclusions were completely erroneous, but he agrees with the result. The result, however, was a dismissal of the charges based on the defendants' facial constitutional challenge despite binding precedent from this Court and other district courts of appeal. That result can never be “the correct result.” The correct result would have been to deny the motions to dismiss on the authority of Taylor. The trial court was then free to express its disagreement with Taylor and to request reconsideration of the holding in Taylor en banc. While a lower court is free to disagree and to express its disagreement with an appellate court ruling, it is duty-bound to follow it. As the Florida Supreme Court has repeatedly articulated, “[t]he decision of the district courts of appeal represent the law of Florida unless and until they are overruled by this Court.” Stanfill v. State, 384 So.2d 141, 143 (Fla.1980). “Thus, in the absence of interdistrict conflict, district court decisions bind all Florida trial courts.” Pardo v. State, 596 So.2d 665, 666 (Fla.1992).

The purpose of this rule was explained by the Fourth District in State v. Hayes:

The District Courts of Appeal are required to follow Supreme Court decisions. As an adjunct to this rule it is logical and necessary in order to preserve stability and predictability in the law that, likewise, trial courts be required to follow the holdings of higher courts—District Courts of Appeal ... if the district court of the district in which the trial court is located has decided the issue, the trial court is bound to follow it.

Pardo, 596 So.2d at 666–67 (quoting State v. Hayes, 333 So.2d 51, 53 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976)); see also Dwyer, 332 So.2d at 335 (“Where an issue has been decided by the Supreme Court of the State, the lower courts are bound to adhere to the Court's ruling when considering similar issues, even though the court might believe that the law should be otherwise.”).

B. The trial court's justification for failing to follow binding precedent

Perhaps recognizing its mandate to follow the law, the trial court justified its failure to do so based on a false “presumption” that, even if true, would not have provided the justification sought. The “presumption” relied on by the trial court was that although this Court in Taylor and the other district courts, such as the First District in Johnson and Harris, the Second District in Burnette, and the Fourth District in Wright, rejected facial challenges to the constitutionality of section 893.13, as amended by section 893.101, on due process grounds, none of these cases “particularizes the source of due process upon which it relies.”

Thus, the trial court reasoned:

In the absence of such particularization I am obligated as a Florida trial court to presume that Florida appellate courts relied upon a Florida-law-based guarantee of due process.... No Florida case has decided the issue presently before me: whether § 893.13 is unconstitutional by operation of the 14th Amendment to the Federal Constitution.

(first emphasis added).

First, the relied on presumption was erroneous. Although the Taylor opinion makes no specific reference as to whether the analysis was performed under Florida or federal constitutional due process, a review of...