State v. White
| Decision Date | 21 September 2020 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 47291 |
| Parties | STATE OF IDAHO, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. TANYA ELAINE WHITE, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED OPINION AND SHALL NOT BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, State of Idaho, Kootenai County. Hon. George Carey, Senior District Judge.
Order denying motion to suppress, affirmed; order denying I.C.R. 36 motion, reversed; judgment of conviction for possession of methamphetamine, affirmed; case remanded to district court to re-enter judgment of conviction with sentence to reflect a unified term of imprisonment of three years with one year determinate.
Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender; Jenny C. Swinford, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Mark W. Olson, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.
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Tanya Elaine White appeals from her judgment of conviction for possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine). White argues that the district court erred by denying her motion to suppress and her Idaho Criminal Rule 36 motion. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm in part and reverse in part.
White was charged with possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), Idaho Code § 37-2732(c)(1), and possession of paraphernalia, I.C. § 37-2734A(1). The charges arose after Deputy Brock observed a woman exit a Walmart and enter a green vehicle, which was parked on the sidewalk of the store entrance, containing a male driver (Mann) and a male passenger, White's son (Tristan). Deputy Brock observed all three of the vehicle occupants look at him and then look ahead. Deputy Brock thought the occupant's behavior upon noticing his presence was "very odd." Deputy Brock traveled behind the vehicle as it headed toward an exit. While driving, the occupants continued to look over their shoulders and in the mirrors at Deputy Brock. Subsequently, the vehicle turned and appeared to be heading toward an entrance. At that time, Deputy Brock engaged in and processed an unrelated traffic stop. While doing so, he observed the green vehicle park at a nearby restaurant. While parked, the occupants watched Deputy Brock. After processing the traffic stop, Deputy Brock returned to the store parking lot and witnessed the green vehicle pull into a parking stall at the store. At that time, Mann and White exited the vehicle and entered the store. The pair watched Deputy Brock as they entered the store. Thereafter, Mann exited the store, saw Deputy Brock, and re-entered the store again.
Because of their suspicious behavior, Deputy Brock parked his patrol vehicle, approached the green vehicle, and engaged in a consensual encounter with the remaining passenger, Tristan. Deputy Brock could smell the odor of marijuana as he approached the vehicle. Deputy Brock engaged in a conversation with Tristan without mentioning the odor. During the conversation, Tristan agreed with Deputy Brock that Mann and White's behavior was odd. In addition, Tristan admitted that there was marijuana in the trunk of the vehicle and he was "pretty sure" that Mann was smoking marijuana. During Deputy Brock's interaction with Tristan, Deputy Ellis and Deputy Norris arrived on scene. Deputy Norris stayed with the vehicle and conducted a search while Deputy Ellis and Deputy Brock went into the store to locate White and Mann.
While walking into the store, Deputy Brock informed Deputy Ellis that he had been "playing cat and mouse" with the couple in the parking lot and that they had "probably grabbed some other stuff from the car" before entering the store. Deputy Brock located White and Mann in the middle of the store. The deputies placed both White and Mann in handcuffs, advised them they were being detained, escorted them back to the vehicle, and read them their Miranda1 rights.
While the other deputies were in the store, Deputy Norris located marijuana and a pipe in the vehicle. He informed Deputy Brock of his discovery and Deputy Brock questioned White about the marijuana. White asked if her son, Tristan, had been arrested. Deputy Brock askedWhite if they were avoiding him for "a little bit of weed." In response to his question, White explained that she and Mann were on probation. In addition, White claimed that the marijuana belonged to her. Subsequently, it was discovered that the marijuana belonged to Tristan. White admitted that she claimed the marijuana belonged to her in order to protect Tristan. Thereafter, Deputy Norris located a purse in the vehicle which contained a pipe, used syringes, and a substance consistent with methamphetamine. Deputy Brock confronted White with the purse and, among other things, White stated "Can you not open that up in front of my son?" Later, Deputy Ellis informed Deputy Brock that security footage from the store depicted Mann and White going into the bathroom after entering the store for the second time. Deputy Ellis recovered a bag with methamphetamine residue inside the bathroom trash can.
Ultimately, White was arrested and charged with the above-listed offenses. White filed a motion to suppress the statements2 she made after she was handcuffed in the store. In her brief in support of her motion, White argued that she was arrested when the deputy handcuffed her in the store and her arrest was not supported by probable cause. In its brief in opposition to White's motion, the State made numerous alternative arguments. The parties stipulated to the introduction of the police report and Deputy Brock's body camera and rested on their briefing. Without considering the parties' alternative arguments, the district court concluded that White's seizure was an investigatory detention which was properly supported by reasonable suspicion. Consequently, the district court denied White's motion to suppress. In exchange for the State dismissing the paraphernalia charge, White agreed to enter a conditional guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine. In doing so, White reserved her right to appeal the district court's denial of her motion to suppress.
At the sentencing hearing, the district court orally sentenced White to a unified term of three years with one year determinate, suspended the sentence, and placed White on probation for a period of two years. The court's written judgment of conviction set forth a unified four-year term with two years determinate. Consequently, White filed an I.C.R. 36 motion to correct the clerical error in her sentence. The district court denied her I.C.R. 36 motion. White timely appeals.
White argues that the district court erred by denying her motion to suppress and her I.C.R. 36 motion to correct a clerical error in the judgment. We will address each of her contentions in turn below.
White argues that the district court erred in denying her motion to suppress because her seizure amounted to an arrest and her arrest was not supported by probable cause. In response, the State argues that the district court did not err in denying White's motion because (1) White's seizure only amounted to an investigative detention; (2) even if White was arrested, her arrest was supported by probable cause; and (3) regardless, proper application of the attenuation doctrine precludes suppression of White's statements.
Generally, the standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999). However, the Idaho Supreme Court has recently stated that, in the "unusual situation" where the appellate court has before it exactly the same evidence as was considered by the district court, the appellate court may "freely review the evidence and weigh the evidence in the same manner as the trial court would do." State v. Anderson, 164 Idaho 309, 312, 429 P.3d 850, 853 (2018) (quoting State v. Lankford, 162 Idaho 477, 492, 399 P.3d 804, 819 (2017)).
White argues that the district court erred in concluding that her seizure was an investigative detention. Specifically, White contends that under the totality of the circumstances, the deputy's use of handcuffs to seize and remove her from the store was unjustified and transformed her seizure into an arrest which was not supported by probable cause. In response, the State argues that the district court correctly concluded that White's seizure was a detentionand the circumstances of the encounter justified the deputy's use of handcuffs. Based on the arguments presented, we must first consider whether White's seizure amounted to an investigative detention or a de facto arrest.
An investigative detention is permissible if it is based upon specific articulable facts which justify suspicion that the detained person is, has been, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity. State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2003). Such a detention must be temporary and last no longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. State v. Roe, 140 Idaho 176, 181, 90 P.3d 926, 931 (Ct. App. 2004); State v. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 647, 651, 51 P.3d 461, 465 (Ct. App. 2002). "[T]here is no bright line rule to determine when an investigatory detention has become an arrest." State v. Buti, 131 Idaho 793, 796, 964 P.2d...
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