State v. White
| Decision Date | 18 October 1971 |
| Docket Number | No. 766--I,766--I |
| Citation | 489 P.2d 934,5 Wn.App. 615 |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Larry Wayne WHITE, Appellant. |
H. John Aitken, Court Appointed, Seattle, for appellant.
Christopher T. Bayley, King County Pros. Atty., Byron H. Ward, Deputy Pros. Atty., Seattle, for respondent.
Larry Wayne White pleaded guilty to one count of forgery in the first degree on August 18, 1969, and on August 7, 1970, was sentenced to a term of not more than 20 years imprisonment.
White now seeks to set aside his guilty plea, contending that Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), decided prior to the time his plea was entered, required that he be specifically informed by the trial judge of the constitutional rights thereby waived and of the maximum permissible sentence. From this, White argues the trial court erred in accepting his plea of guilty without first advising him of his privilege against self-incrimination, his right to confront his accusers, and the maximum permissible sentence.
We do not believe Boykin establishes such a rigid rule. In that case, a defendant who pled guilty to five indictments of common law armed robbery was later sentenced to death--common law armed robbery being a capital offense in Alabama. Insofar as the record showed, the judge did not ask the defendant any questions concerning the plea; nor did it appear that the defendant addressed the court. While there is language in the majority opinion 1 which indicates the judge has a duty to ascertain if the accused understands the nature of the plea and its consequences, it is nowhere stated that he has a duty to specifically inform the accused of the right being waived and the consequences of the plea. The court's holding rested upon the failure of the record to provide any basis, other than appointment of counsel, for inferring the plea was entered voluntarily and understandingly.
The holding of Boykin is satisfied if it appears from the record that the plea was voluntarily entered with a knowledge of the rights being waived and with a realization of the possible consequences; although the judge is under a duty to ascertain that the defendant pleads voluntarily and understandingly, he need not advise the accused of the nature and consequences of the plea. The determination of whether defendant had the required knowledge is made on the totality of the circumstances as revealed by the record. Boykin viewed in this light is substantially in accord with the prevailing rule in Washington. Miesbauer v. Rhay, 79 Wash.2d 505, 487 P.2d 1046 (1971); Cf. Woods v. Rhay, 68 Wash.2d 601, 414 P.2d 601 (1966); State v. Mitchell, 2 Wash.App. 943, 472 P.2d 629 (1970); McBain v. Maxwell, 2 Wash.App. 27, 466 P.2d 177 (1970); and Miller v. Rhay, 1 Wash.App. 1010, 466 P.2d 179 (1970), are all cases decided under the rule existing prior to Boykin.
In the instant case the trial judge conscientiously questioned 2 White in the presence of counsel as to whether his plea was voluntarily and intelligently given. He was asked whether he had been advised by counsel of his constitutional rights and whether the matter had been discussed at sufficient length with counsel to enable him to make an intelligent decision as to whether he was guilty. The record in this case leaves us with no doubt the plea was voluntarily and understandingly given. The trial judge did not inquire as to whether White had been advised of the maximum possible sentence, however, it did affirmatively appear that his counsel had discussed the case with White at length and that he had been advised of his constitutional rights. In this context we must infer White's counsel performed his fundamental and elementary duty of advising him of the maximum penalty which lawfully could be imposed. Moreover, even if it were assumed the appellant did not know the maximum penalty, we are convinced such ignorance would not have affected the plea, as it was obvious that in the...
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Wood v. Morris
...the constitutional requirements of Boykin. Compare Miller v. Rhay, 1 Wash.App. 1010, 1012, 466 P.2d 179 (1970) With State v. White, 5 Wash.App. 615, 616, 489 P.2d 934 (1971). The affirmative record requirement of Boykin has been interpreted differently by different courts. It has been held ......
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State v. Lewis
...(1973); State v. Hadsell, 6 Wash.App. 946, 497 P.2d 254 (1972); State v. Harvey, 5 Wash.App. 719, 491 P.2d 660 (1971); State v. White, 5 Wash.App. 615, 489 P.2d 934 (1971). The consequences of a guilty plea include the waiver of certain constitutional rights which include the waiver of the ......
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State v. Zumwalt
...Wn. App. at 132. 17. Reply Brief of Appellant at 3. 18. State v. Brett, 126 Wn.2d 136, 198, 892 P.2d 29 (1995). 19. State v. White, 5 Wn. App. 615, 618, 489 P.2d 934 (1971) (court rejected challenge to voluntariness of guilty plea based on presumption that counsel `preformed his fundamental......
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State v. Durham, 2076--II
...nature of the charge, any possible defenses, and the weight of the evidence against him in counseling the guilty plea. State v. White, 5 Wash.App. 615, 489 P.2d 934 (1971); In re Woods v. Rhay, supra. See also Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 96 S.Ct. 2253, 49 L.Ed.2d 108 In summary, we b......