State v. Williams
| Decision Date | 01 June 2011 |
| Docket Number | 38643-7-II |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. JASON SILVA WILLIAMS, Appellant. |
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
A jury found Jason Silva Williams guilty of two counts of possession of a controlled substance for methamphetamine and oxycodone. Williams appealed his convictions and, in August 2010, we remanded for a new suppression hearing because the trial court erred when it found that Williams lacked standing to challenge the search of a laptop bag containing controlled substances. On remand, the trial court concluded that the warrantless searches of the laptop bag and vehicle were lawful. Because Williams had no burden to show an expectation of privacy in the bag, we hold that the warrantless search of the laptop bag was unlawful and any evidence discovered as a result of it was inadmissible. We further hold that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object to inadmissible hearsay testimony and reverse Williams's convictions. But because it appears from our review of the record that the inadmissible evidence was the only evidence presented to the jury to support its guilty verdicts and our review is confined to the evidence that the jury actually considered our only remedy is to reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
At approximately 1 am on March 26, 2008, Tacoma Police Officer Shelly Brown saw two men, initially sitting in a truck parked by the side of the road, get out of the truck and she then saw the driver, later identified as Robert Rambo, grab a gas can. Brown pulled her patrol vehicle behind the parked truck approached the men, and asked them if everything was okay she did not activate her emergency lights. Rambo told her that his truck did not work and that someone was picking them up. He also told her that he picked up a gas can because his truck was out of gas. Brown could see that the truck's gas gauge indicated it was almost half full. Brown asked Rambo if he had identification and he handed his driver's license to her; Brown wrote down his information and handed the license back to him. She similarly asked the passenger Williams, if he had identification. Williams gave Brown his identification; she wrote down his information and handed it back to him.
Officer Brown returned to her vehicle and ran a records check on the two men. A records check on Rambo came back clean, but Williams had a misdemeanor warrant for driving while under the influence (DUI). A second officer, Michael Johnson, arrived and assisted with the arrest of Williams. After Brown told Rambo what was happening, Rambo told her that a blue laptop-style bag sitting in the middle of the truck's bench seat belonged to Williams. Brown picked up the bag and asked Williams if it belonged to him, which he denied. Brown searched the bag and found unspent ammunition, an unlabeled pill bottle containing oxycodone, coffee filters with methamphetamine residue, and a notebook.
Officer Brown arrested Rambo for constructive possession of the contents of the laptop bag and searched the vehicle. She discovered a small pouch lying next to where the laptop bag had been that contained a scale, three grams of methamphetamine, and small resealable plastic bags typically used for storing narcotics. Brown also found pipes commonly used to consume narcotics.
The State charged Williams with unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, methamphetamine, and unlawful possession of a controlled substance, oxycodone. Rambo pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver before trial. Rambo did not testify at Williams's trial. Procedural Facts
On July 23, 2008, Williams moved to suppress the evidence seized subsequent to his arrest, asserting that the officers committed an unlawful pretextual stop and lacked probable cause to arrest him. The trial court held a CrR 3.6 suppression hearing on July 30 and denied Williams's motion. A jury trial began on August 25. At trial, Officer Brown testified about the events leading to Williams's arrest. She stated that after Williams was arrested and secured in the back of a patrol car, she approached Rambo to let him know what was going on. She further testified that when she approached Rambo, he told her that a blue bag in his truck belonged to Williams. Defense counsel did not object to this testimony.
The jury entered verdicts finding Williams not guilty of possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver, guilty of the lesser included offense of possession of methamphetamine and guilty of possession of oxycodone. Williams timely appealed his convictions.
On August 31, 2010, we held the trial court erred when it concluded that Williams lacked standing to challenge the search of the laptop bag and remanded for a new suppression hearing. State v. Williams, noted at 157 Wn.App. 1046 (2010). The trial court held a hearing on September 27. The State presented no evidence at this second hearing. Based on evidence already presented, the trial court changed some findings of facts and concluded that the warrantless searches of the laptop bag and vehicle were lawful. Williams filed a supplemental brief assigning error to the trial court's finding that Williams had denied ownership of the laptop bag, and the trial court's conclusions of law that (1) Williams lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the laptop bag; (2) the evidence found in the laptop bag was properly admitted into evidence at trial; (3) the warrantless search of the pouch was lawful under Arizona v. Gant, ____U.S. ____, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009); and (4) evidence found in the small pouch was properly admitted into evidence at trial.
Williams contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress evidence seized following his arrest. Specifically, Williams argues that Officer Brown's warrantless search of the laptop bag was not justified by the search incident to arrest exception recognized in Gant because Williams was secured in the back of Brown's patrol car before she conducted the search. The State argues that the search was lawful because (1) both Williams and Rambo "disavowed" the bag and therefore, relinquished any reasonable expectation of privacy in its contents, (2) as a valid search incident to Rambo's arrest, or (3) for officer safety.[1]
To review a trial court's ruling on a suppression motion, we examine whether substantial evidence supports the challenged findings. State v. Ross, 106 Wn.App. 876, 880, 26 P.3d 298 (2001), review denied, 145 Wn.2d 1016 (2002). Substantial evidence is "'evidence in sufficient quantum to persuade a fair-minded person of the truth of the declared premises.'" State v Jeannotte, 133 Wn.2d 847, 856, 947 P.2d 1192 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Olmstead v. Dep't of Health, 61 Wn.App. 888, 893, 812 P.2d 527 (1991)). We treat unchallenged findings as verities on appeal. Ross, 106 Wn.App. at 880. And we review a trial court's conclusions of law in an order pertaining to suppression of evidence de novo. State v. Carneh, 153 Wn.2d 274, 281, 103 P.3d 743 (2004).
At the September 27 suppression hearing, the State argued that Gant did not apply with respect to the laptop bag evidence because the search was not incident to either Rambo's or Williams's arrest. Specifically, the State argued that because Rambo had "in effect, hand[ed] the bag to the officer, " there was no search of a vehicle triggering a Gant analysis. Report of Proceedings (RP) (Sept. 27, 2010) at 18. The trial court agreed. Based solely on the argument by the parties, the trial court modified its findings of fact to reflect a more detailed account of the events[2] and concluded that the search of the laptop bag was lawful.
Without citing to authority, the State asserts that Williams had no expectation of privacy in Rambo's vehicle because (1) he was a passenger, (2) he was under arrest, and (3) he was removed from the vehicle. The State's argument is moot. As an initial matter, we reiterate that passengers have automatic standing to challenge the search and seizure of a driver's automobile where they are charged with possessory offenses supported by evidence discovered in the vehicle. See, e.g., State v. Coss, 87 Wn.App. 891, 895-96, 943 P.2d 1126 (1997), review denied, 134 Wn.2d 1028 (1998). The automatic standing doctrine confers standing on anyone charged in a possessory crime, eliminating the requirement to show a legitimate expectation of privacy. Coss, 87 Wn.App. at 895-96.
Washington courts have consistently held that vehicle passengers hold an independent, constitutionally protected privacy interest not diminished merely upon stepping into an automobile driven by another.[3] See State v. Byrd, 110 Wn.App. 259, 262, 39 P.3d 1010 (2002). Here, the trial court employed the two-part test of State v. Evans, 159 Wn.2d 402, 409, 150 P.3d 105 (2007), [4] to find that Williams had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of the laptop bag and thus the evidence seized during the warrantless search was admissible. But because the automatic standing doctrine applies, we hold that the trial court erred when it concluded Williams bore a burden to show an expectation of privacy in the vehicle or the contents of the laptop bag.
Next we determine whether the trial court properly admitted the contents of the laptop bag as evidence against Williams. Warrantless searches and seizures are per se illegal unless they come within specially established exceptions to the warrant requirement. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Wash. Const. art. I, § 7. The State bears the burden of proving that the warrantless...
To continue reading
Request your trial