State v. Williams

• Decision Date: 12 September 2000
• Citation: 59 Conn. App. 771,758 A.2d 400
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: (Conn.App. 2000) STATE OF CONNECTICUT V. CHARLES WILLIAMS (AC 20043)

758 A.2d 400 (Conn.App. 2000)

STATE OF CONNECTICUT

V.

CHARLES WILLIAMS

(AC 20043)

THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT

Argued June 1, 2000

September 12, 2000

Carlos E. Candal, for the appellant (defendant).

Robin Schwartz, special deputy assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were James Thomas, state's attorney, and George Ferko, assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

Lavery, C. J., and Landau and Mihalakos, Js.

OPINION

Lavery, C. J.

The defendant, Charles Williams, appeals from a judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of criminal possession of a firearm in violation of General Statutes § 53a-217.¹ The defendant claims that the trial court improperly (1) denied his motion to suppress, (2) denied his motion for judgment of acquittal because there was insufficient evidence to allow the jury to find that the firearm possessed by the defendant was operable and (3) refused to give a jury instruction on the defense of nonexclusive possession. We agree with the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress and with its denial of the motion for judgment of acquittal because of insufficient evidence of operability, but we disagree with the court in its refusal to instruct the jury on the defense of nonexclusive possession and, therefore, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. On January 26, 1999, Officer Andrew Lawrence of the Hartford police department was driving in his patrol car when he observed the defendant drive through a stop sign. Lawrence activated his lights and siren, called for backup and pursued the defendant. The defendant pulled into a driveway, got out of the car and knocked on the door or rang the doorbell of a home. Soon thereafter, the defendant walked away from the house and proceeded down the street, leaving the car in the driveway.

Lawrence did not follow the defendant. Instead, while monitoring the defendant as he was walking away, he approached the vehicle and looked through the car window. Inside, he saw a .38 semiautomatic pistol on the driver's seat. Once backup officers arrived, Lawrence pursued the defendant while the car was secured by the other officers. Lawrence caught up with the defendant, who had since rounded a street corner, and arrested him.

The state filed a two count information alleging that the defendant used a motor vehicle without the owner's permission in violation of General Statutes § 53a-119b (a) (1) and that the defendant was in criminal possession of a firearm in violation of § 53a-217 (a) (1). On May 25, 1999, the defendant filed a motion to suppress all items seized by the police. The trial court's signed oral decision on the motion to suppress focused on the issue of whether the "viewing of a weapon in plain view of the driver's seat of a vehicle [constituted] probable cause to arrest the operator of said vehicle for the crime of weapon in a motor vehicle in violation of § 29-38 of the Connecticut General Statutes." ² The court denied the motion on July 16, 1999.

At the end of the state's case, the defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal on both counts. The trial court granted the motion as to the first count of using a motor vehicle without the owner's permission, but denied the motion as to the second count of criminal possession of a handgun. On July 20, 1999, the defendant filed a request to charge the jury on the theory of nonexclusive possession, which was denied the following day by the court. The jury returned a guilty verdict on July 21, 1999. On July 29, 1999, the defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal after the verdict. The motion was denied on August 27, 1999, and judgment was rendered on the same day. The defendant appealed on September 22, 1999.

I.

The defendant first argues that the court improperly denied his motion to suppress. We disagree.

"As a preliminary matter, [o]ur standard of review of a trial court's findings and conclusions in connection with a motion to suppress is well defined. A finding of fact will not be disturbed unless it is clearly erroneous in view of the evidence and pleadings in the whole record . . . . [W]here the legal conclusions of the court are challenged, we must determine whether they are legally and logically correct and whether they find support in the facts set out in the memorandum of decision . . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Casiano, 55 Conn. App. 582, 586, 740 A.2d 435 (1999), cert. denied, 252 Conn. 942, 747 A.2d 518 (2000), quoting State v. Blackman, 246 Conn. 547, 553, 716 A.2d 101 (1998).

The defendant claims that Lawrence lacked sufficient probable cause to arrest him because Lawrence never gave consideration as to whether a valid permit had been issued to the defendant before arresting him. A similar argument was addressed by this court thirteen years ago in State v. Lizotte, 11 Conn. App. 11, 525 A.2d 971, cert. denied, 204 Conn. 806, 528 A.2d 1154 (1987). In Lizotte, the defendant was stopped by police for a motor vehicle infraction. Id., 13. During the stop, one of the officers scanned the inside of the passenger compartment with a flashlight as part of a routine search for weapons and he noticed an ammunition belt partially covered by a towel on the floor of the vehicle. Id., 14. On the basis of their suspicions that a weapon might accompany the ammunition, the police conducted a pat-down search of the defendant. Id. The police lifted the towel and discovered a fully loaded pistol. Id. The defendant was arrested and convicted for carrying a weapon in a motor vehicle. Id., 14-15.

Prior to trial, the defendant in Lizotte moved to suppress the items seized in his vehicle. This court upheld the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to suppress. We concluded that the officers' observation of the gun belt with ammunition "constituted sufficient facts or circumstances to support a reasonable belief that the defendant was also carrying a weapon in the vehicle in violation of General Statutes § 29-38 . . . ." Id., 19. This court also held that "[i]n determining whether the police officers had probable cause to arrest the defendant for carrying a weapon in a motor vehicle, we also note that probable cause may exist even without ascertaining whether the defendant had a permit to carry the weapon discovered." (Emphasis added.) Id., citing Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 148-49, 92 S. Ct. 1921, 32 L. Ed. 2d 612 (1972). Just as police in Lizotte did not have to ascertain whether the defendant had a permit for the weapon for probable cause to have existed, the police in this case also did not have to determine whether the defendant had a permit before arresting him.

"[T]o establish probable cause, it is not necessary to produce a quantum of evidence necessary to convict." State v. Cobuzzi, 161 Conn. 371, 376, 288 A.2d 439 (1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1017, 92 S. Ct. 677, 30 L. Ed. 2d 664 (1972). State v. Lizotte, supra, 11 Conn. App. 19, instructs us that police may arrest someone in possession of a weapon without determining whether the possessor has a proper permit, and we decline the defendant's invitation to depart from that precedent. Thus, we conclude that the court properly denied the defendant's motion to suppress.

II.

The defendant next argues that the court improperly denied his motion for judgment of acquittal. The defendant contends that insufficient evidence existed to show that the weapon found in the vehicle was operable. Therefore, the defendant reasons, the court improperly denied his motion for judgment of acquittal on the charge of criminal possession of a firearm in violation of General Statutes § 53a-217 (a) (1). We disagree.

"The standard of appellate review of a denial of a motion for a judgment of acquittal has been settled by judicial decision. State v. Heinz, 193 Conn. 612, 625, 480 A.2d 452 (1984). The issue to be determined is whether the jury could have reasonably concluded, from the facts established and the reasonable inferences which could be drawn from those facts, that the cumulative effect was to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Duhan, 194 Conn. 347, 355, 481 A.2d 48 (1984); State v. Heinz, supra, 625. The facts and the reasonable inferences stemming from the facts must be given a construction most favorable to sustaining the jury's verdict." State v. Candito, 4 Conn. App. 154, 156-57, 493 A.2d 250 (1985).

Additional facts are necessary to resolve this issue. When the weapon was discovered on the driver's seat of the car, it was jammed. A bullet, which had not been properly ejected, was lodged in the weapon's chamber.

Mike Gaffney, an officer with the Hartford police department's evidentiary services unit, testified that he dislodged the bullet by pulling the slide back on the gun and tapping the bottom. He also testified that it was possible for another bullet to have come up underneath the jammed bullet. Tom Wroniak, an officer with the Hartford police department's career development division's firearms training unit, testified that a jammed weapon is a temporary problem and does not necessarily render a weapon inoperable. Wroniak also successfully test-fired the weapon twice and the weapon did not jam.

Sufficient evidence was presented for the jury to determine that the weapon found was operable for purposes of § 53a-217 (a) (1). The jam in the weapon was merely temporary and could be easily fixed. Indeed, as Gaffney testified, it was possible that a second bullet could have entered the chamber underneath the jammed bullet. In a similar case where a weapon was found jammed but subsequently test-fired successfully, this court concluded that sufficient evidence existed to support a conviction on the charge of carrying a pistol without a permit in violation of General Statutes § 29-35. State v. Zayas, 3 Conn. App. 289, 299, 489 A.2d 380, cert. denied, 195 Conn. 803, 491 A.2d 1104 (...