State v. Williams
Decision Date | 06 May 2010 |
Docket Number | 14-09-00354-CR,14-09-00355-CR.,No. 14-09-00353-CR,14-09-00353-CR |
Citation | 312 S.W.3d 276 |
Parties | The STATE of Texas, Appellant, v. Lavetta Renee WILLIAMS, Appellee. |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
Jeri Yenne, Sparks P. Veasey, III, Angleton, for appellant.
James Joseph Hanley, Houston, for appellee.
Panel consists of Justices YATES, BROWN, and BOYCE.
MAJORITY OPINION
Lavetta Renee Williams was arrested on three counts of possession of a controlled substance, penalty group three less than twenty-eight grams. The arrest occurred after police discovered she was concealing prescription drugs in her bra. She filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained in the search. After reviewing all the evidence during the hearing on the motion to suppress, the trial court granted Williams's motion. We affirm.
At about 4:30 a.m. on July 29, 2008, Angleton police officer Tony Duncan pulled over a vehicle with a defective tail lamp. Four people were in the vehicle including Lavetta Renee Williams, who was seated in the rear seat behind the passenger. Officer Duncan testified that he had pulled over the same vehicle earlier that night in the same part of town. He stated that only Joseph Newman, the driver, was in the vehicle at the time of the first incident. During the first incident, Officer Duncan noticed a bottle of pills in the center console of the vehicle, but he let Newman "go with a warning."
When Officer Duncan pulled over the vehicle the second time, he noted that the bottle of pills was missing. Officer Duncan also testified that when Newman pulled over, the front-seat passenger exited the vehicle and ran into a nearby convenience store. Officer Duncan arrested Newman for possession of a controlled substance after he discovered numerous prescription pills in his pocket during a pat-down search.
Officer Duncan testified that after he made the arrest, Newman told him that Williams had a steak knife, and she was threatening to stab the other passengers. During Newman's arrest, Williams had stayed seated in the back seat of the vehicle, she did not make any sudden movements or gestures, and she never attempted to escape. Officer Duncan testified that he was familiar with Williams because she had been the subject of several narcotics complaints and had a reputation for having a violent temper.
After all the occupants were out of the vehicle, at least two other officers, including one female officer, arrived on the scene to assist Officer Duncan. Officer Duncan testified that he did not want to conduct a pat-down of Williams because she was a female. He stated that he asked Williams to "kind of reach underneath her bra and just pull it out a little bit and kind of shake it a little bit ... and maneuver it." Because Williams was relatively well-endowed—"more than average"—Officer Duncan was concerned she may have concealed the steak knife in her bra. Williams "refused, cried, and said she did not want to pull out her bra." Officer Duncan again asked Williams to shake out her bra. After the second request, Williams complied and numerous pills fell out of her bra. Officer Duncan arrested Williams for possession of a controlled substance. After she was arrested, the female officer on the scene conducted a pat-down of Williams.
Williams filed a motion to suppress the evidence of drugs in her bra, and after reviewing all the evidence at the hearing on the motion to suppress, the trial court granted the motion. The State's appeal followed.
The State contends that the trial court erred in granting Williams's motion to suppress the prescription pills that fell out of Williams's bra after she maneuvered it. Specifically, the State argues that the search was reasonable under the circumstances, Williams consented to the search, and Officer Duncan's request was less intrusive than a pat-down. Williams contends that the search exceeded the permissible scope of a pat-down, she did not voluntarily consent to the search, and Officer Duncan's request was more intrusive than a pat-down.
We generally review a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress using an abuse-of-discretion standard. Swain v. State, 181 S.W.3d 359, 365 (Tex.Crim.App.2005). During the suppression hearing, the trial court is the exclusive trier of fact and judge of the witnesses' credibility. State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex.Crim.App.2000); Mason v. State, 116 S.W.3d 248, 256 (Tex. App.-Houston 14th Dist. 2003, pet. ref'd). An appellate court affords almost total deference to the trial court's determination of historical facts supported by the record, especially when the trial court's findings are based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Johnson v. State, 68 S.W.3d 644, 652-53 (Tex.Crim.App.2002) (citing Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex.Crim.App.1997)). We afford the same amount of deference to a trial court's ruling on "application of law and facts questions" or "mixed questions of law and fact" if the resolution turns on evaluating credibility and demeanor. Johnson, 68 S.W.3d at 652; Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89. We review de novo, however, those questions of mixed law and fact not turning on credibility or demeanor. Johnson, 68 S.W.3d at 653 (citing Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89). If the trial court's ruling is reasonably supported by the record and is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case, the reviewing court must sustain it upon review. Villarreal v. State, 935 S.W.2d 134, 138 (Tex.Crim.App.1996); Flores v. State, 172 S.W.3d 742, 748 (Tex. App.-Houston 14th Dist. 2005, no pet.). This is true even if the trial court states the wrong reason for the correct decision. State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855-56 (Tex. Crim.App.2000).
The State argues that Officer Duncan did not violate Williams's Fourth Amendment rights against unlawful searches and seizures because the officer's actions were reasonable under the circumstances. Officer Duncan testified that he had a reasonable basis to believe Williams possessed a steak knife, and he was concerned for his safety. Based on this information, he requested that Williams pull her bra away from her body and maneuver it in lieu of conducting a pat-down. The State would have this court conclude that based on these facts Officer Duncan's actions are permissible under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) and its progeny. We decline to do so.
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unlawful searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. Both the U.S. Supreme Court and the Court of Criminal Appeals have held that a traffic stop is considered a Fourth Amendment seizure. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979); see Davis v. State, 947 S.W.2d 240, 243-45 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). Because traffic stops are analogous to investigative detentions, they are analyzed under the two-prong test in Terry. Green v. State, 256 S.W.3d 456, 461 (Tex.App.-Waco 2008, no pet.) (citing Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 439, 104 S.Ct. 3138). During a valid traffic stop, the driver and all of his passengers are considered seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 257-58, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007). To be a valid traffic stop, the stop must be reasonable. Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 244; see U.S. Const. amend. IV. A detention is reasonable if: (1) the police officer's actions were justified at the stop's inception; and (2) the stop was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that initially justified the stop. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20, 88 S.Ct. 1868; Kothe v. State, 152 S.W.3d 54, 63 (Tex.Crim.App.2004). Once a police officer makes a valid traffic stop and detains the suspect, the officer may further detain the suspect if he develops reasonable suspicion that another offense is being committed. Goudeau v. State, 209 S.W.3d 713, 719 (Tex.App.-Houston 14th Dist. 2006, no pet.); see Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 244.1
The State correctly argues that there may be reasonable circumstances that allow officers to search a suspect for weapons, but courts have not allowed an overly broad or unlimited search during a pat-down. See Balentine v. State, 71 S.W.3d 763, 770 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002). A valid investigative detention can give a police officer the ability to pat-down or frisk the suspect for weapons. Baldwin v. State, 278 S.W.3d 367, 371 (Tex.Crim. App.2009). Police officers may conduct a limited search for weapons of the suspect's outer clothing, even in the absence of probable cause, when an officer reasonably believes that the suspect is armed and dangerous. Balentine, 71 S.W.3d at 769; Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 329 (Tex.Crim.App.2000); see Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868.2 Courts have emphasized, however, that the protective search is not related to seizing evidence or other non-weapon contraband. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972) (); Balentine, 71 S.W.3d at 769. An officer is allowed to search a suspect for weapons only if he can point to specific and articulable facts which reasonably led him to conclude that the suspect might possess a weapon. Balentine, 71 S.W.3d at 769; Carmouche, 10 S.W.3d at 329. The officer's belief that the suspect has a weapon must be "objectively reasonable in light of the circumstances." Carmouche, 10 S.W.3d at 330. In other words, "the officer need not be absolutely certain that an individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent person would justifiably believe that he or others were in danger." Balentine, 71 S.W.3d at 769.3 Courts have stressed, however, that the permissible scope of a...
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