State v. Williams

• Decision Date: 03 May 1971
• Docket Number: No. 656--41011--41012--I,656--41011--41012--I
• Citation: 484 P.2d 1167,4 Wn.App. 908
• Parties: STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Walter L. WILLIAMS and Bernice J. Williams, and each of them, Appellants.
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals

Page 908

4 Wn.App. 908

484 P.2d 1167

STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Walter L. WILLIAMS and Bernice J. Williams, and each of them, Appellants.

No. 656--41011--41012--I.

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 1, Panel One.

May 3, 1971.

Kempton, Savage & Gossard, Anthony Savage, Jr., Seattle, Court-appointed for appellant.

Christopher T. Bayley, King County Pros. Atty., Michael P. Ruark, Deputy Pros. Atty., Seattle, for respondent.

HOROWITZ, Chief Judge.

Defendants, husband and wife, were charged by information filed October 3, 1968, with the crime of manslaughter for negligently failing to supply their 17-month child with necessary medical attention, as a result of which he died on September 12, 1968. Upon entry of findings, conclusions and judgment of guilty, sentences were imposed on April 22, 1969. Defendants appeal.

The defendant husband, Walter Williams, is a 24-year old full-blooded Sheshont Indian with a sixth-grade education. His sole occupation is that of laborer. The defendant wife, Bernice Williams, is a 20-year-old part Indian with an 11th grade education. At the time of the marriage, the wife had two children, the younger of whom was a 14-month son. Both parents worked and the children were cared for by the 85-year-old mother of the defendant husband. The defendant husband assumed parental responsibility with the defendant wife to provide clothing, care and medical attention for the child. Both defendants possessed a great deal of love and affection for the defendant wife's young son.

The court expressly found:

That both defendants were aware that William Joseph Tabafunda was ill during the period September 1, 1968 to September 12, 1968. The defendants were ignorant. They did not realize how sick the baby was. They thought that the baby had a toothache and no layman regards a toothache as dangerous to life. They loved the baby and gave it aspirin in hopes of improving its condition. They did not take the baby to a doctor because of fear that the Welfare Department would take the baby away from them. They knew that medical help was available because of previous experience. They had no excuse that the law will recognize for not taking the baby to a doctor.

The defendants Walter L. Williams and Bernice J. Williams were negligent in not seeking medical attention for William Joseph Tabafunda.

That as a proximate result of this negligence, William Joseph Tabafunda died.

Findings 5, 6 and 7. From these and other findings, the court concluded that the defendants were each guilty of the crime of manslaughter as charged.

Defendants take no exception to findings but contend that the findings do not support the conclusions that the defendants are guilty of manslaughter as charged. The contentions raise tow basic issues, (1) the existence of the duty to furnish medical aid charged by the information to be violated ¹ and the seriousness of the breach required; and (2) the issue of proximate cause, I.e., whether defendants were put on notice, in time to save the child's life, that medical care was required. Because the nature of the duty and the quality or seriousness of the breach are closely interrelated, our discussion of the first issue involved will embrace both matters.

Parental duty to provide medical care for a dependent minor child was recognized at common law and characterized as a natural duty. In re Hudson, 13 Wash.2d 673, 126 P.2d 765 (1942); White v. McDowell, 74 Wash. 44, 132 P. 734 (1913); See Commonwealth v. Breth, 44 Pa.Co.Ct.R. 56 (1915); Annot., 100 A.L.R.2d 483, §§ 6, 15(a), 15(b) (1965). In Washington, the existence of the duty is commonly assumed and is stated at times without reference to any particular statute. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Lybbert, 75 Wash.2d 671, 453 P.2d 650 (1969); In re Hudson, 13 Wash.2d 673, 693, 126 P.2d 765 (1942); In re Guardianship of Rudonick, 76 Wash.2d 117, 125, 456 P.2d 96 (1969). The existence of the duty also is assumed, but not always defined, in statutes that provide special criminal and civil sanctions for the performance of that duty. These include RCW 26.16.205, 26.20.030, 26.24.090, 26.32.140, 26.37.050 and chapter 26.21. See State v. Russell, 68 Wash.2d 748, 415 P.2d 503 (1966). Thus, RCW 26.16.205 imposes civil liability on parental property for the 'expenses of the family and education of the children.' The quoted language is broad enough to include 'necessaries,' and necessaries include necessary medical expense of dependent minor children which it is the duty of a parent to provide. On the question of the quality or seriousness of breach of the duty, at common law, in the case of involuntary manslaughter, the breach had to amount to more than mere ordinary or simple negligence--gross negligence was essential. See 1 O. Warren, Homicide § 86 at 424 (Permanent ed. 1938); R. Perkins, Criminal Law 60--61 (1957). In Washington, however, RCW 9.48.060 ² (since amended by Laws of 1970, ch. 49, § 2) and RCW 9.48.150 ³ supersede both voluntary and involuntary manslaughter as those crimes were defined at common law. Under these statutes the crime is deemed committed even though the death of the victim is the proximate result of only simple or ordinary negligence. State v. Brubaker, 62 Wash.2d 964, 385 P.2d 318 (1963); State v. Ramser, 17 Wash.2d 581, 136 P.2d 1013 (1943); State v. Hedges, 8 Wash.2d 652, 113 P.2d 530 (1941).

The concept of simple or ordinary negligence describes a failure to exercise the 'ordinary caution' necessary to make out the defense of excusable homicide. RCW 9.48.150. Ordinary caution is the kind of caution that a man of reasonable prudence would exercise under the same or similar conditions. If, therefore, the conduct of a defendant, regardless of his ignorance, good intentions and good faith, fails to measure up to the conduct required of a man of reasonable prudence, he is guilty of ordinary negligence because of his failure to use 'ordinary caution.' See State v. Hedges, Supra. If such negligence proximately causes the death of the victim, the defendant, as pointed out above, is guilty of statutory manslaughter.

In the instant case, defendants contend that the only duty to provide medical care for the infant child is the statutory duty set forth in RCW 26.20.030; that the court having concluded that the defendants were not guilty of 'willful * * * misconduct,' that no duty to furnish medical care was violated and that, accordingly, defendants are not guilty of the crime of statutory manslaughter charged in the information.

RCW 26.20.030(1)(b) makes it a felony for a person who 'willfully omits, without lawful excuse, to furnish necessary * * * medical attendance for his or her child * * *.' The words 'willfully omits' are, as pointed out in State v. Russell, 73 Wash.2d 903, 907--908, 442 P.2d 988 (1968), used in two senses, namely, (1) 'an act or omission done intentionally * * *' or (2) when used in statutes making nonsupport a crime, 'an absence of lawful excuse or justification on the part of the accused parent.' It was further pointed out that, by reason of RCW 26.20.080, the state meets its burden of proving willfulness and absence of lawful excuse on a prima facie basis when the evidence, directly or circumstantially, reveals a failure on the part of a physically or vocationally able parent to furnish the required medical attendance. Hence, RCW 26.20.030 is presumptively violated either because a defendant intentionally omits to furnish necessary medical care, or omits so to do without lawful excuse.

Defendants' contention misconceives the significance of the words 'willful * * * misconduct' contained in the conclusions because of defendants' failure to recognize that 'willful' is a phrase of double meaning. The presumption of correctness that attends judgments of the trial court is necessarily predicated upon the subordinate presumption of the correctness of findings and conclusions. To give proper effect to this presumption requires that findings, whether or not containing a conclusion of law, and conclusions of law be reconciled if reasonably possible. Such a reconciliation is entirely possible in the instant case by a proper interpretation of the phrase 'willful * * * misconduct.' Since the trial court expressly found that the defendants 'had no excuse that the law will recognize for not taking the baby to a doctor,' it is reasonable to conclude that the phrase 'willful * * * misconduct,' contained in the conclusion, merely means intentional misconduct. The conclusion, in light of the findings, means merely that the conduct, although not intentional, was without lawful excuse and therefore willful in the second sense. State v. Russell, 73 Wash.2d 903, 442 P.2d 988 (1968); State v. McCarty, 76 Wash.2d 328, 456 P.2d 350 (1969); State v. Ozanne, 75 Wash.2d 546, 452 P.2d 745 (1969). Even if it is assumed that the information charging the crime of manslaughter relied upon a violation of RCW 26.20.030(1)(b), the conviction must stand since the findings and supporting evidence are sufficient to support the conclusion that, in the second sense of the term, the defendants willfully violated the duty owing their deceased child.

Furthermore, the significance of the words 'willful * * * misconduct' contained in the conclusion is overstated. If it be assumed that RCW 26.20.030(1)(b) can be said to create a duty to furnish medical care otherwise not existing, as distinguished from a mere statement of a condition precedent to the imposition of a criminal sanction, then a duty may be said to exist even if the conditions permitting imposition of the criminal sanction do not. See State v. Parmenter, 74 Wash.2d 343, 444 P.2d 680 (1968). Hence, a conclusion that defendants' conduct was not willful does not mean that the duty has not been violated. It merely means that the special sanction of RCW 26.20.030(1) (b) cannot be invoked.

We need not, however, rest our decision solely on the above mentioned...