State v. Wilson

• Decision Date: 18 March 2011
• Docket Number: No. 06–10–00188–CR.,06–10–00188–CR.
• Citation: 337 S.W.3d 289
• Parties: The STATE of Texas, Appellant,v.Jamie Lea WILSON, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

337 S.W.3d 289

The STATE of Texas, Appellant,

v.Jamie Lea WILSON, Appellee.

No. 06–10–00188–CR.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Texarkana.

Submitted: March 9, 2011.Decided: March 18, 2011.

Noble D. Walker, Jr., Dist. Atty., G. Calvin Grogan V., Asst. Dist. Atty., Greenville, for appellant.Toby C. Wilkinson, Greenville, for appellee.Before MORRISS, C.J., CARTER and MOSELEY, JJ.

OPINION

Opinion by Justice CARTER.

The State appeals ¹ the trial court's ruling granting a motion to suppress filed by Jamie Lea Wilson after her arrest for possession of methamphetamine in an amount of four or more but less than 200 grams. We affirm the trial court's ruling.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Officer Stephen Brownlow was contacted “regarding a tip involving drug activity.” Over the telephone, an informant revealed that “there would be a gold, Chevy Blazer expected eastbound on Highway 66 within 15 minutes of [when] we receive[d the] information, and there would be two females in the vehicle and that they would be carrying about four ounces of methamphetamine.”

Brownlow located a gold Chevy Blazer and “followed it through town” for approximately five minutes. No traffic or other violation was committed. The vehicle pulled into the driveway of a private residence behind a local church and parked in front of another vehicle. Brownlow turned on the patrol car lights as the Blazer came to a stop. Jennifer Rossignol was driving the Blazer while carrying passenger Wilson. Brownlow testified that “when I stopped the vehicle, the driver got out” and “tried to walk over to the house. I told her to stop and come back to the vehicle.” Rossignol's driver's license was expired.

Brownlow testified Wilson “was reaching down—she turned away from the patrol—from us and our view, the front of her body was facing away, and she was digging down in her pants like this like she was either stuffing, reaching, or scratching something. So immediately suspicious.” Fearing Wilson might have a weapon, Brownlow instructed her to “get her hands out of her pants.” When she turned around, Brownlow observed “a cylindrical shaped object on the side of her leg.” Prior to the commencement of a pat-down search, Wilson voluntarily retrieved methamphetamine from her pants. She was arrested for possession of methamphetamine.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review the trial court's decision to grant Wilson's motion to suppress evidence by applying a bifurcated standard of review. Graves v. State, 307 S.W.3d 483, 489 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2010, pet. ref'd); Rogers v. State, 291 S.W.3d 148, 151 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2009, pet. ref'd).

Because the trial court is the exclusive trier of fact and judge of witness credibility at a suppression hearing, we afford almost total deference to its determination of facts supported by the record. State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 856–57 (Tex.Crim.App.2000); Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex.Crim.App.2000); Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). We also afford such deference to a trial court's ruling on application of law to fact questions, also known as mixed questions of law and fact, if the resolution of those questions turns on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Villarreal v. State, 935 S.W.2d 134, 138 (Tex.Crim.App.1996).

While we defer to the trial court on its determination of historical facts and credibility, we review de novo its application of the law and determination on questions not turning on credibility. Carmouche, 10 S.W.3d at 332; Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89; Graves, 307 S.W.3d at 489. Since all evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, we are obligated to uphold the granting of Wilson's motion to suppress if it was supported by the record and was correct under any theory of law applicable to the case. Carmouche, 10 S.W.3d at 328; State v. Ballard, 987 S.W.2d 889, 891 (Tex.Crim.App.1999).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Burden of Proof

When a defendant seeks to suppress evidence on the basis of an illegal search or seizure, the burden of proof is placed initially upon the defendant. Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 492 (Tex.Crim.App.2005). A defendant meets the initial burden of proof by establishing that a search or seizure occurred without a warrant, shifting the burden of proof to the State. Id. If the State is unable to produce evidence of a warrant, it must prove the reasonableness of the search or seizure. Id. Here, the suppression hearing began with the State stipulating this case involved a warrantless arrest. This stipulation shifted the burden of proof to the State. See id.

B. Brownlow's Seizure of Wilson Was an Investigative Detention

The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals recognizes three categories of interactions between police officers and citizens: arrests, investigative detentions, and encounters. State v. Perez, 85 S.W.3d 817, 819 (Tex.Crim.App.2002). Citing State v. Priddy, the State argues that Brownlow's interaction with Wilson was an encounter which did not require probable cause or reasonable suspicion. 321 S.W.3d 82, 87 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2010, pet. ref'd). In Priddy, our sister court correctly stated that during encounters, “[l]aw enforcement officers are permitted to approach individuals without probable cause or reasonable suspicion” because although “[s]uch interactions may involve inconvenience or embarrassment ... they do not involve official coercion.” Id. (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497–98, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983); State v. Garcia–Cantu, 253 S.W.3d 236, 243 (Tex.Crim.App.2008); State v. Velasquez, 994 S.W.2d 676, 678 (Tex.Crim.App.1999)).

The lack of requirement for probable cause or reasonable suspicion is premised on the theory that “[u]nlike an investigative detention or an arrest—each a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes—an encounter is a consensual interaction, which the citizen may terminate at any time.” Id. at 86 (citing Gurrola v. State, 877 S.W.2d 300, 302–03 (Tex.Crim.App.1994)). “So long as the citizen remains free to disregard the officer's questions and go about his or her business, the encounter is consensual and merits no further constitutional analysis.” Id. (citing California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991); Johnson v. State, 912 S.W.2d 227, 235 (Tex.Crim.App.1995)). The test also has been stated that “in order to determine whether a particular encounter constitutes a seizure, a court must consider all the circumstances surrounding the encounter to determine whether the police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that the person was not free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.” Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991).

The facts of this case do not indicate a consensual encounter. Brownlow had been driving behind the Blazer for approximately five minutes before he followed it into the driveway of a private residence. He turned on his patrol car lights as the vehicle came to a stop. When the driver of the vehicle exited the Blazer and began walking toward the house, Brownlow “told her to stop and come back to the vehicle.” This command, by the uniformed officer given after initiation of patrol car lights, would communicate to reasonable persons that they were not free to decline the officer's requests or otherwise terminate the encounter. Therefore, Brownlow's seizure of Wilson implicated Fourth Amendment protections.

C. Reasonable Suspicion Was Required

The Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. This prohibition extends to “brief investigatory stops such as the stop of [a] vehicle.” United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981); see Corbin v. State, 85 S.W.3d 272, 276 (Tex.Crim.App.2002).

Law enforcement officers may stop and briefly detain persons suspected of criminal activity on less information than is constitutionally required for probable cause to arrest. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). To initiate an investigative stop, the officer must possess a reasonable suspicion based on specific, articulable facts that in light of the officer's experience and general knowledge, would lead the officer to the reasonable conclusion that criminal activity is underway and the detained person is connected to the activity. Garcia v. State, 43 S.W.3d 527, 530 (Tex.Crim.App.2001). Such a stop must be objectively reasonable in light of the particular circumstances of the case. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 411, 117 S.Ct. 882, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997); Terry, 392 U.S. at 21–22, 88 S.Ct. 1868; Corbin, 85 S.W.3d at 276. Reasonableness depends on “a balance between the public interest and the individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law enforcement.” Corbin, 85 S.W.3d at 276 (quoting Wilson, 519 U.S. at 411, 117 S.Ct. 882).

D. The Investigative Detention Without Reasonable Suspicion Was Unreasonable

1. The Anonymous Tip

An investigative stop need not be based on personal observation, but may be based on an informant's tip that bears sufficient “indicia of reliability” to justify a stop. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972). The State argues Brownlow's detention was reasonable given the informant's tip.

An anonymous telephone call rarely will, standing alone, establish the requisite level of reasonable suspicion because “an anonymous tip alone seldom demonstrates the informant's basis of knowledge or veracity.” Gilmore v. State, 323 S.W.3d 250, 258 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2010, pet. ref'd) (citing Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990); Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 270, 120 S.Ct. 1375, 146 L.Ed.2d 254 (2000)).

After a hearing, the trial court granted the motion to suppress the evidence found as a result of the search. The trial court was in the...