State v. Wilson
| Decision Date | 23 May 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. 2005-2186.,2005-2186. |
| Citation | 865 N.E.2d 1264,113 Ohio St.3d 382,2007 Ohio 2202 |
| Parties | The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. WILSON, Appellant. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Mary H. McGrath, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Robert L. Tobik, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and John T. Martin, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
{¶ 1} In this case, the court of appeals held that the trial court's determination that the defendant is not a sexual predator was against the manifest weight of the evidence. We find that the court of appeals erred because it did not apply the civil manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard of review. Accordingly, we reverse.
{¶ 2} Appellant, Ralph Wilson, has a criminal history that goes back to 1966, when he was convicted, at the age of 17, of possession of a weapon. He was sentenced to three years' probation and fined $50.
{¶ 3} In July 1974, a jury convicted Wilson of attempted felonious assault. The court suspended Wilson's prison sentence and imposed three years of probation.
{¶ 4} Between March 31, 1976, and January 5, 1977, Wilson raped four women. On July 5, 1977, Wilson was convicted of the March rape. The court sentenced Wilson to seven to 25 years in prison. Subsequently, he pleaded guilty to the three other rape charges. The court imposed a seven-to-25-year sentence for each, to be served concurrently with his sentence in the first rape case.
{¶ 5} In 1987, the state paroled Wilson. In 1988, the state charged Wilson with driving under the influence, and he spent three days in jail. In 1990, the state incarcerated Wilson for a parole violation and he was released in 1991. After his release, Wilson got married.
{¶ 6} In early 1992, Wilson pleaded guilty to grand theft and breaking and entering. Wilson was incarcerated until 2001.
{¶ 7} On August 11, 1999, appellee, the state of Ohio, filed a motion requesting the trial court to find that Wilson is a sexual predator under R.C. Chapter 2950. After numerous court proceedings that are not material to our decision, the trial court commenced a sex-offender-classification hearing on March 11, 2004. The hearing took place over four days. On July 21, 2004, the trial court found that Wilson is not a sexual predator, but because Wilson had been convicted of a sexually oriented offense as defined in R.C. 2950.01(D), he was automatically classified as a sexually oriented offender. See State v. Hayden, 96 Ohio St.3d 211, 2002-Ohio-4169, 773 N.E.2d 502, ¶ 18. Wilson has been free since 2001, and he is still married.
{¶ 8} The court of appeals held that the trial court's determination that Wilson is not a sexual predator was against the manifest weight of the evidence. The court of appeals held that the evidence proved that Wilson is a habitual sex offender and a sexual predator.
{¶ 9} This cause is now before this court pursuant to our acceptance of Wilson's discretionary appeal.
{¶ 10} Wilson does not challenge the court of appeals' determination that he is a habitual sex offender. However, he does challenge the court of appeals' determination that he is a sexual predator. Wilson alleges that the court of appeals erred by not applying the "clearly erroneous" standard of review.
{¶ 11} In order to put in the proper context our analysis as to whether the court of appeals applied the proper standard of review, we first review R.C. Chapter 2950 as it was in August 1999, when Wilson was incarcerated and the state filed its motion to have Wilson classified as a sexual predator.
{¶ 12} In August 1999, Ohio defined three categories of sexual offenders. They were, starting with the category containing those offenders who are least likely to reoffend, (1) sexually oriented offenders, (2) habitual sex offenders, and (3) sexual predators. Former R.C. 2950.01(B), (D), and (E), Am.Sub.H.B. No. 565, 147 Ohio Laws, Part II, 4493, 4521; State v. Williams (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 513, 518, 728 N.E.2d 342.
{¶ 13} A "sexually oriented offender" is a person "who has committed a `sexually oriented offense' as defined in R.C. 2950.01(D), and does not meet the definition of either a habitual sex offender or sexual predator." Williams at 519, 728 N.E.2d 342.
{¶ 14} A "habitual sex offender" is a person who has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a sexually oriented offense and who previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to one or more sexually oriented offenses. R.C. 2950.01(B); Williams at 518, 728 N.E.2d 342.
{¶ 15} Finally, a "sexual predator" is a person who has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to committing a sexually oriented offense and is likely to engage in the future in one or more sexually oriented offenses. R.C. 2950.01(E); Williams at 518-519, 728 N.E.2d 342.
{¶ 16} If a defendant has been convicted of a sexually oriented offense and the trial court determines that the offender is not a habitual sex offender or a sexual predator, then the designation of "sexually oriented offender" attaches as a matter of law. State v. Hayden, 96 Ohio St.3d 211, 2002-Ohio-4169, 773 N.E.2d 502, ¶ 18.
{¶ 17} An offender in any of the three categories must register with his or her local sheriff and provide certain personal information, including his or her home address. R.C. 2950.04; State v. Cook (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 404, 408, 700 N.E.2d 570. "Registration * * * allows law enforcement officials to remain vigilant against possible recidivism by offenders." Id. at 417, 700 N.E.2d 570.
{¶ 18} The sheriff must notify certain persons in the community regarding a sex offender's registration. R.C. 2950.11. The purpose of the notification is to place the public on notice, thereby permitting them to develop plans to protect themselves against possible recidivism.
{¶ 19} R.C. 2950.09(B)(3) lists ten factors for a court to consider in determining whether a sexual offender is a sexual predator.1 However, a court has discretion to determine what weight, if any, it will assign to each factor, and under R.C. 2950.09(B)(3)(j) may consider other "characteristics that contribute to the offender's conduct." State v. Thompson (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 584, 752 N.E.2d 276, paragraph one of the syllabus.
{¶ 20} The state must prove that an offender is a sexual predator by clear and convincing evidence. R.C. 2950.09(B)(4). Clear and convincing evidence is evidence that "will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established." Cross v. Ledford (1954), 161 Ohio St. 469, 53 O.O. 361, 120 N.E.2d 118, paragraph three of the syllabus. To meet the clear-and-convincing standard requires a higher degree of proof than "a preponderance of the evidence," but less than "evidence beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Ingram (1992), 82 Ohio App.3d 341, 346, 612 N.E.2d 454.
{¶ 21} Wilson alleges that the court of appeals erred when it failed to apply the "clearly erroneous" standard of review. Wilson asserts that a judge's determination is clearly erroneous if it is "totally lacking in any competent and credible supportive evidence." Wilson relies primarily upon two Ninth District Court of Appeals cases for his assertion that the "clearly erroneous" standard is the proper standard to apply in this case: State v. Unrue, Summit App. No. 21105, 2002-Ohio-7002, 2002 WL 31829077, ¶ 6; and Spinetti v. Spinetti (Mar. 14, 2001), Summit App. No. 20113, 2001 WL 251348. The court in Unrue stated, (Emphasis added.) Unrue, 2002-Ohio-7002, 2002 WL 31829077, ¶ 6. The language "some competent, credible evidence" is the same language this court used in C.E. Morris Co. v. Foley Constr. Co. (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 279, 8 O.O.3d 261, 376 N.E.2d 578, syllabus, to explain the civil manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard. In fact, the court in Unrue later makes clear that the Ninth District merely refers to the "some competent, credible evidence" standard of review as the "clearly erroneous" standard of review. Id. Thus, we find that the "clearly erroneous" standard of review espoused by Wilson as adopted by the Ninth District Court of Appeals equates to the civil manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard defined in C.E. Morris Co.
{¶ 22} The state also argues that we should adopt the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard as defined in C.E. Morris Co.
{¶ 23} We previously applied a manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard in evaluating a trial court's sex-offender-classification determination. State v. Cook, 83 Ohio St.3d at 426, 700 N.E.2d 570. However, in Cook, we did not specify whether we were applying the civil or criminal manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard, and consequently, some courts of appeals apply the civil standard, and others apply the criminal standard. See State v. Morrison (Sept. 20, 2001), 10th Dist. No. 01AP-66, 2001 WL 1098086. We will now examine the two standards.
{¶ 24} As mentioned previously, the civil manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard was explained in C.E. Morris Co. v. Foley Constr. Co., 54 Ohio St.2d 279, 8 O.O.3d 261, 376 N.E.2d 578, syllabus ("Judgments supported by some competent, credible evidence going to all the essential elements of the case will not be reversed by a reviewing court as being against the manifest weight of the evidence"). We have also recognized when reviewing a judgment under a manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard, a court has an obligation to presume that the findings of the...
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