State v. Witt
| Citation | 310 Minn. 211,245 N.W.2d 612 |
| Decision Date | 03 September 1976 |
| Docket Number | No. 45197,45197 |
| Parties | STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Thomas E. WITT, Appellant. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Minnesota (US) |
Syllabus by the Court
1. The evidence is sufficient to sustain the jury's verdict of guilty of kidnapping and aggravated rape.
2. While the pretrial identification procedures employed by the police in this case were questionable, there is not a sufficient basis for excluding complainant's incourt identification of defendant based upon independent foundation in complainant's observations during the crime, and untainted by the pretrial identification procedures. The pretrial identification procedures did not create a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misdentification.
3. The former aggravated rape statute, Minn.St.1974, § 609.291, did not deprive defendant of the equal protection of the laws. The former statutes governing sexual offenses did not create classifications based upon gender per se, nor did they prescribe different punishments for the same acts. Rather, these statutes represented permissible exercises by the legislature of its broad discretion to define crimes and punishments, and its power to selectively deal with those acts which it deems to pose the most significant harms to society.
C. Paul Jones, Public Defender, Rosalie E. Wahl, Asst. Public Defender, Minneapolis, for appellant.
Warren Spannaus, Atty. Gen., Peter W. Sipkins, Sol. Gen., Richard B. Allyn, Asst. Atty. Gen., Gary Hansen, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Paul, DeWayne P. Mattson, County Atty., Rochester, for respondent.
Heard before ROGOSHESKE, TODD, and BREUNIG, JJ., and considered and decided by the court en banc.
Defendant, Thomas E. Witt (Witt), appeals from a judgment of the district court entered pursuant to the verdict of a jury finding defendant guilty of kidnapping and aggravated rape. He was sentenced to the maximum term of 30 years on the aggravated rape conviction. Witt contends that the aggravated rape statute pursuant to which he was convicted and sentenced (since repealed) denied him equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution; that complainant's in-court identification of him was improperly admitted since it was based on constitutionally defective pretrial identification procedures; and that the evidence does not sustain the verdict. We affirm.
The issues raised on this appeal do not require a detailed statement of the facts except as they pertain to the pretrial identification procedures. The complainant in this case reported the rape to the police shortly after it occurred. Based on information which she provided and their investigation, police suspicion had focused on Witt by the day following the rape. On that day, the complainant went to the police station where she was shown a display of eight photographs, one of which was of defendant. She could not identify any photo in the display as that of her assailant. Five days later, following notification to Witt's attorney, a lineup consisting of Witt and five other men was held. At this time, the complainant identified Witt, whose counsel was present throughout, as the man who had attacked her. During the trial the complainant made an in-court identification of Witt and testified that she did not recall having been showing the display of the eight photographs the day following the rape.
1. With respect to Witt's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict, we have carefully reviewed the entire record and find this claim to be without merit.
2. The record further satisfies this court that the in-court identification was independent of any prior improper confrontation. The complainant had more than ample opportunity to observe her assailant during the crime, and her description immediately after the assault substantially portrays the defendant, Witt. State v. Hayes, 292 Minn. 399, 195 N.W.2d 555 (1972); State v. Watts, 296 Minn. 354, 208 N.W.2d 748 (1973). Although we conclude that the pretrial identification procedures employed by the police in this case did not create a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification, see Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198, 93 S.Ct. 375, 381, 34 L.Ed.2d 401, 410 (1972), we do not condone these unnecessarily suggestive procedures. If suspicion has focused on a particular individual and his picture is shown to the complainant along with others but the complainant does not identify the picture, a subsequent lineup, even though otherwise proper, is open to question when the individual is the only person in the lineup whose picture has recently been shown to the complainant. It would be a better practice in such a situation to eliminate the use of photos and proceed directly to the lineup, or to include in the group of pictures shown at least one or more pictures of persons other than the suspect who also subsequently appear in the lineup.
3. With raises an equal protection challenge to Minn.St.1974, § 609.291, 1 our former aggravated rape statute, on the ground that it singles out for prosecution males who engage in illegal sexual intercourse with females--a particular type of sexual penetration--and subjects them to a maximum 30-year sentence, whereas males or females who illegally commit other types of sexual penetration can only be prosecuted under other less onerous criminal statutes.
Initially, we note that the statutory scheme governing criminal sexual conduct in Minnesota was completely revised by L.1975, c. 374, and Witt concedes that he would have no equal protection challenge to the new statute, since the language of which he now complains was specifically eliminated therefrom. As of August 1, 1975, a member of either sex can be prosecuted for committing any illegal act of sexual penetration (as statutorily defined) upon a member of either sex.
If we accepted Witt's premise that under the former statute he suffered a greater penalty specifically Because of his gender, we would be greatly troubled by his equal protection argument. However, we are convinced that the former Minnesota statutes defining and specifying punishments for various acts of sexual conduct did not create classifications based upon gender per se. Rather, those classifications were based upon legislative judgments as to the degree of harm posed to victims and to society as a whole by particular sexual acts, and as to the severity of penalty necessary to accomplish punishment, deterrence, or other social goals with regard to each such act.
State legislatures possess broad discretion to define criminal offenses and prescribe penalties therefor. Our criminal statutes are replete with legislative designations of varying degrees of the same criminal offense, each carrying a varying penalty. See, 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 564:
'* * * The legislature * * * in prescribing and fixing punishment for crime has a great latitude of discretion in classifying the same with reference to the heinousness and gravity of the act or acts constituting the crime, and * * * the legislature may, without violating the equal protection clause, establish different punishments in different parts of the state, under different conditions, for the same offense, or different punishments for different degrees of the same offense; or it may provide a special punishment for a special class of offenders, such as guardians, minors, convicts, and for habitual offenders * * *.'
The sole limitation which the equal protection clause imposes upon the legislature in the exercise of this power is that criminal statutes must not prescribe different punishments 'for the same acts committed under the same circumstances by persons in like situation.' Id. See, State v. Pehrson, 205 Minn. 573, 287 N.W. 313 (1939). We are not convinced that the former statutes defining rape and other criminal sexual offenses prescribed different punishments for 'the same acts.'
It should be noted that if 'great bodily harm' was inflicted during the commission of a sex crime other than rape, the assailant (whether male or female) would be subject to a 10-year, as opposed to a 4-year, maximum sentence pursuant to the former indecent liberties statute, Minn.St.1974, § 609.296. Moreover, rape unattended by force or the other aggravating circumstances specified under Minn.St.1974, § 609.291, subjected the perpetrator to a maximum sentence of only 10 years, as opposed to the 30-year maximum for aggravated rape. Similarly, Minn.St.1974, § 609.293,...
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...criminal acts, and may select those acts which it believes pose the most significant societal problems. State v. Witt, 310 Minn. 211, 215, 217, 245 N.W.2d 612, 615, 617 (1976). The sole limitation which the equal protection clause imposes upon the legislature in the exercise of this power i......
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State v. Rivera
...Cowan, 560 F.2d 1298, 1303 (6th Cir. 1977) cert. denied, 435 U.S. 929, 98 S.Ct. 1500, 55 L.Ed.2d 525 (1978); State v. Witt, 310 Minn. 211, 218-219, 245 N.W.2d 612, 616-617 (1976); State v. Craig, 169 Mont. 150, 157, 545 P.2d 649, 653 (1976). The legislature chose to selectively deal with th......
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