State v. Wright
Decision Date | 17 May 2000 |
Citation | 167 Or. App. 297,999 P.2d 1220 |
Parties | STATE of Oregon, Appellant, v. Keith Dee WRIGHT, Respondent. |
Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
Ann Kelley, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for appellant. With her on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor General.
Elizabeth A. Baldwin, Astoria, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent.
Before De MUNIZ, Presiding Judge, and HASELTON and WOLLHEIM, Judges.
The state appeals from an order sustaining a demurrer to an indictment as being insufficiently definite and certain. ORS 135.630(2); ORS 132.550(7).1 We conclude that order is appealable under ORS 138.060(1), and reverse.
Defendant was charged by a six-count indictment, which alleged as pertinent:
Defendant demurrered to those counts on two alternative grounds. First, defendant asserted that "the facts stated do not constitute an offense," ORS 135.630(4), because they did not allege "any acts on the part of the defendant." Second, defendant asserted that those counts were not definite and certain in that they failed to set out "the acts constituting the offense in ordinary and concise language." ORS 132.550(7). See ORS 135.630(2). The state responded that the challenged counts were sufficient in both respects in that they pleaded the offenses in the language of the underlying statutes and that, to the extent that the indictment did not describe defendant's conduct with particularity, that was a matter properly addressed through pretrial discovery. The state particularly invoked our holdings in State v. Strandquist, 57 Or.App. 404, 644 P.2d 658, rev. den. 293 Or. 483, 650 P.2d 928 (1982), and State v. Caffee, 116 Or.App. 23, 840 P.2d 720 (1992), rev. den. 315 Or. 312, 846 P.2d 1161 (1993).
The trial court denied defendant's demurrer that counts 3, 4, and 5 failed to allege the essential elements of the offenses. However, the court allowed defendant's demurrer that those counts were not sufficiently definite and certain:
The court then entered an "Order on Defendant's Demurrer," allowing the demurrer and granting the state leave to resubmit the case to the grand jury. The state opted not to resubmit to the grand jury, and appeals from that order.
At the outset, we must address a jurisdictional issue. Defendant contends that the state cannot appeal from a pretrial order sustaining a demurrer under ORS 135.630(2)—and, particularly, that such an appeal is not authorized by ORS 138.060(1). We disagree. See State v. Robertson, 293 Or. 402, 404-07, 649 P.2d 569 (1982).
ORS 138.060(1) provides that the state may appeal "[a]n order made prior to trial dismissing or setting aside the accusatory instrument." In Robertson, the court considered the scope of that provision and, particularly, whether it encompassed "`orders' sustaining demurrers whether or not they are identified as judgments, as prescribed in ORS 135.660."2293 Or. at 407,649 P.2d 569. The court canvassed the evolution of the statute, id. at 406-07, 649 P.2d 569, and concluded that, based on the legislative history, ORS 135.660(1) was not limited "literally" to appeals of orders of dismissal under ORS 135.4703 and orders setting aside indictments under ORS 135.510.4 Rather, the statute was intended to broadly encompass orders sustaining demurrers that formerly would not have been reviewable in the absence of a subsequent judgment of dismissal. 293 Or. at 406-07,649 P.2d 569 ( ).
Thus, the court concluded that "because the purpose of the [statutory] amendments was to broaden the state's ability to appeal orders that invalidate accusatory instruments, the court may take jurisdiction of such appeals from `orders' sustaining demurrers whether or not they are identified as judgments, as prescribed in ORS 135.660." 293 Or. at 407, 649 P.2d 569.
Under the rule of prior construction, see Stephens v. Bohlman, 314 Or. 344, 350 n. 6, 838 P.2d 600 (1992), that holding is incorporated into the statute. See also State v. Parker, 299 Or. 534, 538-39, 704 P.2d 1144 (1985) ( )(applying Robertson).
Defendant argues, nevertheless, that Robertson is not dispositive because the demurrer there was based on ORS 135.630(4) and, particularly, asserted that the indictment did not allege a crime because the underlying coercion statute was unconstitutionally vague. Defendant's argument, as we understand it, is that Robertson's jurisdictional holding goes only to orders sustaining demurrers under subsection (4), and not to ORS 135.630 generally. Nothing in Robertson suggests such a limitation.5 To the contrary, Robertson's holding is unqualified. Accordingly, the trial court's order sustaining the demurrer under ORS 135.630(2) is appealable.
Turning to the merits, ORS 135.630 provides, in part:
ORS 132.550 provides, in part:
The state argues, as it did to the trial court, that the indictment was sufficiently definite and certain. The state invokes the well-established principle that, in general, "an indictment in the language of [the] statute" is sufficient to withstand a demurrer. E.g., State v. Nussbaum, 261 Or. 87, 91, 491 P.2d 1013 (1971); State v. Bockorny, 125 Or.App. 479, 483, 866 P.2d 1230 (1993),on recons. 126 Or.App. 504, 869 P.2d 349, rev. den. 319 Or. 150, 877 P.2d 87 (1994). Indeed, the state asserts, there is no case in which an indictment alleged in the language of the underlying statute has been deemed insufficient under ORS 135.630(4) as failing to state facts sufficient to constitute an offense.
Defendant responds that "sufficiency" under subsection (4) and "definiteness and certainty" under subsection (2) and ORS 132.550(7) are distinct concepts and distinct requirements—generally analogous in the civil context to the bases for a motion to dismiss for "failure to state ultimate facts sufficient to constitute a claim," ORCP 21 A(8), and a motion to make more definite and certain under ORCP 21 D. Thus, defendant reasons, an indictment's "sufficiency" for purposes of subsection (4) does not determine whether it is adequately definite and certain to withstand a demurrer under subsection (2). Rather, defendant asserts, the analysis under subsection (2) and ORS 132.550(7) is more specific and rigorous, see, e.g., State v. Sanders, 280 Or. 685, 572 P.2d 1307 (1977), and, under Sanders and related cases, the three challenged counts here are fatally inadequate because they fail to allege defendant's conduct with specificity.6 As amplified below, we agree with defendant and the trial court that an indictment that satisfies subsection (4) may nevertheless be inadequate under subsection (2) and ORS 132.550(7). However, we conclude that the three challenged counts here were, in fact, sufficiently definite and certain to withstand demurrer under subsection (2) and ORS 132.550(7). See, e.g., Caffee, 116 Or.App. 23, 840 P.2d 720; Strandquist, 57 Or.App. 404, 644 P.2d 658; State v....
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