State v. Wright, 43030
| Decision Date | 12 December 1974 |
| Docket Number | No. 43030,43030 |
| Citation | 529 P.2d 453,84 Wn.2d 645 |
| Parties | STATE of Washington, Appellant, v. WRIGHT et al., Respondents. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
L. Edward Brown, Pros. Atty., Curtis M. Janhunen, Montesano, Slade Gorton, Atty. Gen., Darrel L. Peeples, Asst. Atty. Gen., Olympia, for appellant.
John M. Wolfe, Aberdeen, for respondents.
The State appeals from a dismissal of misdemeanor charges against the defendants arising out of driving their automobiles on portions of ocean beach contrary to an administrative regulation prohibiting such traffic. The issue presented is whether or not the Washington State Parks and Recreation Commission (hereinafter Commission), acting pursuant to the seashore conservation area act, RCW 43.51.650--43.51.685, and by way of WAC 352--36-- 040, may prohibit vehicular traffic at specified times on designated ocean beaches.
The trial court, in dismissing the charges, held the Commission lacked statutory authority to promulgate the prohibitions contained in WAC 352--36--040. We disagree and reverse.
The legislative background and facts are not in dispute. By way of Laws of 1935, ch. 54, § 1, p. 141, Laws of 1901, ch. 105, § 1, p. 217, and Laws of 1901, ch. 110, § 2, p. 225, codified respectively as RCW 79.16.130, 1 79.16.160, 2 and 79.16.170, 3 the legislature declared certain Pacific Ocean shores and beaches, including the beach area here involved, to be 'public highway(s) forever and as such highway(s) shall remain forever open to the use of the public.' Thereafter, by Laws of 1951, ch. 271, § 46, p. 912, and Laws of 1961, ch. 12, § 46.08.180, p. 252, 4 originally codified as RCW 46.08.180, the legislature placed authority to regulate and control traffic on and along the designated ocean beach highways in law enforcement officials of the county, state, and fish and game departments. Subsequently, in Laws of 1963, ch. 212, § 1, p. 1058, codified as RCW 79.16.172, 5 the legislature declared that the portion of the named ocean beach highways lying between the lines of vegetation and mean high tide be public recreational areas and as such to be forever reserved for public use. Finally, for our purposes here, the legislature, by Laws of 1967, ch. 120, p. 559, Laws of 1969, 1st Ex.Sess., ch. 55, p. 660, codified as RCW 43.51.650 through 43.51.685, enacted the seashore conservation area act with administrative jurisdiction over the area involved placed in the Commission. The principles fostering this enactment were stated by the legislature to be:
The beaches bounding the Pacific Ocean from the Straits of Juan de Fuca to Cape Disappointment at the mouth of the Columbia River constitute some of the last unspoiled seashore remaining in the United States. They provide the public with almost unlimited opportunities for recreational activities, like swimming, surfing and hiking; for outdoor sports, like hunting, fishing, clamming, and boating; for the observation of nature as it existed for hundreds of years before the arrival of white men; and for relaxation away from the pressures and tensions of modern life. In past years, these recreational activities have been enjoyed by countless Washington citizens, as well as by tourists from other states and countries. The number of people wishing to participate in such recreational activities grows annually. This increasing public pressure makes it necessary that the state dedicate the use of the ocean beaches to public recreation and to provide certain recreational and sanitary facilities. Nonrecreational use of the beach must be strictly limited. Even recreational uses must be regulated in order that Washington's unrivaled seashore may be saved for our children in much the same form as we know it today.
The guidelines to be followed by the Commission in administering the enactment were legislatively stated as follows:
The Washington state parks and recreation commission shall administer the Washington State Seashore Conservation Area in harmony with the broad principles set forth in RCW 43.51.650. Where feasible, the area shall be preserved in its present state; everywhere it shall be maintained in the best possible condition for public use. All forms of public outdoor recreation shall be permitted and encouraged in the area, unless specifically excluded or limited by the commission. While the primary purpose in the establishment of the area is to preserve the coastal beaches for public recreation, other uses shall be allowed as provided in RCW 43.51.650 through 43.51.685, or when found not inconsistent with public recreational use by the Washington state parks and recreation commission.
RCW 46.08.180, relating to traffic control on the ocean beach highways, was redesignated as RCW 43.51.680, and amended to read:
For the protection and conservation of natural resources, and for the safety and enjoyment of the public using the beaches, the Washington state parks and recreation commission, after agreement with the Washington state highway commission, shall establish reasonable regulations for the use and control of vehicular traffic on and along the ocean beach highways as designated and established under RCW 79.16.130, 79.16.160, and 79.16.170. The Washington state parks and recreation commission shall cooperate with county sheriffs and the state patrol in enforcing such traffic regulations: Provided, That automobile driving shall be permitted on the beaches subject to the authority of the department of fisheries to prohibit driving over clam beds.
Commencing in the 42nd regular session of the legislature, amendments to RCW 43.51.680 were introduced. In essence, the proposed amendments would have granted specific authority to the Commission to effect certain closures of the ocean beach highways to vehicular traffic. The amendments did not pass. Ostensibly, however, these efforts prompted a senatorial inquiry of the Attorney General concerning the extent of the Commission's authority under RCW 43.51.680 to limit or prohibit vehicular traffic on the ocean beach highways. On January 12, 1972, the office of the Attorney General issued an opinion, ruling, in essence, that, all pertinent statutes being considered, the legislature intended by RCW 43.51.680 to vest the Commission with authority to regulate the times and places on and along the ocean beach highways where automobiles could be driven, but that the Commission could not prohibit vehicular traffic on all such beaches at all times.
Thereafter, the Commission on April 19, 1972, promulgated order No. 13, ch. 352--36, relating to vehicular traffic on ocean beaches. Section 352--36--040 of that order provides:
RESTRICTED AREAS. (1) Between June 15 and September 15, or during the official closure of the razor clam season if of greater duration than the stated period, vehicular traffic shall be prohibited on North Beach beyond a point which is one-quarter mile north or south of any access road to the beach, south of the mouth of the Copalis River.
(2) Between May 15 and September 15, or during the official closure of the razor clam season if of greater duration than the stated period, vehicular traffic shall be prohibited on the following designated portions of the ocean beaches:
(a) On South Beach from the western terminus of Ocean Avenue in the Town of Westport north to the south jetty at Point Chehalis; PROVIDED THAT, during the remainder of the year vehicles not capable of four wheel drive shall be prohibited from the same area.
(b) On Long Beach from the north jetty at the mouth of the Columbia River to North Head.
Subsequently, the defendants and each of them consciously drove their motor vehicles onto prohibited areas of the ocean beaches in violation of WAC 352--36--040. They were arrested and charged as heretofore indicated.
We substantially agree with the conclusions reached by the Attorney General in the January 12, 1972 opinion, I.e., that the legislature in enacting the seashore conservation area act, and particularly RCW 43.51.680, intended to confer upon the Commission authority to selectively, and on a reasonable basis, prohibit vehicular traffic at designated times and places on the ocean beach highways created by RCW 79.16.130, 79.16.160, and 79.16.170, but that the Commission was not empowered to prohibit such traffic on any or all of such beach highways permanently.
RCW 79.16.130, 79.16.160, and 79.16.170, and the seashore conservation area act relate to the same basic subject matter, I.e., ocean beaches. In ascertaining legislative purpose, statutes which stand in pari materia are to be read together as constituting a unified whole, to the end that a harmonious, total statutory scheme evolves which maintains the integrity of the respective statutes. Champion v. Shoreline School Dist. 412, 81 Wash.2d 672, 504 P.2d 304 (1972); Beach v. Board of Adjustment, 73 Wash.2d 343, 438 P.2d 617 (1968). Also, the entire sequence of statutes relating to a given subject matter should be considered, since legislative policy changes as economic and sociological conditions change. Connick v. Chehalis, 53 Wash.2d 288, 333 P.2d 647 (1958).
Applying these rules to the enactments before us, we believe the conclusion we have reached becomes evident from the legislative history recited above. This history, we are satisfied, marks not an abandonment of, but a gradual withdrawal from, the concept of ocean beaches as public highways in the full sense of that term. Conceivably, in the early years of our state, ocean beaches provided residents of the localities involved a necessary and convenient route of travel and transportation, due, perhaps, to the lack of adequate surrounding road nets. However, as the years passed, inland highway systems markedly improved, motor vehicular traffic and travel greatly increased, accessibility to the beaches grew and expanded,...
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