Champion v. Shoreline School Dist. No. 412 of King County, 42492

• Decision Date: 14 December 1972
• Docket Number: No. 42492,42492
• Parties: Lois CHAMPION and Bryanetta Harvey, Appellants, v. SHORELINE SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 412 OF KING COUNTY, Washington, Respondent.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

Page 672

81 Wn.2d 672

504 P.2d 304

Lois CHAMPION and Bryanetta Harvey, Appellants, v. SHORELINE SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 412 OF KING COUNTY Washington, Respondent.

No. 42492.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Dec. 14, 1972.

LeSourd, Patten, Fleming & Hartung, Leon C. Misterek, C. Dean Little, Seattle, for appellants.

Colvin & Williams, John J. Keough, Seattle, for respondent.

ROSELLINI, Associate Justice.

The question before the court in this case is: Is a school nurse, who holds a 'standard specialized personnel certificate' required under rules and regulations of the State Board of Education, a 'certificated employee' within the meaning of RCW 28A.67.070? That statute provides, in material part:

No teacher, principal, supervisor, superintendent, or other certificated employee, holding a position as such with a school district, hereinafter referred to as 'employee', shall be employed except by written order of a majority of the directors of the district at a regular or special meeting thereof, nor unless he is the holder of an effective teacher's certificate or other certificate required by law or the state board of education for the position for which the employee is employed.

* * *

* * *

Every board of directors determining that there is probable cause or causes that the employment contract of an employee should not be renewed by the district for the next ensuing term shall notify that employee in writing on or before April 15th preceding the commencement of such term of that determination of the board of directors, which notification shall specify the cause or causes for nonrenewal of contract.

The agreed statement of facts shows that the plaintiffs, who were certified by the State Board of Education as qualified to perform the duties of a school nurse, were employees of the defendant, Shoreline School District No. 412 of King County. In April 1972, they were notified that their services would not be required after the close of that school year. It is agreed that the notices did not conform to the requirements of RCW 28A.67.070. The record before the court indicates that the plaintiffs were terminated because of a decision to reorganize the nursing staff of the district for reasons of economy and efficiency.

In this action, the plaintiffs sought to compel their reinstatement, as provided in RCW 28A.67.070, where timely notice is not given. The trial court held that it was not the legislative intent to include school nurses within the definition of the word 'employee' as used in that chapter. We agree.

We bear in mind, as always when approaching a problem of statutory interpretation, that the duty of the court is to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent, where that intent is not clearly expressed in the statute itself. Anderson v. Seattle, 78 Wash.2d 201, 471 P.2d 87 (1970). In doing so, the courts should first resort to the context and subject matter of the legislation, since the intention of the legislature is to be deduced, if possible, from what is said. In re Estate of Kurtzman, 65 Wash.2d 260, 396 P.2d 786 (1964).

Another settled rule of construction, applicable here, is that statutes which are in pari materia should be read together as constituting one law. Statutes are in pari materia when they relate to the same person or thing, or to the same class of persons or things. State ex rel. American Piano Co. v. Superior Court, 105 Wash. 676, 178 P. 827 (1919).

With these principles in mind, we find, on turning to RCW 28A.67, that it is a part of the school laws which were revised and reenacted as the school code in 1969. Prior to 1969, RCW 28A.67.070 and referred only to teachers. In Laws of 1969, 1st Ex.Sess., ch. 34, § 12, the words 'principal, supervisor, superintendent, or other certificated employee, holding a position as such with a school district, hereinafter referred to as 'employee',' were added.

It is the theory of the plaintiffs that the term 'other certificated employee,' as used in this statute, is broad enough to include all persons who hold certificates of any kind which are required by the State Board of Education, and is not limited to persons who hold teaching certificates.

The trial court applied the doctrine of Ejusdem generis to determine the scope of the term 'other certificated employee' as used in this section, and held that it included only persons having teaching certificates. Under that doctrine, where specific words are followed by general words, the specific words govern the character or kind of the matter included in the general words. King County Water Dist. No. 68 v. Tax Comm'n, 58 Wash.2d 282, 362 P.2d 244 (1961). If however, the specific words exhaust the class designated by the enumeration, general words take a meaning beyond the class. 2 J. Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 4913 (3d ed. 1943).

It is conceded that all of the persons specifically mentioned in this act must hold teaching certificates, which the State Board of Education is charged with the responsibility of issuing under RCW 28A.70. The plaintiffs contend that the persons enumerated exhaust the class. However, the record shows that librarians, assistant superintendents and vice principals are required to hold such certificates; thus, the class is not exhausted by the enumeration.

The legislature has itself employed, in another section of the school code, a specification of certificated employees which includes a number of such employees not specifically mentioned in RCW 28A.67.070. RCW 41.36.010 provides:

The word 'teacher' wherever used in this chapter shall be held and construed to mean and include any person regularly employed and qualified at the time of retirement as a teacher, instructor, principal, supervisor or superintendent in the public schools of such school districts, or as assistant to any such teacher, instructor, principal, supervisor or superintendent: Provided, That 'assistant' shall mean such person only as is engaged in educational work and is qualified as a teacher.

To be qualified as a teacher, under the school code, one must hold a valid teaching certificate.

Thus, the class is not exhausted by the persons specified in RCW 28A.67.070, and it would appear that under the rule of Ejusdem generis, the legislative intent must have been to extend the benefits of the act only to those persons who are required to hold teaching certificates. The plaintiffs maintain, however, that the law, as it existed prior to 1969, when it referred only to 'teachers,' was broad enough to include administrative personnel who are required to hold teaching certificates, and that the 1969 amendments specifying certain administrators must be construed as expanding the class to include persons who are required to hold certificates other than teaching certificates, or else the legislative action was superfluous and meaningless.

We do not think, however, that this conclusion is necessarily indicated. It appears more logical that the legislature thought that the term 'teacher' might be regarded as embracing only those certificated employees actually engaged in teaching, and that it amended the act to specifically include administrators in order to remove any ambiguity.

Our examination of the school code leads to the conclusion that the legislature, whenever, it used the term 'certificated employee' or 'certificated personnel' in the school code, used it with reference to persons who hold teaching certificates. Not only does the common rule of statutory construction dictate that statutes in pari materia should be read together and harmonized, but the legislature in this case made express provision for such construction. RCW 28A.98.040 provides:

The provisions of this title, Title 28A RCW, shall be construed in pari materia even though as a matter of prior legislative history they were not originally enacted in the same statute.

In RCW 28A.72, providing for negotiations by certificated personnel, 'certificated employee' is defined as follows:

'Certificated employee' means any employee holding a regular teaching certificate of the state and who is employed by any school district with the exception of the chief administrative officer of each local district.

RCW 28A.72.020.

This court said in State ex rel. American Piano Co. v. Superior Court, Supra, 105 Wash. at 679, 178 P. at 828, quoting from 36 Cyc. 1150:

'Whether a Legislature had used a word in a statute in one sense and with one meaning, and subsequently uses the same word in legislating on the same subject-matter, it will be understood as using it in the same sense, unless there be something in the context or the nature of things to indicate that it intended a different meaning thereby.'

Accord, DeGrief v. Seattle, 50 Wash.2d 1, 297 P.2d 940 (1956).

Although the word 'certificated' is used many times in the code, we have found none in which, in the context, it would appear to apply to...