State v. Yancy
| Decision Date | 17 May 1979 |
| Docket Number | No. 45489,45489 |
| Citation | 594 P.2d 1342,92 Wn.2d 153 |
| Parties | The STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Joseph YANCY, Jr., Appellant. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Robert Olson, Public Defender, Seattle, Michael E. Withey, Timothy K. Ford, Seattle, for appellant.
Norm K. Maleng, Pros. Atty., J. Robin Hunt, Deputy Pros. Atty., Seattle, for respondent.
The appellant was found guilty of violating RCW 9A.88.070(1)(b), which provides:
(1) A person is guilty of promoting prostitution in the first degree if he knowingly:
(b) Advances or profits from prostitution of a person less than eighteen years old.
RCW 9A.88.060 provides in part:
The following definitions are applicable in RCW 9A.88.070 through 9A.88.090:
(2) "Profits from prostitution." A person "profits from prostitution" if, acting other than as a prostitute receiving compensation for personally rendered prostitution services, he accepts or receives money or other property pursuant to an agreement or understanding with any person whereby he participates or is to participate in the proceeds of prostitution activity.
The evidence showed that two girls under the age of 18, while living in a hotel room with the appellant, at his invitation, turned over to him their earnings from prostitution, which he spent on the living expenses of the three. While he testified that he contributed his own "earnings" from thievery during the time this living arrangement was conducted, there was evidence from which the jury could infer that at least a part of the earnings of the girls was used for his benefit.
It is first contended that the statute is void for vagueness. The appellant cites the rule that a penal statute must provide sufficient notice of the proscribed conduct, so that one is not required to speculate as to what is prohibited. Bellevue v. Miller, 85 Wash.2d 539, 536 P.2d 603 (1975). A statute will be found invalid if it is couched in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. Seattle v. Drew, 70 Wash.2d 405, 423 P.2d 522 (1967). As we said there, a penal statute must contain ascertainable standards of guilt.
The appellant argues that the statutory language is vague because it includes profiting from prostitution within the definition of "promoting" prostitution. The definitions of profits found in Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary, he says, are not broad enough to bring it within the dictionary definition of "promoting." 1 Neither that dictionary nor Webster's Third New International Dictionary, which this court generally uses, purports to enumerate all the activities which may tend to promote a given aim or enterprise. The legislature has found that profiting from the proceeds of prostitution tends to promote it. We are offered no showing that that finding is without foundation. The appellant's theory appears to be that the legislature must adhere strictly to dictionary definitions. No authority is cited for such a proposition. On the contrary, we have recently recognized and followed the rule that the legislature may define a word, giving it a meaning broader than the one it ordinarily carries. Seattle v. Buchanan, 90 Wash.2d 584, 584 P.2d 918 (1978).
The statutory definition is couched in simple language readily understandable by a person of ordinary intelligence. It is that definition which must guide his conduct. As we pointed out in Seattle v. Buchanan, supra, vagueness which may inhere in the use of a term which is open to various interpretations may be corrected by a legislative definition which gives it a more precise meaning. That is the function which the legislature performed here. The term "promoting prostitution" might indeed have been open to attack for vagueness, had the legislature not precisely defined what conduct it intended to include within its meaning.
The appellant further contends that the words "agreement or understanding," as used in RCW 9A.88.060(2), are unconstitutionally vague because they do not specify whether the agreement or understanding must be formal. The word understanding, as defined in the appellant's brief, has among its various definitions the one which is appropriate here that of an informal agreement. The words used by the legislature expressed an intent, which we would think to be readily perceivable that proof of an informal agreement is sufficient to establish this element of the offense.
The appellant next suggests that the statute is overbroad and impinges his freedom of association, guaranteed by the First Amendment. He cites Blondheim v. State, 84 Wash.2d 874, 529 P.2d 1096 (1975), where we said that a statute which is so broadly drawn that it may prohibit constitutionally protected activity, as well as unprotected behavior, denies substantive due process of law. It is suggested that persons engaged in legitimate pursuits who render services to a prostitute and are paid for them out of the prostitute's earnings, or a person living with a prostitute and unwittingly receiving the benefit of his or her earnings could be found guilty of violating this provision.
We do not find the statute open to this construction. In none of the situations hypothesized by the appellant is there an agreement or understanding Whereby the person is to participate in the proceeds of prostitution activity. With regard to a person rendering services, the agreement is that he is to be paid for his services. It is immaterial to him what the source of the money may be. If there is an agreement whereby he exacts a promise that he will be paid out of the proceeds of prostitution activity, his conduct is no longer innocent, and he can hardly be heard to claim constitutional protection. The same is true with respect to persons living with a prostitute. Unless they accept the proceeds of that person's prostitution pursuant to an agreement to participate in those proceeds, there is no violation.
It is next argued that the legislature did not intend this statute to reach an amateur promoter, such as the appellant, but was aimed only at large commercial enterprises.
No provision of the statute imposing such a limitation upon its scope is cited. It is suggested that a synopsis and commentary found in the Washington State Criminal Justice Training Commission, Revised Criminal Code Training and Seminar Manual (compiled and edited by G. Golob & G. Mooney (1976)) supports this view. While we think the appellant's interpretation is somewhat doubtful, we will assume it is correct. Nevertheless, the comment reflects nothing more than the personal opinions of the two lawyers who compiled the volume, and they modestly and properly disclaim any No authorities are cited in connection with the comment on 9A.88.060(2), nor does it purport to interpret any specific language of the act but rather to state what the writers conceive to have been the purpose of the act.
There is nothing in the language of the statute, which we can discern, that limits its application to large commercial enterprises; and the appellant cites no legislative history which would substantiate his claim with respect to its intent. Each of the sections involved here refers to "any person." RCW 9A.04.110 gives the word person the usual legal definition including within its meaning "any natural person and, where relevant, a corporation, joint stock association, or an unincorporated association." If the statute was meant to have the narrow meaning suggested by the appellant, that intention was not expressed in the act, and it is to the statute which we must look to find the legislative purpose.
It is next contended that the statute was not intended to punish a person in the appellant's position unless he was in fact supported by the prostitute. He further contends that the evidence did not show that he received such support, since, by his testimony, the appellant contributed more to the expenses of the menage than was derived from prostitution, his contributions being derived from petty thievery. The statute does...
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