State v. Yeats

• Decision Date: 14 December 1917
• Citation: 77 So. 262,74 Fla. 509
• Parties: STATE ex rel. CHURCH v. YEATS et al., Board of County Com'rs.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

77 So. 262

74 Fla. 509

STATE ex rel. CHURCH v. YEATS et al., Board of County Com'rs.

Florida Supreme Court

December 14, 1917

Error to Circuit Court, Hillsborough County; F. M. Robles, Judge.

Mandamus by the State of Florida, on relation of Harry Church, against J. G. Yeats and others, constituting the board of county commissioners of Hillsborough county, Fla. Demurrer and motion to quash sustained and judgment for defendants, and relator brings error. Reversed.

Whitfield J., dissenting.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

The title to an act cannot be relied upon to add to, enlarge, or extend the operation or effect of the act, but may serve to aid in the construction of the body of the act and as evidence of the legislative intent.

Where several sections of the General Statutes are repealed, but in the repealing section of the act they are simply referred to by numbers, and the words 'of the General Statutes' omitted, but the title to the act refers not only to the numbers but followed by the quoted words, and in the same act are other sections of the General Statutes amended which give not only the number of sections but followed by the words 'of the General Statutes,' it is sufficiently evident that the sections referred to only by numbers were sections of the General Statutes.

Where the Constitution prescribes the manner of doing an act or ascertaining a fact the manner is exclusive, and it is beyond the power of the Legislature to enact a statute that would defeat the purpose of the constitutional provision.

The Legislature is not permitted, under the exercise of the police power, to enact a statute that will in its operation defeat the purpose of the Constitution.

COUNSEL McKay, Withers & Phipps, of Tampa, and J. Turner Butler, of Jacksonville, for plaintiff in error.

Mabry &amp Carlton, of Tampa, for defendants in error.

OPINION

WILLS Circuit Judge.

This is a proceeding by mandamus by the petitioner to compel the respondents, as county commissioners of Hillsborough county to grant him a permit to sell intoxicating liquors and wines in election district No. 13 in said county. The petition and alternative writ sets out a full compliance with all laws prior to the enactment of chapter 7290 of the Laws of Florida 1917, entitled 'An act amending sections 1219 and 1220 of the General Statutes of Florida, relating to requisites of application for permit to sell liquors, wines or beers, and the publication thereof, and repealing sections 1222, 1223, and 1224 of the General Statutes of Florida, and providing for remonstrance to petitions,' and that there had been no election held in Hillsborough county by which the sale of liquors, wines, and beer had been prohibited.

To this the respondents filed a demurrer and motion to quash upon the grounds:

(1) The writ does not show the petitioner is entitled to any relief against them.

(2) The writ shows on its face the petitioner has not complied with the law entitling him to the relief sought.

(3) The writ shows the petitioner has not complied with chapter 7290, General Laws of the State of Florida.

Upon a hearing of the demurrer and motion the circuit judge sustained each and entered judgment, and petitioner took writ of error.

The petitioner assails chapter 7290 of the Laws of the State of Florida upon two grounds:

(1) That sections 1222, 1223, and 1224 of the General Statutes are not repealed by chapter 7290, because section 3 of said act reads as follows: All laws or parts of laws in conflict herewith, including sections 1222, 1223, and 1224, are hereby repealed.

(2) That chapter 7290 is violative of article 19 of the Constitution of Florida.

While the title to an act cannot add to or enlarge the operation or effect of a statute, it may be looked to for aid in the construction of a statute, and while after the numbers of the sections in the body of the act we do not find 'of the General Statutes,' we do find after the numbered sections in the title the quoted words.

Also we find in sections 1 and 2 of this statute that other sections of the General Statutes were amended, and these sections are followed by the words 'of the General Statutes.' From this context we think that it is clear that sections 1222, 1223, and 1224 of the General Statutes were meant, and no one could have been misled by the omission of the words 'of the General Statutes,' especially in view of the language of the entire section, that all laws or parts of laws in conflict herewith, including sections 1222, 1223, and 1224, are hereby repealed, there can be no doubt of the legislative intent.

The second contention is that chapter 7290 violates article 19 of the Constitution of this state. 'Courts may inquire only into the power of the Legislature to lawfully enact a particular statute, and all doubt as to its constitutionality are resolved in favor of the statute.' Dutton Phosphate Co. v. Priest, 67 Fla. 370, 65 So. 282. It does not follow, however, that in every case the courts, before they can set aside a law as invalid, must be able to find in the Constitution some specific inhibition which has been disregarded or some empress command which has been disobeyed. Cooley's Const. Lim. (7th Ed.) 242. Says the court in Sill v. Corning, 15 N.Y. 297, text 303, quoted in Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, p. 242:

'The law-making power of the state, it is said in one case, recognizes no restraints, and is bound by none, except such as are imposed by the Constitution. That instrument has been aptly termed a legislative act by the people themselves in their sovereign capacity, and is therefore the paramount law. Its object is not to grant legislative power, but to confine and restrain it. Without the constitutional limitations, the power to make laws would be absolute. These limitations are created and imposed by express words or arise by necessary implication.'

The implied restraints of the Constitution upon legislative power may be as effectual in its (the statute's) condemnation as written words, and such restraints may be found in either the language employed or in the evident purpose which was in view and the circumstances and historical events which led to the enactment of the particular provision as a part of the organic law. Rathbone v. Wirth, 150 N.Y. 459, 45 N.E. 15, 34 L. R. A. 408.

When the Constitution prescribes the manner in which a thing shall be done or a fact ascertained by implication, it prohibits the Legislature from by statute providing a different manner--the one prescribed in the Constitution is exclusive of all other modes.

Our Constitution, art. 19, § 1, provides that:

'The board of county commissioners of each county in the state, not oftener than once every two years, upon the application of one-fourth of the registered voters of any county, shall call and provide for an election * * * to decide whether the sale of intoxicating liquors, wines or beer shall be prohibited therein, the question to be determined by a majority vote of those voting at the election. * * * Provided, that intoxicating liquors, * * * spirituous, vinous or malt shall not be sold in any election district in which a majority vote was cast against the same at said election.'

Prior to the adoption of article 19 the Legislature was unlimited in its power to deal with the sale of intoxicating liquors, even to the absolute prohibition of the sale, but by the adoption of article 19 the people of the several counties and election districts are to determine the question whether the sale of such liquors shall be prohibited, and in that article have provided the manner in which the wishes of the county can be obtained 'by a majority vote of those voting at the election called under this section.'

This court in the case of State ex rel. Mira v. Smith, 26 Fla. 427, 7 So. 848, said:

'The purpose of the local option article was to remit to the registered voters of each county the settlement of the issue whether the sale of intoxicating liquors, wines, or beer should be prohibited within the county.'

We think under article 19 and the construction placed on it in case of State ex rel. Mira v. Smith, supra, the Constitution, by article 19, provides the manner by 'election called,' as provided in said article, and by whom to be determined the 'registered voters.'

The Legislature, by the provisions of chapter 7290, by requiring 'a majority of the white registered voters' and 'a majority of the colored registered voters' to sign the application for permit to sell intoxicating liquors, thus in effect making these separate majorities decide the wishes of the people of the county instead of the registered voters voting, as provided by the Constitution.

We are mindful of the language of this court in the case of State ex rel. Mira v. Smith, supra, wherein, speaking of an application being required to be signed by a majority of the registered voters, it was said, 'In effect the certificate of a majority of the registered voters of the district that he is personally fit to be intrusted with the business of a liquor dealer.' We can readily see that this regulation did not conflict with, but was perfectly consistent with, the provision of the Constitution in providing the issue should be decided by a majority of he registered voters.

The Legislature, unless restrained by some constitutional authority, establishes the public policy of the state, and the courts ordinarily will not interfere with its discretion but when it seeks to regulate by statute the provisions of organic law it then becomes a judicial question, and the courts will, when such a statute is assailed, determine whether such a statute is a reasonable exercise of the police under the provisions of the Constitution,...