State v. York
| Decision Date | 28 November 1925 |
| Citation | 90 Fla. 625,106 So. 418 |
| Parties | STATE ex rel. McAULEY v. YORK, Chief of Police. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Error to Circuit Court, Hillsborough County; F. M. Robles, Judge.
Proceedings by the State, on the relation of H. S. McAuley, for a writ of habeas corpus to be directed to D. B. York, Chief of Police of the City of Tampa. The petition was dismissed, and petitioner remanded to custody, and he brings error.
Affirmed.
Syllabus by the Court
Ordinance prohibiting taxicab stands on streets within certain area held not void as constituting prohibition. An ordinance prohibiting taxicab stands on the streets within a certain area in a city, but not prohibiting their free use otherwise therein, and providing for the location of stands at other places outside of the designated area, is not void as constituting a prohibition rather than a regulation of the use of taxicabs within the designated area; the power of the city to regulate such vehicles being conceded.
Regulatory ordinance presumed justified, unless contrary clearly appears. When the municipal power to regulate is shown to exist, a regulatory ordinance, valid on its face and pursuant to the power, will be presumed to be applicable to, and justified by, local conditions, unless the contrary is made clearly to appear.
Person attacking ordinance as unreasonable or discriminatory has burden of showing it is unreasonable, or unfair and oppressive, as applied to him. When an ordinance is within the grant of power to the municipality, the presumption is that it is reasonable, unless its unreasonable character appears on its face, and the person attacking it as unreasonable or unjustly discriminatory must assume the purden of affirmatively showing that as applied to him it is unreasonable, or unfair and oppressive.
Ordinance held not unjust discrimination against owners of taxicabs. Where an ordinance prohibiting taxicab stands on the streets within a certain area of a city permits the parking of automobiles by the general public on said streets, and provides for certain spaces in each business block in said area where vehicles carrying freight and express for hire may stop for the loading and unloading of merchandise from the respective places of business in such blocks, such latter provisions do not constitute an unjust discrimination against the owners of taxicabs thus prohibited from having a taxicab stand within such designated area.
Distinction between parking of ordinary vehicles and maintenance of taxicab stands held to sustain ordinance. There is a distinction between allowing the parking of ordinary vehicles by the general public along city streets and allowing owners or operators of taxicabs for hire to appropriate a certain portion of a busy city street as a location for the conduct of their private business, where their taxicabs are kept in the intervals when they are not employed in the carriage of persons or property, and while awaiting or soliciting such employment.
Right of abutting owners to reasonable means of ingress and egress cannot ordinarily be denied. It is a matter of common knowledge that cities usually allow abutting owners or their tenants engaged in the mercantile business reasonable means of ingress and egress between their stores or places of business and the public street for the unloading and loading and the carrying of freight thereto and therefrom; indeed this is a right which, though subject to reasonable regulations, cannot ordinarily be entirely denied.
Not province of writ to review irregularity or error of procedure. It is not the province of the writ of habeas corpus to take the place of a writ of error and to bring in review any irregularity or mere error of procedure committed by a judicial tribunal having jurisdiction of the cause and the person, and under whose judgment a party claiming to be unlawfully restrained of his liberty may be held.
Sparkman & Knight and Whitaker Bros., all of Tampa for plaintiff in error.
A. T Stuart, of Tampa, for defendant in error.
The petitioner, McAuley, was convicted in the municipal court of the city of Tampa of violating section 46 of Ordinance No. 31A of said city 'by having a stand for taxicab for thire on the street within two blocks of Franklin street, within the city limits of the city of Tampa,' and sued out a writ of habeas corpus in the circuit court of Hillsborough county, addressed to the chief of police, York, alleging in his petition that the said ordinance was invalid. Return was duly made, and, on hearing, the petition was dismissed, the petitioner remanded to custody, and petitioner was allowed, and took, a writ of error.
The ordinance attacked provides, inter alia, that ; also prohibiting abutting owners from receiving rents or compensation for the use of the public streets in front of their property, and prohibiting taxi drivers from verbally soliciting business on the streets other than at stands.
Petitioner's counsel contends that this ordinance prohibits the use of taxicabs on certain streets, or within a certain area whereas the city only has the charter power to regulate such use. We do not so understand the language of the ordinance. While inartificially drawn, it clearly intends only to prevent the establishment of taxicab stands within the designated area, and the solicitation of business on the streets at places other than such regular stands as may be established outside such designated area. It is conceded that the city has all power necessary to regulate vehicles of all kinds on the streets of the city under section 1871 of the Revised General Statutes of 1920, and also under chapter 9925 of the Special Laws of 1923, and other acts conferring corporate powers. This ordinance does not prohibit the use of taxicabs on any of the city streets. The prohibition of taxicab stands, or the solicitation of business, on the streets within certain crowded areas, or areas of heavy and constant traffic, but allowing their free movement and use therein, is in the nature of a regulation, rather than a prohibition, of the use of such vehicles, and hence within the corporate powers of regulation. State v. Barbelais, 101 Me. 512, 64 A. 881; Commonwealth v. Ellis, 158 Mass. 555, 33 N.E. 651; Shreveport v. Dantes, 118 La. 113, 42 So. 716; Dillon's Municipal Corporations (5th Ed.) §§ 712, 1166, 1167; 19 R. C. L. 846, 847, 849. To allow taxicab stands to be located...
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