State v. Young

• Decision Date: 21 December 2016
• Docket Number: No. 80A14,80A14
• Parties: STATE of North Carolina v. David Martin Beasley YOUNG
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

369 N.C. 118

794 S.E.2d 274

STATE of North Carolina

v.David Martin Beasley YOUNG

No. 80A14

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Filed December 21, 2016

Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Robert C. Montgomery, Senior Deputy Attorney General, for the State-appellant.

Glenn Gerding, Appellate Defender, by Barbara S. Blackman and Kathryn L. VandenBerg, Assistant Appellate Defenders, for defendant-appellee.

JACKSON, Justice.

In this case we consider whether the Superior Court, Buncombe County correctly ordered that defendant, who was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for a murder he committed at age seventeen, must be resentenced as a result of the decision in Miller v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012). Because we conclude that defendant's sentence is prohibited by Miller , we affirm.

On 3 May 1999, following a capital trial, a jury found defendant guilty of first-degree murder pursuant to the felony murder rule based on attempted armed robbery and "sale of a counterfeit controlled substance with a deadly weapon." The jury also found defendant guilty of one count each of possession with intent to sell or deliver, sale of, and conspiracy to sell a counterfeit controlled substance. Defendant's convictions resulted from his involvement in a disputed drug-related transaction that escalated into a fatal shooting on 8 January 1997. State v. Young , 151 N.C.App. 601, 2002 WL 1543672, at *1 (2002) (unpublished). Defendant was seventeen years old on the date of the offenses. After considering whether defendant should receive a sentence of death or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, the jury recommended life, and the trial court entered judgment accordingly.

In the wake of the Supreme Court's Miller decision, defendant filed a motion for appropriate relief in Superior Court, Buncombe County on 4 October 2012. The court conducted a hearing on 18 January 2013 and in an order filed on 1 February 2013, found that defendant "was under the age of 18 at the time of the commission of the crime" and that when "the crime was committed, North Carolina law required the mandatory imposition of life imprisonment without parole for all offenders convicted of first-degree murder." The court further explained that pursuant to Miller , "mandatory imposition of life without parole upon defendants who were under the age of 18 at the time of commission of their crimes constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution." Therefore, the court concluded that the 2012 Miller decision retroactively applied to defendant's 1999 sentence, vacated the sentence, and ordered a new sentencing hearing.

On 13 March 2013, the State filed a petition for writ of certiorari, petition for writ of supersedeas, and motion for temporary stay with the North Carolina Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals allowed the petition for writ of certiorari and stayed the superior court's order pending disposition of the appeal. On 12 March 2014, this Court entered an order on its own initiative certifying the appeal for discretionary review prior to a determination by the Court of Appeals.

In a brief filed with the Court of Appeals, the State argued that the superior court erred by giving Miller retroactive effect and vacating defendant's sentence; however, on 25 January 2016, before this appeal was decided, the United States Supreme Court filed an opinion in Montgomery v. Louisiana , 567 U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 718, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016). In pertinent part, the Supreme Court concluded that "[w]here state collateral review proceedings permit prisoners to challenge the lawfulness of their confinement, States cannot refuse to give retroactive effect to a substantive constitutional right that determines the outcome of that challenge." Id. at ––––, 136 S.Ct. at 731–32. The Supreme Court then held that " Miller announced a substantive rule of constitutional law." Id. at ––––, 136 S.Ct. at 736. On 29 January 2016, shortly after Montgomery was decided, we ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefs.

In its supplemental brief the State acknowledges that "[t]he United States Supreme Court has now made clear [in Montgomery ] that its holding in Miller applies retroactively to already final cases." Nevertheless, the State contends that defendant is not entitled to resentencing based upon Miller and Montgomery . The State asserts that "[e]ven though the General Assembly chose to call the sentence defendant received in this case ‘life imprisonment without parole,’ " defendant's sentence "is not really life imprisonment without parole but instead a sentence of life imprisonment with ‘a meaningful opportunity to obtain release.’ " Specifically, the State argues that N.C.G.S. § 15A–1380.5 —which was enacted effective 1 May 1994 and repealed effective 1 December 1998—applies to the offenses that defendant committed on 8 January 1997. The State contends that section 15A–1380.5 thus provides a meaningful opportunity for release and therefore, defendant's sentence is not of the type addressed by the Miller decision. We disagree.¹

In several recent cases, the United States Supreme Court has considered how the two gravest punishments imposed in the United States criminal justice system should apply to persons who committed crimes as minors. See, e.g. , Graham v. Florida , 560 U.S. 48, 69, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010) (noting that life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is the second greatest punishment permitted by law); Roper v. Simmons , 543 U.S. 551, 568, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005) ("Because the death penalty is the most severe punishment, the Eighth Amendment applies to it with special force." (citing Thompson v. Oklahoma , 487 U.S. 815, 856, 108 S.Ct. 2687, 101 L.Ed.2d 702 (1988) (O'Conner, J., concurring))). In this context, the Supreme Court has explained that "less culpability should attach to a crime committed by a juvenile than to a comparable crime committed by an adult." Thompson , 487 U.S. at 835, 108 S.Ct. 2687 (plurality opinion). "Inexperience, less education, and less intelligence make the teenager less able to evaluate the consequences of his or her conduct while at the same time he or she is much more apt to be motivated by mere emotion or peer pressure than is an adult." Id. The Supreme Court has stated that relative to adults, minors may lack maturity, may have a lessened sense of responsibility, and may be more vulnerable to peer pressure and other outside influences. Roper , 543 U.S. at 569, 125 S.Ct. 1183. Because of these differences, minors’ "irresponsible conduct is not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult." Id. at 570, 125 S.Ct. 1183 (quoting Thompson , 487 U.S. at 835, 108 S.Ct. 2687 ).

Another consideration emphasized by the Supreme Court in its recent decisions is a minor offender's "capacity for change." Graham , 560 U.S. at 74, 130 S.Ct. 2011. The Supreme Court has stated that minors "still struggle to define their identity" and are less likely than adults to be "irretrievably depraved." Roper , 543 U.S. at 570, 125 S.Ct. 1183. Citing both its precedents and literature from the social sciences, the Supreme Court concluded that minors’ personality traits "are more transitory, less fixed"; that specific traits such as "impetuousness and recklessness that may dominate in younger years can subside"; and that "[o]nly a relatively small proportion of adolescents who experiment in risky or illegal activities develop entrenched patterns of problem behavior that persist into adulthood." Id. (quoting Johnson v. Texas , 509 U.S. 350, 368, 113 S.Ct. 2658, 125 L.Ed.2d 290 (1993), and Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty , 58 Am. Psychologist 1009, 1014 (2003), and citing Erik H. Erikson, Identity: Youth and Crisis (1968)).

Most relevant to our analysis here are the decisions in Graham and Miller , which set limits on the power of the States to impose a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole on defendants who committed crimes before the age of eighteen. Miller , 567 U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. at 2469 ; Graham , 560 U.S. at 82, 130 S.Ct. 2011. In Graham the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution "prohibits the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide." 560 U.S. at 82, 130 S.Ct. 2011. In pertinent part, the Supreme Court reasoned that removing the possibility of parole makes a life sentence "far more severe." Id. at 70, 130 S.Ct. 2011 (quoting Solem v. Helm , 463 U.S. 277, 297, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983), abrogated by Harmelin v. Michigan , 501 U.S. 957, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991) ). Life imprisonment without the possibility of parole "deprives the convict of the most basic liberties without giving hope of restoration, except perhaps by executive clemency—the remote possibility of which does not mitigate the harshness of the sentence."

Id. at 69–70, 130 S.Ct. 2011 (citing Solem , 463 U.S. at 300–01, 103 S.Ct. 3001 ). In concluding that such a harsh sentence is never proportionate for a nonhomicide offense committed by a minor, the Supreme Court determined that establishing "a categorical rule [against life without the possibility of parole] gives all juvenile nonhomicide offenders a chance to demonstrate maturity and reform." Id. at 79, 130 S.Ct. 2011. The Supreme Court stated:

A State is not required to guarantee eventual freedom to a juvenile offender convicted of a nonhomicide crime. What the State must do, however, is give defendants like Graham some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation. It is for the State, in the first instance, to explore the means and mechanisms for compliance. ... The

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