Steed v. State

• Decision Date: 01 November 1944
• Docket Number: No. A-214.,A-214.
• Citation: 183 S.W.2d 458
• Parties: STEED et al. v. STATE.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

Page 458

183 S.W.2d 458

STEED et al. v. STATE.

No. A-214.

Supreme Court of Texas.

November 1, 1944.

Error to Court of Civil Appeals of Sixth Supreme Judicial District.

Separate proceedings under the Juvenile Delinquency Act by the state against Ray Steed and Leslie Wray which were consolidated by agreement. To review a judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals 180 S. W.2d 446, affirming a judgment of the trial court finding the children to be delinquent children and committing them to the State Juvenile Training School for Boys at Gatesville for an indeterminate term not exceeding their 21st birthday, Ray Steed and another bring error.

Reversed for a new trial.

Herbert Line and Robert S. Vance, both of Texarkana, for petitioners.

Weldon Glass, Dist. Attorney, of Texarkana, for respondent.

SHARP, Justice.

This proceeding was instituted by petition under the provisions of the Juvenile Delinquency Act, Article 2338—1, Vernon's Annotated Civil Statutes, against Ray Steed and Leslie Wray. It was alleged that both petitioners were delinquent male children of sixteen years of age. Upon a verdict of a jury, finding the defendants to be delinquent children, the trial court rendered judgment committing them to the State Juvenile Training School for Boys at Gatesville, Texas, for an indeterminate period, not to exceed their twenty-first birthdays. Upon appeal to the Court of Civil Appeals for the Sixth Supreme Judicial District, the judgment was affirmed. 180 S.W.2d 446.

The act relied upon by the State to show delinquency was rape. The alleged facts were abundantly proven, and no question has arisen relative to that phase of the case.

The sole question presented by petitioners to this Court is whether the defendants' motion for an instructed verdict and motion for new trial were sufficiently specific, under our Rules, to raise the point of the failure of the State to make proof of the ages of the defendants.

Defendants moved for an instructed verdict, based upon the following ground: "Because the evidence does not establish that the defendants are delinquent juveniles, as that term is defined in Section 3 of the delinquent child act."

Section 3 of the Act reads:

"The word `court' means the `Juvenile Court.' The word `Judge' means the Judge of the Juvenile Court. The term `delinquent child' means any female person over the age of ten (10) years and under the age of eighteen (18) years and any male person over the age of ten (10) years and under the age of seventeen (17) years:

"(a) who violates any penal law of this state of the grade of felony;

"(b) or who violates any penal law of this state of the grade of misdemeanor where the punishment prescribed for such offense may be by confinement in jail;

"(c) or who habitually violates any penal law of this state of the grade of misdemeanor where the punishment prescribed for such offense is by pecuniary fine only;

"(d) or who habitually violates any penal ordinance of a political subdivision of this state;

"(e) or who habitually violates a compulsory school attendance law of this state;

"(f) or who habitually so deports himself as to injure or endanger the morals or health of himself or others;

"(g) or who habitually associates with vicious and immoral persons."

In their motion for new trial the defendants complained (1) of the court's refusal to grant their motion for an instructed verdict, and (2) because "The verdict is not supported by the evidence." The same reason was given under each assignment as was urged in the motion for peremptory instruction, namely, "Because the evidence does not establish that the defendants are delinquent juveniles, as that term is defined in Section 3 of the delinquent child act." The trial court overruled the motion for new trial.

In the Court of Civil Appeals the defendants for the first time urged a specific point to the effect that the evidence wholly failed to establish that they were over the age of ten years and under the age of seventeen years. The Court refused to consider said point, because the objections in the trial court upon which it was predicated were not sufficiently specific to point out the asserted error to the trial court, citing Rules 268 and 322, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.

In the recent case of Dendy v Wilson, 179 S.W.2d 269, 273, 151 A.L.R. 1217, this Court had occasion to pass upon the validity of the Juvenile Delinquency Act. It was there upheld as against various constitutional objections, this Court saying: "This Act does not undertake to convict and punish a child for the commission of a crime. It defines a `delinquent child,' and this definition furnishes the basis for proceedings against such a child under the Act. The only issue to be determined at the trial is whether the juvenile is a `delinquent child' within the meaning of the Act."

At another place in the same opinion, it was said: "The Act does not require a minor to testify...