Steigman v. Danese

• Decision Date: 13 January 1987
• Docket Number: No. BJ-95,BJ-95
• Parties: 12 Fla. L. Weekly 265 Helene A. STEIGMAN, formerly known as Helene D. McCall, and Elizabeth D. Droze, Appellants, v. Doris B. DANESE, Florida National Bank, as personal representative of the Estate of Bernard L. Danese, John B. Danese, III, Dorothy Mathias, and Barbara Danese, Appellees.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 463

502 So.2d 463

12 Fla. L. Weekly 265

Helene A. STEIGMAN, formerly known as Helene D. McCall, and Elizabeth D. Droze, Appellants, v. Doris B. DANESE, Florida National Bank, as personal representative of the Estate of Bernard L. Danese, John B. Danese, III, Dorothy Mathias, and Barbara Danese, Appellees.

No. BJ-95.

District Court of Appeal of Florida,

First District.

Jan. 13, 1987.

Rehearing Denied March 9, 1987.

John P. Cattano, of Rogers, Towers, Bailey, Jones & Gay, Jacksonville, for appellants.

Dana G. Bradford II, of Gallagher, Baumer, Mikals, Bradford, Cannon & Walters, P.A., Jacksonville, for appellees.

JOANOS, Judge.

Appellants Helene A. Steigman and Elizabeth B. Droze seek review of a summary final order which dismissed their fourth amended complaint with prejudice. Appellants contend the dismissal was improper if predicated on any of the following grounds: (1) the sufficiency of the allegations of the complaint, (2) the failure to comply with the provisions of sections 733.702 and 733.703, Florida Statutes, and (3) the statute of limitations or the doctrine of laches. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

Appellants' brother, Bernard L. Danese, died on February 18, 1984. On November 19, 1984, the first notice of administration of the Danese estate was published. On December 21, 1984, appellants filed their initial complaint and notice of lis pendens. Shortly thereafter, appellants filed an amended complaint to include exhibits omitted from the original complaint due to clerical error. On January 17, 1985, a second amended complaint was filed to include Barbara Danese as a party.

The second amended complaint contained four counts: Count I was an action for cancellation of deeds, Count II was an action for resulting trusts, Count III was an action for constructive trusts, and Count IV was an action for damages. Each count was based on the allegation that in 1968 Bernard L. Danese wrongfully procured quitclaim deeds to real property from his sisters, appellants herein.

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss alleging the complaint failed to plead ultimate facts, the complaint was barred by the applicable statute of limitations and the doctrine of laches, and failure to comply with the Florida non-claim statute. Appellants filed a memorandum of law opposing the motion. After a hearing, the second amended complaint was dismissed and appellants were given fifteen days to file a third amended complaint. The order provided no reasons for dismissal.

A third amended complaint was filed, providing greater detail concerning the confidential and fiduciary relationship between Bernard L. Danese and his sisters. Upon motion to dismiss and a hearing thereon, the third amended complaint was dismissed. Appellants were allowed twenty days to file another complaint, but the order of dismissal was silent with regard to reasons therefor.

Appellants filed their fourth amended complaint. Again, appellees filed a motion to dismiss, and appellants filed memorandum of law opposing the motion. After a hearing, the trial court entered an order dismissing the fourth amended complaint with prejudice. Again the order was silent as to reasons for the dismissal.

Because of the silence of the trial court's order with respect to the grounds for dismissal, this court has been required to attempt to determine those grounds in order to effect meaningful appellate review. In addition, this omission has required counsel for both parties to argue each conceivable ground which may have been the basis for the dismissal with prejudice. While a trial court is not always required to state its reasoning in an order, it makes the appellate process more effective when it does.

Appellants' first argument is addressed to the sufficiency of the allegations of the complaint. A claim for relief "must state a cause of action and shall contain ... a short and plain statement of the ultimate facts showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.110(b)(2); Trawick, Fla.Prac. and Proc. s. 6-5 (1985). Each element essential to recovery for the particular cause of action must be alleged. Foley v. Hialeah Race Course, Inc., 53 So.2d 771 (Fla.1951). And while it is not sufficient to allege conclusions alone, "conclusions are not objectionable if they are supported by sufficient allegations of ultimate facts." Trawick, Fla.Prac. and Proc. s. 6-6 (1985). The purpose of a motion to dismiss is to test the legal sufficiency of the pleading. The motion admits all well pleaded allegations to which it is directed, and asserts that the pleading does not state a cause of action on the grounds specified. Connolly v. Sebeco, Inc., 89 So.2d 482 (Fla.1956). If the motion is directed to the pleading as a whole and any count or alternative cause of action alleged is sufficient, then the motion should be denied. Wilson v. Clark, 414 So.2d 526 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Trawick, Fla.Prac, and Proc., s. 10-4 (1985).

Count I of the complaint in this case is an action for cancellation of a deed. In Harrell v. Branson, 344 So.2d 604 (Fla. 1st DCA), cert. denied, 353 So.2d 675 (Fla.1977), this court held that entitlement to rescission or cancellation of a deed will lie when the deed has been obtained (1) through misrepresentation upon which the grantor relied, (2) inadequate consideration, and (3) an abuse of a confidential or fiduciary relationship. The court said "[i]t is not necessary that a direct statement be made to the representee in order to give rise to the right to rely upon the statement, for it is immaterial whether it passes through a direct or circuitous channel in reaching him, provided it be made with the intent that it shall reach him and be acted on by the injured party." 344 So.2d at 606.

The term "confidential relationship" encompasses "virtually all relationships of trust and dependence," and "courts have been especially quick to find a confidential relationship where ... [as in the instant case] the grantor and grantee are related by blood and the grantor has become dependent on the grantee." Thomas for Fennell v. Lampkin, 470 So.2d 37, 39, f.n. 2 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985).

Thus, a presumption of undue influence will arise when the evidence establishes: (1) the existence of a confidential relationship between the grantor and the beneficiary, and (2) that the beneficiary actively procured the deed. Jordan v. Noll, 423 So.2d 368, 369 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), pet. for rev. denied, 430 So.2d 451 (Fla.1983). Once the presumption of undue influence arises, the beneficiary has "the burden of giving a reasonable explanation for the active role in the affairs of the grantor." 423 So.2d at 369. See also Thomas for Fennell v. Lampkin, 470 So.2d at 39, where the court said: "It is a well-established proposition in Florida that a deed may be set aside because of undue influence exercised on the grantor by the grantee." Accord Adams v. Stringfellow, 91 Fla. 305, 107 So. 633 (Fla.1926); Pratt v. Carns, 80 Fla. 243, 85 So. 681 (Fla.1920).

In the instant case, Count I of the complaint alleges: (1) a confidential relationship arising out of both the blood relationship between the grantors and their brother Bernard L. Danese, as well as their dependence upon him as the dominant family figure; (2) reliance upon the representations of their brother that the subject property would always belong to them and would be reconveyed to them at a later date, and (3) a lack of consideration. In addition, the complaint alleges specific incidences of the dominance and control exerted by Danese over his sisters. Another significant factor is the inference that the sisters would not have quitclaimed their respective interests in their deceased parents' property absent reasonable assurances that their interests would be protected.

For the most part, the conclusions expressed in Count I are supported by allegations of fact. However, there are no allegations of ultimate facts to support the allegation of paragraph 19 that the sisters "received no consideration for the purported conveyance" of their interests in the real property. Also, the recitals of the attached exhibits to the effect that consideration of $1.00 had been paid, could be viewed as inconsistent with the allegation of "no consideration." Despite this minimal suggestion of inconsistency, Count I alleges the requisite elements established by case law from this court and other district courts of appeal, which if proved, would entitle the sisters to rescission or cancellation of the quitclaim deed.

Count II of the complaint is an action for acknowledgment and establishment of resulting trusts. In Wadlington v. Edwards, 92 So.2d 629, 631 (Fla.1957), the court explained the nature of the implied trust termed "resulting trust" thusly:

A resulting trust is simply a status that automatically arises by operation of law out of certain circumstances. ... In the creation of a resulting trust it is essential that the parties actually intend to create the trust relationship but fail to execute documents or establish adequate evidence of intent. The typical illustration is where one man furnishes the money to buy a parcel of land in the name of another with both parties intending at the time that the legal title is held by the named grantee for the benefit of the unnamed beneficiary.

And in Steinhardt v. Steinhardt, 445 So.2d 352, 357-358 (Fla. 3d DCA); pet. for rev. denied, 456 So.2d 1181 (Fla.1984), the court stated that--

A resulting trust ... arises in three situations, (1) where an express trust fails in whole or in part, (2) where an express trust is fully performed without exhausting the trust estate, and (3) where a person furnishes money to purchase property in the name of another, with both parties intending at the time that the legal title be held by the named grantee for the benefit of the unnamed purchaser of the property.

See also Lowell and Grimsley, Florida Law of Trusts, s. 14-2 (3rd ed. 1984): "The...