Stein v. State
| Decision Date | 13 January 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 78460,78460 |
| Citation | 632 So.2d 1361 |
| Parties | 19 Fla. L. Weekly S32 Steven Edward STEIN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender and W.C. McLain, Asst. Public Defender, Tallahassee, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen. and Richard B. Martell, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee.
Steven Edward Stein appeals his convictions of two counts of first-degree murder and one count of armed robbery, his sentences of death for each of the murder convictions, and his sentence of life imprisonment for the armed robbery conviction. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, Sec. 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. For the reasons expressed, we affirm those convictions and sentences.
The record reflects the following facts regarding this case. 1 Stein, Marc Christmas, and Kyle White were roommates. Stein was employed as a cook at a Lem Turner Road Pizza Hut in Jacksonville, Florida. Christmas was unemployed, but was a previous employee of an Edgewood Avenue Pizza Hut in Jacksonville, Florida. White testified that, about a week before the murders, Stein and Christmas had a conversation about how to rob a Pizza Hut restaurant. During the conversation, Stein mentioned the Pizza Hut on Edgewood Avenue, and both Stein and Christmas stated that there could be no witnesses to the robbery. On the day of the murders, Christmas, Stein, Stein's girlfriend, and White were home together. About 9:30 p.m. Stein and Christmas left, taking with them Stein's .22 caliber rifle. They stated that they were going to see Christmas' father about selling him the rifle. They returned home around 11:30 to 11:45 p.m.
The next morning, Dennis Saunders and Bobby Hood were found shot to death at the Edgewood Avenue Pizza Hut and the sum of $980 was missing from the restaurant. The victims were shift supervisors of the restaurant and their bodies were found in the men's restroom. Bullet fragments and cartridge casings were recovered from the restroom area. Hood had suffered five gunshot wounds--four to the head and one to the chest. The medical examiner testified that the shots had been fired from four to six inches away and that Hood was sitting at the time he was shot. Saunders had suffered four gunshot wounds--one through the neck, one in the right shoulder, one in the chest, and one in the right thigh. The medical examiner testified that Saunders was sitting on the floor at the time the shots began and, given the position of the bullet wounds, that he was moving around during the shooting.
Ronald Burroughs was an employee of the Edgewood Avenue Pizza Hut. He testified that on the night of the murders, he left the restaurant at 11:15 p.m. When he left, Hood and Saunders were still inside the restaurant and only two customers remained at the restaurant. Burroughs later identified those two customers as Stein and Christmas. Additionally, an unpaid guest check on a table in the restaurant contained a fingerprint belonging to Christmas.
Additional testimony revealed that three expended .22 caliber casings were found at the residence of Stein and Christmas. A ballistics expert testified that the casings found at the scene and the casings found at the residence were fired from the same firearm. Additionally, Christmas's father testified that Stein and Christmas did not come to his house on the night of the murders.
After Stein and Christmas were arrested, Stein gave a statement to investigators about the crimes. Before giving that statement, Stein signed two waiver-of-rights forms. After signing the first, Stein asked to speak to an attorney and the questioning was terminated. Apparently, however, after the questioning was terminated, one of the investigators made a comment to Stein to the effect that God would forgive him for what he had done. The investigators then left Stein alone in the interview room. Several minutes later, but before Stein had seen an attorney Stein initiated contact with the investigators by knocking on the door and stating, "I want to talk about part of it." At that time, the investigators had Stein execute the second waiver-of-rights form, on which a notation was made that Stein had initiated the conversation. Stein told the investigators that he and Christmas took approximately $900 in the robbery and that the victims were shot because the robbery "went bad." Stein never admitted, however, that he was the shooter.
Subsequently, Stein moved to suppress these statements. At the suppression hearing, Stein stated that he never made any statements to the investigators; that he had asked for an attorney three times; and that he understood his rights. The trial judge denied the motion, finding that Stein had made the statements freely and voluntarily and that Stein had initiated the conversation.
At trial, Stein was convicted as charged. At the penalty phase proceeding, the State introduced testimony that Stein was carrying a .38 caliber revolver 2 and ammunition at the time of his arrest. Stein's sister and girlfriend testified on his behalf. The jury recommended, by a ten-to-two vote, that Stein be sentenced to death for each of the two murders. The trial judge sentenced him to death for the murders and to life imprisonment for the armed robbery. In doing so, the trial judge found five aggravating circumstances: 1) previous conviction for a violent felony based on the contemporaneous murders of the two victims; (2) the homicides occurred during the commission of a robbery; (3) the homicides were committed to avoid arrest; (4) the homicides were heinous, atrocious, or cruel; and (5) the homicides were cold, calculated, and premeditated. Additionally, the trial judge found one statutory mitigating factor--no significant history of prior criminal activity.
Stein raises three issues in appealing his convictions. First, he claims that the trial judge erred in denying his motion to suppress the statements he made to investigators. In support of this claim, Stein asserts that the investigators failed to honor his request for counsel. Additionally, Stein contends that any statements made to the officers after that request were not voluntary because the comment made by one of the investigators regarding God's forgiveness constituted continued interrogation and was the type of comment that would elicit an incriminating response. Consequently, Stein maintains that his statements must be suppressed because, once a defendant asserts the right to counsel, there can be no continued interrogation or valid waiver of the defendant's rights without the actual presence of counsel.
Clearly, once an accused asks for counsel, an accused may not be subjected to further interrogation until counsel has been made available to the accused, absent initiation of further communication with law enforcement officers by the accused. Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 111 S.Ct. 486, 112 L.Ed.2d 489 (1990); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). Under the circumstances of this case, however, we find that Stein voluntarily initiated continued communication with the investigators and that the motion to suppress was properly denied. At the suppression hearing, Stein himself admitted that the brief conversation about God had no effect on his decision to talk to the investigators. Additionally, once Stein asked for an attorney, the investigators left the room; however, after the investigators left the room, Stein initiated continued further communication by knocking on the door and stating, "I want to talk about part of it." Further, before the investigators asked Stein any more questions, they again advised him of his right to an attorney. Given this record, we find that the motion was properly denied. This does not mean, however, that the investigator's comments regarding God were appropriate. Once an accused asks to speak to counsel, law enforcement officers should refrain from making any comments to an accused other than those necessary to properly process the accused through the system. Nevertheless, in this case, even were we to find that the comments did induce Stein's continued communication, given the significant amount of other incriminating evidence in this case, we would find that the admission of Stein's statements constituted harmless error. State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129 (Fla.1986).
In his next claim, Stein contends that the trial judge erred in allowing a suppression hearing to proceed in the absence of Stein's counsel. The record reflects that both Stein and Christmas filed motions to suppress the evidence seized from their residence, but that Christmas's counsel handled the presentation of the testimony of the only witness initially called at the suppression hearing. After Christmas's counsel concluded direct examination of the witness, Stein's counsel had to leave the hearing and, consequently, waived his appearance at the remainder of the hearing. Stein, however, chose to remain until the hearing was concluded. Given these facts, Stein contends that he was left to represent himself for the remainder of the hearing and that the trial judge made no inquiry as to either Stein's desire to waive his counsel's presence or his desire to represent himself at the hearing.
The record reflects that Stein's counsel discussed the waiver of his presence with Stein and that, upon inquiry by the judge, Stein simply requested to remain at the hearing as an observer subsequent to the waiver. Given that the presentation of the testimony was being handled by Christmas's attorney, that Stein was not placed in the position of having to represent himself, and that Stein was not prejudiced by his attorney's absence, we conclude that no inquiry by the court was necessary.
In his third claim, Stein contends that the trial judge erred in failing to declare a mistrial after two witnesses made certain...
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