Steinberg v. Steinberg (In re Steinberg Family Living Trust)
| Decision Date | 28 April 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 16-0380,16-0380 |
| Citation | 894 N.W.2d 463 |
| Parties | IN RE STEINBERG FAMILY LIVING TRUST David L. Steinberg, Appellee, v. Steven C. Steinberg, Appellant. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Erik W. Fern and Dale L. Putnam of Putnam, Fern & Thompson Law Office, P.L.L.C., Decorah, for appellant.
Tonita M. Helton of Helton Law Offices, PLLC, Leon, for appellee.
In this declaratory judgment action, we are asked to decide whether we should recognize an exception to the doctrine of ademption1 for real estate in a trust that was replaced through a like-kind tax exchange. In the alternative, we are asked to judicially adopt section 2–606 of the Uniform Probate Code involving ademption. Two brothers, the sole beneficiaries of the Steinberg Family Living Trust, brought competing motions for summary judgment regarding the distribution of property under the trust. The brothers, David and Steven, disagree as to whether a specific bequest was adeemed. Specifically, they requested a declaration of how a Minnesota farm should be distributed. While the Minnesota farm is now a part of the trust, it was acquired after the creation of the trust through a like-kind tax exchange of property. The property exchanged was specifically bequeathed to Steven. However, the acquired Minnesota farm is not specifically bequeathed to either beneficiary.
The district court held that the specific bequest was adeemed because the bequeathed parcel of land was no longer in existence or part of the trust assets. The district court further held that a piece of property that had been acquired in a like-kind tax exchange could not be substituted for the prior, specifically bequeathed parcel of property. Therefore, pursuant to a residuary clause of the trust, the Minnesota farm was ordered to be distributed equally between the two beneficiaries.
Additionally, the district court was asked to interpret Article 5, section B(1) of the trust. The district court found that this provision of the trust granting one brother the right to purchase or rent the other brother's specifically bequeathed property was ambiguous and conflicting. The district court declared that the provision granting Steven the option to purchase the Iowa farm from David, whether called a repugnancy or an inconsistency, was ineffective and struck it. The district court thereby granted summary judgment to David.
For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the district court to the extent it declared the specific bequest to Steven was adeemed and to the extent it concluded the Minnesota farm was to be distributed equally between the brothers. We reverse the decision of the district court to the extent it granted summary judgment to David on the disputed trust provision. While we agree the trust provision was ambiguous, we also find that there are genuine issues of material fact which preclude the entry of summary judgment in favor of David. We remand to the district court for a trial on the disputed trust provision.
On February 18, 2000, Jack and Clarine Steinberg established the Steinberg Family Living Trust. They appointed themselves and their son, Steven Steinberg, to serve as cotrustees. The trust provided that Steven and their other son, David Steinberg, would serve together as cotrustees upon the deaths of both Jack and Clarine. In addition to ultimately serving as cotrustees, David and Steven were the only named beneficiaries. The trust was never amended by Jack or Clarine.
Jack passed away on August 22, 2011, and Clarine passed away on July 24, 2013. At Clarine's death, the trust became irrevocable and triggered the appointment of David as cotrustee. David was appointed cotrustee in April 2014. At the time of Clarine's death, the trust held several assets, including the two parcels of real estate at issue in this case. David and Steven disagree as to their respective rights to the two properties and how they should be distributed.
The second property, the Iowa property, consists of approximately forty acres of land and is legally described as "The Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 16, in Township 99 North, Range 26 West of the 5th P.M., in Winnebago County, Iowa." At the time of Clarine's death, the Minnesota property was appraised at $567,000. The Iowa property was appraised at $9500 per acre, which amounts to approximately $380,000.
The parties agree that the "NW1/4NW1/4 Sec. 16-99-26" gifted to David refers to the Iowa property. Article 5, section C provides that Steven and David will have equal fifty percent shares of any remaining trust assets.
In 2008, while Clarine and Steven were cotrustees, the trust sold the Winnebago County, Iowa property described as "W1/2SW1/4 Sec. 16-99-26" (Winnebago property) and purchased the Minnesota property in a like-kind tax exchange. Therefore, at the time of Clarine's death, there were two parcels of land contained in the trust: the Iowa property and the Minnesota property. However, only the Iowa property was specifically gifted in the trust, to David. The Minnesota property was not mentioned anywhere in the trust.
Pursuant to the trust provision, Steven gave his notice of intent to purchase the Iowa property from David for $1500 per acre or approximately $60,000 for the forty acres. David responded by filing a declaratory judgment action on May 4, 2015, requesting that the district court clarify and interpret the trust as to the distribution of the two parcels of land remaining in the trust. In October, the parties filed competing motions for summary judgment. David's motion for summary judgment argued that the trust expressly gifted the Iowa property to him, subject to an option held by Steven to rent the property for $1500 per acre while David continued to own the property. David additionally argued that the Minnesota property should be split equally between himself and Steven under Article 5, section C of the trust. Steven's motion for summary judgment argued that the district court should issue a deed of trust for the Iowa property to him upon the payment of $60,000. Steven additionally argued that the Minnesota property should be conveyed solely to him based on the like-kind tax exchange for the Winnebago property specifically devised to him and not split equally under section C.
On December 4, the district court held a hearing on the competing motions for summary judgment. On February 2, 2016, the district court issued its ruling granting David's motion for summary judgment on both issues. Correspondingly, the district court denied Steven's motion for summary judgment. The district court held that since the Winnebago property was no longer an asset of the trust, the specific bequest of it to Steven was adeemed. The district court did not recognize an exception to the doctrine of ademption for the like-kind tax exchange of property. The Minnesota property therefore fell under Article 5, section C of the trust, which provides for an equal fifty percent division of the property between David and Steven. The district court also held that the trust agreement expressly gifted the Iowa property to David and the gift was an absolute devise. The district court struck the later provision that allowed Steven to purchase the property and declared that the trust "expressly gifts the Iowa property to David L. Steinberg, subject to an option held by Steven C. Steinberg to rent the Iowa property for $1500.00 an acre for so long as David L. Steinberg may own the property." Steven appealed, and we retained the appeal.
We review the district court's rulings on motions for summary judgment for correction of errors at law. Roll v. Newhall , 888 N.W.2d 422, 425 (Iowa 2016). "On review, ‘we examine the record before the district court to determine whether any material fact is in dispute, and if not, whether the district court correctly applied the law.’ " Id. (quoting J.A.H. ex rel. R.M.H. v. Wadle & Assocs., P.C. , 589 N.W.2d 256, 258 (Iowa 1999) ). Summary judgment is proper only when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact." Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(3). A genuine issue of material fact exists "if reasonable minds can differ on how the issue should be resolved." Iowa Arboretum, Inc. v. Iowa 4-H Found. , 886 N.W.2d 695, 701 (Iowa 2016) (quoting Cemen Tech, Inc. v. Three D Indus., L.L.C. , 753 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Iowa 2008) ). We view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Iowa Arboretum , 886 N.W.2d at 701. In doing so, we grant the nonmoving party "all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record." Roll , 888 N.W.2d at 425 (quoting Estate of Gray ex rel. Gray...
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