Steiner v. Melvin

• Decision Date: 14 July 1977
• Docket Number: 2,Nos. 1,3,No. 53525,53525,s. 1
• Citation: 143 Ga.App. 97,237 S.E.2d 635
• Parties: E. Ann STEINER et al. v. P. L. MELVIN
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 635

237 S.E.2d 635

143 Ga.App. 97

E. Ann STEINER et al. v. P. L. MELVIN.

No. 53525.

Court of Appeals of Georgia, Division Nos. 1, 2, 3.

July 14, 1977.

Rehearing Denied July 29, 1977.

Freeman & Hawkins, Paul M. Hawkins, William Q. Bird, Atlanta, for appellants.

Dennis, Corry, Webb, Carlock & Williams, Thomas S. Carlock, Wade K. Copeland, Atlanta, for appellee.

SMITH, Judge.

Mr. and Mrs. Steiner, the appellants, brought a wrongful death action against Melvin following a traffic accident in which the appellants' son was fatally injured. This appeal from the judgment entered on the jury verdict in the appellee's favor contends that irrelevant evidence was admitted and that various portions of the charge were erroneous. We find no error and affirm.

The accident occurred in Fulton County on a notorious segment of Powers Ferry Road. Traffic crossing a narrow, one-lane, 500 foot bridge spanning the Chattahoochee River is controlled by traffic lights on each end which are programmed to allow traffic from one direction, and then the other, to cross alternately. The decedent was traveling eastbound by motorcycle as he approached the bridge. Testimony admitted over objection showed that he stopped at the traffic light, which was red, but he ran it before it turned green and entered the bridge, accelerating to about 50 miles per hour. Other evidence showed that he reached the other side and traveled two hundred feet further before colliding with the appellee's vehicle which was turning left, from the west-bound lane, into the motorcycle's path.

1. The evidence that the decedent had disobeyed the red light on the bridge some 750 feet from the impact was admissible. This evidence was relevant as it was very closely connected by time and distance to the accident, and therefore bore directly on whether the decedent was exercising ordinary care for his own safety at the time and place of the accident. But in any event, where the relevancy of evidence is doubtful it should be admitted and its weight left to the determination of the jury. Lovejoy v. Tidwell, 212 Ga. 750, 751, 95 S.E.2d 784.

2. The trial judge properly charged the provisions of § 34 (Ga.L.1953, pp. 556, 569; Code Ann. § 68-1612) and § 48 (Ga.L.1953, pp. 556, 577; Code Ann. § 68-1626(c)) of the 1952 Highway Traffic Act. Although since repealed, each section was in effect at the time of the trial.

(a) Section 34 (Code Ann. § 68-1612) prohibited the disobedience of an official traffic control device. As the evidence of the violation of the traffic light was admissible (see Division 1 above), the charge of this provision was adjusted to the evidence.

(b) Section 48 (Code Ann. § 68-1626(c)) required a driver of a vehicle to drive at a reduced speed when traveling on a narrow or winding roadway, and when special hazards exist with respect to other traffic or by reason of highway conditions. Thus, this statutory provision was also adjusted to the evidence as it was shown that the bridge over which the decedent traveled immediately preceding the accident was very narrow and very old in appearance and with wooden decking as shown by photographs.

With regard to each of these sections, the judge properly instructed the jury that if it found any violation of these statutory provisions by plaintiff's decedent, it must then consider and determine whether the violation was the proximate cause of the collision.

3. The court did not err in refusing to charge the jury on the doctrine of last clear chance. On the trial of the case there was no evidence that the appellee had any opportunity to take evasive action after he became aware of the impending collision. "The last clear chance doctrine simply has no application unless the defendant knew of the plaintiff's perilous situation and had opportunity to take proper evasive action to avoid injuring him. It does not apply to a 'should know' or 'should have known' situation." Conner v. Mangum, 132 Ga.App. 100, 105-106(6), 207 S.E.2d 604, 609. See also Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Wallace, 123 Ga.App. 490, 491, 181 S.E.2d 542. There is no error in failing to charge a principle which is not applicable to the evidence adduced on the trial of the case. McLarty v. Emhart Corporation, 227 Ga. 104, 107(4), 179 S.E.2d 46.

4. The appellants contend the court erred in charging the following language: "I charge you that one who is himself rightfully using the roadway or street has a right to the use thereof which is superior to that of one who is violating traffic regulations, and in the absence of knowledge, such a person is not required to anticipate that some other user will unexpectedly violate the law or rule of the road and create a situation of danger." There was no error in giving this charge which is a correct statement of the law (Russell v. Corley, 212 Ga. 121, 122(2), 91 S.E.2d 24) and could be applied to the evidence presented by either party.

5. The appellants contend that the trial court has a responsibility upon request to instruct the jury with respect to the contentions of the parties. The general rule is that if the judge clearly and fairly gives to the jury the law applicable to the issues involved, his failure formally to state the contentions as shown by the pleadings will not be cause for a new trial. Central of Georgia Railway Co. v. McKinney, 118 Ga. 535(1), 536, 45 S.E. 430; Garmon v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 139 Ga.App. 152, 155(2), 227 S.E.2d 821. Here, the pleadings were read to the jury, and the court fully charged on the contentions of negligence as therein made which were supported by the evidence and the law. To have charged, as requested that the appellee was required to stop prior to making a left turn would have been more favorable to the appellants and would have resulted in an argumentative charge. There is no merit in this complaint.

Judgment affirmed.

BELL, C. J., DEEN, and QUILLIAN, P. JJ., and WEBB, MARSHALL, SHULMAN, and BANKE, JJ., concur.

McMURRAY, J., dissents.

McMURRAY, Judge, dissenting.

This wrongful death action arose when plaintiffs' decedent was killed while riding his motorcycle east on Powers Ferry Road in Fulton County and collided with an automobile driven by defendant. Several hundred feet west of the scene of the collision Powers Ferry Road crosses the Chattahoochee River by way of a narrow, one-lane bridge. Access to the bridge is controlled by traffic lights at each end of the bridge which allow traffic in only one direction to be upon the bridge at any one time. The traffic light at the west end of the bridge, which controls access to the bridge by eastbound motorists, was more than 750 feet from the scene of the collision. ...