Stephens v. State
| Decision Date | 16 March 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. 67435,67435 |
| Citation | 317 S.E.2d 627,170 Ga.App. 342 |
| Parties | STEPHENS v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Harlan M. Starr, Dalton, for appellant.
Stephen A. Williams, Dist. Atty., for appellee.
Appellant appeals from his conviction and the sentence which was entered on a jury verdict finding him guilty of burglary.
1. Appellant's first enumeration of error addresses the admission into evidence of an oral statement that he gave to police. Appellant's contention is that his statement was not voluntarily given and was made in the absence of his knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel.
When appellant contested the admissibility of his statement, the trial court conducted a Jackson-Denno hearing. Although not without conflict, the evidence presented at the hearing clearly authorized the trial court's finding that appellant was read his Miranda rights and, thereafter, signed a waiver of rights form before he gave his oral statement to the officers. No serious contention was made that the waiver or the subsequent statement was induced by threats, promises or coercion. "Under these circumstances, appellant's statement was freely and voluntarily given and the trial court did not err in failing to exclude it." Hance v. State, 245 Ga. 856, 859, 268 S.E.2d 339 (1980).
This result is not changed by the fact that, after making his oral statement, appellant refused to sign a written statement without first speaking with counsel. The trial court was authorized to find that this request for benefit of counsel, which was made only after the oral statement had been given, was the first time that appellant sought to invoke the constitutional rights that he had previously waived. The effect of this assertion by appellant of his right to counsel was to render inadmissible any statement subsequently given by him in violation thereof. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). It did not, however, have the effect of rendering inadmissible any previous statement which appellant had already made pursuant to a valid waiver of his constitutional rights. The holding in Edwards does not stand for the proposition "that the authorities could in no event use any incriminating statements made by [the accused] prior to his having access to counsel." Edwards v. Arizona, supra at 485, 101 S.Ct. at 1885. Appellant received the full protection afforded by Edwards when only his oral statement and nothing else was admitted into evidence against him.
Appellant further contends that the effect of the undisputed evidence that he invoked his right to counsel before signing a written statement is to bolster and enhance the credibility of his testimony that he had requested but had been denied an attorney several times previous to making the oral statement. A trial court's findings as to factual determinations and credibility relating to the admission of in-custody statements will be upheld on appeal unless clearly erroneous. See generally Gates v. State, 244 Ga. 587, 590, 261 S.E.2d 349 (1979). In the instant case, the trial court was clearly authorized to find, based upon the testimony of the interrogating officer, that appellant first invoked his right to counsel only after having already given an oral statement pursuant to a written waiver of rights.
Lastly, it is of no consequence that appellant signed no written statement. Myrick v. State, 155 Ga.App. 496, 497(2), 271 S.E.2d 637 (1980).
2. Appellant enumerates the denial of his motion for a directed verdict of acquittal. The contention is that there was insufficient evidence of unauthorized entry to authorize a finding of burglary.
The relevant evidence was as follows: Appellant's brother-in-law, who was one of the owners of the house where the burglary took place, testified that he left his residence, and locked the doors behind him. Sometime later, he returned and discovered that there had been a forced entry into his home and that several guns were missing. He further testified that he had given no one his "personal permission" to enter the house in his absence.
The other owner, appellant's sister, testified that she had spoken with appellant on the day of the break-in. According to her testimony, appellant called her at work and asked what time she would be getting off and whether her husband was at home. She told him that she did not...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Peebles v. State
...any previous statement which [defendant] had already made pursuant to a valid waiver of his constitutional rights." Stephens v. State, 170 Ga.App. 342(1), 343, 317 S.E.2d 627. Consequently, since evidence authorized a finding that defendant's first custodial statement was made after a knowi......
-
Cordy v. State
...relating to the admission of in-custody statements will be upheld on appeal unless clearly erroneous. [Cit.]" Stephens v. State, 170 Ga.App. 342, 343(1), 317 S.E.2d 627 (1984). There was no error in the admission of the 6. Cordy claims his convictions should be reversed because the prosecut......
-
Kirby v. State, 69553
...trier of fact could have found proof of [appellant's guilt of armed robbery] beyond a reasonable doubt." Stephens v. State, 170 Ga.App. 342, 344-345, 317 S.E.2d 627 (1984). Appellant also contends that the armed robbery conviction cannot stand because he was acquitted by the jury of aggrava......
-
Scott v. State
...clearly erroneous, they must be upheld. Gates v. State, 244 Ga. 587, 590(1), 261 S.E.2d 349 (1979); see also Stephens v. State, 170 Ga.App. 342, 343(1), 317 S.E.2d 627 (1984) The evidence of defendant's guilt met the requirements of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.......