Stephenson v. Furnas Elec. Co., 93-1366

• Decision Date: 19 October 1994
• Docket Number: No. 93-1366,93-1366
• Citation: 522 N.W.2d 828
• Parties: Bonnie STEPHENSON, Appellant, v. FURNAS ELECTRIC COMPANY and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, Appellees.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 828

522 N.W.2d 828

Bonnie STEPHENSON, Appellant, v. FURNAS ELECTRIC COMPANY and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, Appellees.

No. 93-1366.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Oct. 19, 1994.

Steven C. Jayne, Des Moines, for appellant.

Joseph S. Cortese II of Jones, Hoffmann, Huber, Kelley, Book & Cortese, Des Moines, for appellees.

Considered by HARRIS, P.J., and LARSON, CARTER, SNELL, and ANDREASEN, JJ.

HARRIS, Justice.

This is an appeal from a decision of the district court sitting on review of agency action in a workers' compensation claim. We affirm.

Appellant Bonnie Stephenson had been employed by Furnas Electric Co. (Furnas) in 1984 and again from 1986 to 1990. Her job responsibilities initially involved assembling and setting industrial switches. Beginning in December 1988 she developed a number of repetitive motion disorders (carpal, cubital, and ulnar tunnel syndromes), and underwent surgery for these conditions in 1989. After the operation she worked in different departments of Furnas, but the work continued to aggravate her condition. Her physician eventually prescribed permanent duty limitations, involving weight restrictions and absence of repetitive activities, but Furnas did not have work available to meet these requirements. She has been unable to find work within the restrictions prescribed by her physician. She continues to suffer from pain, and has difficulty doing even most basic household duties. Bonnie was given permanent impairment ratings of eight percent for the right upper extremity, and six percent of the left upper extremity.

After Bonnie applied for workers' compensation benefits, the deputy industrial commissioner held she was entitled to some, but not all of them. On her appeal the industrial commissioner affirmed in part, but reduced the award for permanent partial disability. The matter is before us on Bonnie's appeal from a district court decision affirming the commissioner.

I. Our review of agency action under Iowa Code section 17A.19(8) (1993) is to determine whether our conclusions are the same as those of the district court. Teleconnect Co. v. Iowa State Commerce Comm'n, 404 N.W.2d 158, 162 (Iowa 1987). The district court, and we, accord only limited deference to the agency's interpretation of law, including statutory and agency rule interpretations. Norland v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv., 412 N.W.2d 904, 908 (Iowa 1987). Our review of factual findings is greatly more circumscribed; we uphold the decision of the agency if it is supported by substantial evidence, when the record is viewed as a whole. Fernandez v. Iowa Dep't of Human Servs., 375 N.W.2d 701, 705 (Iowa 1985). We are not free to interfere with any agency finding where there is a conflict in the evidence or when reasonable minds might disagree about the inference to be drawn from the evidence, whether it is disputed or not. Ward v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 304 N.W.2d 236, 239 (Iowa 1981).

This is not to say we never interfere; the agency's decision cannot be unreasonable or involve an abuse of discretion. Unreasonableness is defined as action in the face of evidence as to which there is no room for difference of opinion among reasonable minds, or not based on substantial evidence. Frank v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 386 N.W.2d 86, 87 (Iowa 1986). Abuse of discretion is synonymous with unreasonableness, and involves lack of rationality, focusing on whether the agency has made a decision clearly against reason and evidence. Id. at 87. The agency of course cannot act unconstitutionally, in violation of a statutory mandate, or without substantial support in the record. Churchill Truck Lines, Inc. v. Transportation Regulation Bd., 274 N.W.2d 295, 299 (Iowa 1979). The court must "broadly and liberally" apply the agency findings in order to uphold, rather than defeat, the agency's decision. Ward, 304 N.W.2d at 237. The imposition of sanctions by administrative agencies is discretionary.

II. One assignment challenges a discretionary ruling by the deputy commissioner that struck the designation of an expert Bonnie hoped to call as a witness concerning her vocational rehabilitation. The challenged ruling was based on Iowa rule of civil procedure 125(c), the rule requiring parties to identify anticipated expert witnesses not previously disclosed "as soon as practicable, but in no event less than thirty days prior to the beginning of trial except on leave of court."

Bonnie's hearing was scheduled for December 5, 1991. She supplemented her response so as to identify her anticipated expert on November 5, 1991, thus complying with the thirty-day requirement. But the deputy found she had decided in early October to call the expert, and therefore concluded she ran afoul the "as soon as practicable" requirement of the rule. He therefore excluded the expert from testifying.

In challenging the ruling, Bonnie first argues the "thirty day" and the "as soon as practicable" requirements are alternative, so that compliance with either will suffice. We disagree; we think the two requirements are cumulative so that violation of either amounts to noncompliance. Neither do we agree with Bonnie's contention that the "as soon as practicable" requirement is somehow softened by the emphasis the deputy placed on the "thirty days prior to trial" language in its order assigning the matter for trial.

Bonnie makes a stronger argument in pointing to the severity of the sanction. Exclusion, the most severe available sanction under the rule, is not to be imposed lightly and is justified only when prejudice would result. Lambert v. Sisters of Mercy Health Corp., 369 N.W.2d 417, 421 (Iowa 1985). Prejudice here to Furnas' insurer is not great. But we cannot say that cutting by half (about sixty days to thirty days) the time...