Stern v. Chandler

• Citation: 134 A.2d 550,153 Me. 62
• Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Maine (US)
• Decision Date: 11 September 1957
• Parties: Harry STERN, Petitioner for Writ of Habeas Corpus v. Arthur W. CHANDLER, Sheriff, and W. Irving Thompson, Deputy Sheriff.

Page 550

134 A.2d 550

153 Me. 62

Harry STERN, Petitioner for Writ of Habeas Corpus v. Arthur W. CHANDLER, Sheriff, and W. Irving Thompson, Deputy Sheriff.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Sept. 11, 1957.

Harry Stern, Bangor, pro se.

Orman G. Twitchell, Bangor, for defendants.

Before WILLIAMSON, C. J., and WEBBER, BELIVEAU, TAPLEY, SULLIVAN and DUBORD, JJ.

DUBORD, Justice.

The petitioner is an attorney at law. During the trial of a criminal case before the Superior Court within and for the County of Penobscot, the petitioner while acting as an attorney for a respondent was adjudged guilty of criminal contempt of court. He was summarily sentenced to pay a fine of $100, and in default thereof, to serve 15 days in jail. The petitioner refused to pay the fine and was delivered into the custody of the Sheriff of Penobscot County and one of his Deputies, the respondents in the within cause. Petitioner forthwith addressed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to a Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court. The writ was issued and after hearing, the writ was dismissed and the petitioner was refused a discharge.

To this ruling dismissing the writ, petitioner took exceptions, and the cause is before us upon these exceptions. The extended bill of exceptions includes a transcript of the the testimony taken at the time of the hearing on the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. There is also included therein so much of the evidence as relates to the finding of the Judge of the Superior Court at the time of the petitioner was adjudged guilty of contempt and sentence summarily imposed upon him. The bill of exceptions shows that prior to imposition of sentence, the presiding justice made the following statement:

'Mr. Stern, throughout this trial I feel you are guilty of contempt of Court, so serious that I cannot disregard it. I feel at this trial your contempt has been so flagrant I have a duty to act upon it. I feel your use of the expression, 'damned fool,' in your argument to the jury illustrates plainly the contempt you have for the Court and the procedure and disregard of the obligations of a member of the Bar.'

There is nothing in the bill of exceptions attacking the jurisdiction of the Court nor the form of the commitment.

Under the provisions of Section 16, Chapter 106, R.S.1954, the Superior Court has power to punish for contempt.

However, even in the absence of such a statute, the power of the Superior Court to punish for contempts is unquestionable.

'The power of courts to punish for contempt has existed for earliest times. It was useless to establish courts unless they had authority to punish acts which might interrupt the orderly course of judicial procedure.' Cushman Co. v. Mackesy, 135 Me. 490, 494, 200 A. 505, 508, 118 A.L.R. 148.

'The power of inflicting punishment upon persons guilty of contempt of court may be regarded as an essential element of judicial authority. It is possessed as a part of the judicial authority granted to courts created by the Constitution of the United States or by the Constitutions of the several states. It is a power said to be inherent in all courts of general jurisdiction, whether they are state or Federal; such power exists in courts of general jurisdiction independently of any special or express grant of statute.' 12 Am.Jur. 418, § 40.

'Courts of justice are universally acknowledged to be vested, by their very creation, with power to impose silence, respect and decorum in their presence, and submission to their lawful mandates.' Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, 227, 5 L.Ed. 242; Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 303, 9 S.Ct. 77, 32 L.Ed. 405.

'The summary power to commit and punish for contempts tending to obstruct or degrade the administration of justice, is inherent in Courts of Chancery and other Superior Courts, as essential to the execution of their powers and to the maintenance of their authority, and is part of the law of the land, within the meaning of Magna Charta and of the twelfth article of our Declaration of Rights.' Cartwright's Case, 114 Mass. 230, 238, Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 303, 9 S.Ct. 77, 32 L.Ed. 405.

'The power to punish for contempt is inherent in the nature and constitution of a court. It is a power not derived from any statute, but arising from necessity; implied, because it is necessary to the exercise of all other powers.' In re Cooper, 32 Vt. 253, 257; Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 303, 9 S.Ct. 77, 32 L.Ed. 405.

Recognizing the power of the Superior Court in the instant case, to punish for contempt, we pass now to the question of the types of contempt.

'There are two kinds of contempt recognized by the authorities and by the practice of the courts. Criminal contempts are those committed in the immediate view and presence of the Court, such as insulting language, or acts of violence, which interrupt the regular proceedings in courts. This class of contempts may and should be punished summarily, and by the order of the presiding Judge, or the Court, after such hearing, at once, as the Court may deem just and necessary.'

'There is another class of contempts, which are in a sense constructive, and arise from matters not transpiring in Court, but in reference to failures to comply with the orders and decrees issued by the Court and to be performed elsewhere. Such refusals or failures are undoubtedly contempts, as actual as those committed in open Court, and liable to be punished under the same law. But the process to bring parties into Court, and the time given for a hearing by our rules, are different from the summary process in case of a criminal contempt before the Court.' Androscoggin & Kennebec R. Co. v. Androscoggin R. Co., 49 Me. 392, 400; Cheney v. Richards, 130 Me. 288, 292, 155 A. 642; Gendron v. Burnham, 146 Me. 387, 398, 82 A.2d 773, 38 A.L.R.2d 210; Cushman Co. v. Mackesy, supra.

'Contempts have been classified as either criminal or civil. * * * The same act of disobedience to a decree may fall into either class, according to the purpose for which and the manner in which the court may deal with it. If the penalty is not imposed wholly for the benefit of the aggrieved party, but in part at least is punishment for the affront to the law, the contempt is deemed criminal. If, on the other hand, the power of the court is used only to secure to the aggrieved party the benefit of the decree, either by means of a fine payable to the aggrieved party as a recompense for his loss through disobedience to the decree, or by means of imprisonment terminable upon compliance with the decree, then the contempt is deemed civil.' Godard v. Banson-Dow Mfg. Co., 319 Mass. 345, 65 N.E.2d 555, 557.

Contempts have been generally defined as:

'Any act which is calculated to embarrass, hinder, or obstruct the court in the administration of justice or to lessen its authority or dignity.' In re Holbrook, 133 Me. 276, 280, 177 A. 418, 420.

'Misconduct by an attorney which reflects improperly on the dignity or authority of the court, or which obstructs or tends to obstruct, prevent, or embarrass the due administration of justice, constitutes contempt. Thus an attorney's refusal or failure to heed a proper order or admonition of the court constitutes contempt, * * * so, also an attorney may be guilty of contempt for addressing insulting language to the court, or to an officer of the court, the jury, or a witness; and it is unnecessary that he be warned against the use of such language.' 17 C.J.S. Contempt § 25b, p. 35.

The petitioner, having been found guilty of criminal contempt committed in the presence of the Court, attacks the legality of the action of the Court and the sentence imposed upon him, by a means of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

It seems clear that at common law a court of competent jurisdiction was held to be the sole Judge of contempt against its authority and dignity. Thus, its judgment in such cases was final and conclusive, and in the absence of constitutional or statutory provisions, there was no right of review in contempt proceedings. 17 C.J.S. Contempt § 112, p. 150.

It was universally stated that every Superior Court of record being, at common law, the sole judge of contempts against its authority and dignity, it naturally resulted that the judgment of every such court, in cases of contempt was final and conclusive and not reviewable by any other tribunal. It was further held that the writ of habeas corpus is a collateral remedy, and under the well established rule that a judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a matter within its jurisdiction, cannot be collaterally impeached, the result was that, no question of jurisdiction being raised or involved, a conviction or commitment for contempt could not be reviewed by means of a writ of habeas corpus. At common law it was held that on a habeas corpus in a case of commitment for contempt, the Court could examine only two questions: first, as to jurisdiction, and secondly, as to the form of the commitment. When the jurisdiction was undoubted, and the commitment sufficient in form, the writ was discharged.

The common law doctrine was tersely expounded in Ex parte Kearney, 7 Wheat. 38, 5 L.Ed. 391, in these words.

'Generally speaking, the sole adjudication of contempt belongs exclusively and without interference to each respective court.'

In the leading case of Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 305, 9 S.Ct. 77, 32 L.Ed. 405, it is indicated that one imprisoned for contempt would be entitled to discharge only when the judgment lies without the jurisdiction of the Court, such judgment, under such circumstances, being a nullity.

"The power to commit or fine for contempt is essential to the existence of every court. Business cannot be conducted unless the court can suppress disturbances, and the only means of doing that is by immediate punishment. * * * It is a case that does not admit of delay, and the court would be without dignity that did not punish it promptly,...