Stewart v. Anderson
| Decision Date | 14 May 1913 |
| Parties | STEWART, Tax Collector, v. ANDERSON et al., Com'rs, etc. ARMISTEAD, Tax Receiver, v. SAME. WILKINSON, Ordinary, v. SAME. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
The act of August 22, 1911 (Acts 1911, p. 186), touching the salaries of certain county officers, while employing certain general terms, is so hedged about with provisions, restrictions, and limitations that it is in reality a special act, and, being in regard to a subject for which provision has previously been made by an existing general law, it is invalid.
(a) The act being unconstitutional, it was error to grant a mandamus to compel certain officers of Fulton county to file reports with the county commissioners, as therein provided.
Error from Superior Court, Fulton County; J. T. Pendleton, Judge.
Three actions by C. L. Anderson and others, as Commissioners of Roads and Revenues--one against A. P. Stewart, as Tax Collector; one against F. M. Armistead, as Tax Receiver; and the other against J. R. Wilkinson, as Ordinary. Judgments for plaintiffs, and defendants bring error. Reversed.
J. D Kilpatrick and Little & Powell, all of Atlanta, for plaintiffs in error.
L. Z Rosser and Hooper Alexander, both of Atlanta, for defendants in error.
ATKINSON J. (after stating the facts as above).
It is declared in article 1, § 4, par. 1, of the Constitution (Civil Code,§ 6391), that "laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation throughout the state, and no special law shall be enacted in any case for which provision has been made by an existing general law." A general law may be repealed or modified by another general law, but it cannot be repealed or modified by a special or local law. If the act under consideration is a general law, it is valid as against the contention that it violates the section of the Constitution above quoted. If it is a special or local law dealing with a subject as to which provision has already been made by an existing general law, then it is in conflict with that section and invalid. The question, therefore, is whether the act under consideration is a general or a special law. Has it uniform operation throughout the state? It does not purport to apply to all counties in the state, but only to such as meet a certain description. The Legislature may make classification for purposes of legislation and pass general laws with reference to such classes. They may classify counties. The basis of classification must have some reasonable relation to the subject-matter of the law, and must furnish a legitimate ground of differentiation. Mere arbitrary discriminations are not permissible under the Constitution. If a legitimate classification is made with respect to persons, the law must be applicable to all persons within the class, or coming within the class. If the classification is sought to be made with reference to counties, and the basis of classification is legal, the law must apply to all counties within the class, or which may come within the class. The Legislature could not constitutionally classify one county by itself. There must be some reasonable basis of classification, so that all which fall within the class may come within the scope of the provisions of the law. Although the act may purport to make a classification of counties for purposes of legislation, yet if the so-called class is so hedged about and restricted that the act applies to only one county, and that other counties coming within the class provided cannot also come within the purview of the law, it is in fact a local or special act, and not a general one. See Worth County v. Crisp County, 139 Ga. 117, 76 S.E. 747; Vaughn v. Simmons, 139 Ga 210, 76 S.E. 1004; Futrell v. George, 135 Ga. 265, 69 S.E. 182.
In the Worth County Case the act considered by this court purported to be a general one in regard to changing the dividing line between two counties, as to which subject-matter a general law already existed. The act provided that, where there are two contiguous counties, and according to the last United States census one of them has a population of not less than 16,422 nor more than 16,424, and the other has a population of not less than 19,146 nor more than 19,148, the dividing line between them may be changed in the manner therein pointed out. According to the last United States census, before the act was adopted, only the counties of Worth and Crisp had such populations as would render it applicable to them. It will be perceived that the act allowed a margin of only three as to the population of each county. While shaped in the form of a general act, it was palpable that the possibility of there being two other contiguous counties which would ever have populations respectively within those limitations were so remote as to form no basis for a reasonable classification, and that in effect the act applied to those two counties alone. It was accordingly held to be a special act, and unconstitutional. In the case of Vaughn v. Simmons, an act which sought to create a special school district, where there was a general law providing the manner of such creation, was held invalid, although it sought to accomplish that purpose by declaring the school district to be an incorporation. In the case of Futrell v. George, there was an attempted classification of counties having a population of between 7,000 and 8,000, or of between 13,700 and 14,000, or of between 16,000 and 21,000, as shown by the United States census for 1900, and it was sought to vary the general road law by such an act. It was patent that the description included only a few counties under the census of 1900, and that other counties which might at any time thereafter have a population within the limitations stated could not come within the provisions of the act. It was accordingly held unconstitutional.
Applying these tests to the present act, could it properly be called a general law, or is it a local or special one? The sole basis of classification mentioned in the act is that of population. It purports to make a class of all counties having a population of 100,000 by the last census or any future census. We think that the population of a county bears such a legitimate relation to the amount of work which county officers do and to the compensation which they receive by way of fees therefor as to furnish a reasonable basis for a classification relative to the constitutional requirement of generality which is now being considered. But, having specified a population of 100,000 as the basis of the classification, the Legislature did not stop there, but proceeded to hedge the act about with so many provisions restrictions, and limitations that it not only excluded counties which might possess the alleged basis of classification by some future census, so that the act could not apply to them, but...
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