Stinnie v. Holcomb
| Decision Date | 21 December 2018 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:16-CV-00044 |
| Citation | 355 F.Supp.3d 514 |
| Parties | Damian STINNIE, et al, Plaintiffs, v. Richard D. HOLCOMB, in His Official Capacity as the Commissioner of the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Virginia |
Alyssa M. Pazandak, Pro Hac Vice, McGuireWoods LLP, Dallas, TX, Angela A. Ciolfi, Mario David Salas, Legal Aid Justice Center, Mary Catherine Bauer, Southern Poverty Law Center, Jonathan Todd Blank, Benjamin Peter Abel, McGuireWoods LLP, Leslie Carolyn Kendrick, University Of Virginia School of Law, Charlottesville, VA, Brooke Alexandra Weedon, McGuire Woods LLP, David Preston Baugh, David P. Baugh, Esq., PLC, Patrick Stephen Levy-Lavelle, Legal Aid Justice Center, Richmond, VA, for Plaintiffs.
Maya Miriam Eckstein, Hunton & Williams LLP, Christian Arrowsmith Parrish, Trevor Stephen Cox, Margaret Hoehl O'Shea, Nancy Hull Davidson, Janet W. Baugh, Adam John Yost, Office of the Attorney General of Virginia, Richmond, VA, Neil Keith Gilman, Pro Hac Vice, Hunton Andrews Kurth, LLP, Stuart Alan Raphael, Hunton & Williams LLP, Washington, DC, for Defendant.
The plaintiffs in this putative class action have sued the Commissioner of Virginia's Department of Motor Vehicles, challenging the constitutionality of Virginia Code § 46.2-395 (" § 46.2-395"), which requires the automatic suspension of drivers' licenses for failure to pay state court fines and costs. Plaintiffs have moved for a preliminary injunction to: (1) enjoin the Commissioner from enforcing § 46.2-395 ; (2) remove current suspensions of Plaintiffs' driver's licenses imposed under § 46.2-395 ; and (3) enjoin the Commissioner from charging a fee to reinstate Plaintiffs' licenses where there are no other current restrictions on their licenses. The parties briefed the motion, and the Court held an evidentiary hearing and oral argument. Based on the current record, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their procedural due process claim because the Commissioner suspends licenses without an opportunity to be heard. The motion for a preliminary injunction will therefore be granted.
This case was first filed with this Court in July 2016 and was dismissed without prejudice. (Dkt. 57). The Fourth Circuit dismissed Plaintiffs' appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. Stinnie v. Holcomb , 734 F.App'x 858, 869 (4th Cir. 2018). The Fourth Circuit explained that this Court's "grounds for dismissal [did] not clearly indicate that no amendment in the complaint could cure the defects in the plaintiff's case." Id. at 861 (internal quotations omitted). Accordingly, on remand, in September 2018, Plaintiffs1 submitted an amended complaint, alleging that § 46.2-395"as written and as implemented by the [Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles ("DMV") Commissioner Richard D. Holcomb ("Commissioner") ] ... is unconstitutional on its face for failing to provide sufficient notice or hearing to any driver before license suspension." (Dkt. 84 ¶ 5). Plaintiffs also allege § 46.2-395 is "unconstitutional as applied to people who cannot afford to pay due to their modest financial circumstances." (Id. ).
In their motion for preliminary injunction, Plaintiffs request that this Court: "(1) enjoin the Commissioner from enforcing Section 46.2-395 against Plaintiffs and the Future Suspended Class Members without notice and determination of ability to pay; (2) remove any current suspensions of [Plaintiffs'] driver's licenses imposed under Section 46.2-395 ; and (3) enjoin the Commissioner from charging a fee to reinstate the Plaintiffs' licenses if there are no other restrictions on their licenses." (Dkt. 90 at 2).
In assessing the appropriateness of this relief, the Court finds the following facts from the preliminary injunction record.
1. Plaintiffs are Virginia residents whose licenses have been suspended due to failure to pay court fines and costs. (Dkt. 90 at 5).
2. Plaintiff Adrainne Johnson, a resident of Charlottesville, Virginia, is the mother of three children. (Dkt. 113 (Hr'g Tr.) at 15).
3. Johnson's license has been suspended "off and on since 2016," and is currently suspended for nonpayment of court fines and costs. (Id. ).
4. Due to her lack of a license, Johnson struggles to get to the grocery store or meet her daughter's medical needs, and cannot take her son to, or attend, any of his sporting events. (Id. at 17, 19).
5. Johnson's lack of a license has impacted her employment, causing her to lose a job, preventing her from being hired, and frustrating her opportunities for advancement. (Id. at 17–19).
6. Johnson and her children currently share a single family home with another family, but with a better paying job, she would be able to improve her living situation. (Id. at 18).
7. Johnson's current income does not leave her with any money after necessary expenses each week. (Id. at 16).
8. At no time did any court inquire how much Johnson could afford to pay or inform her about the availability of alternatives to payments, and she has been unable to provide the requested amount. (Id. at 38–41).2
9. Plaintiffs Stinnie and Adams find themselves in similar circumstances. (See Dkt. 90-3 and 90-4).
10. Stinnie describes a "cycle of debt, license suspension, and more debt and incarceration for driving while suspended" that prevents him from improving his employment situation or meeting basic needs, such as medical treatment and housing. (Dkt. 90-3 at 2).
11. Adams's license is currently suspended because she cannot afford to pay court fines and costs. (Dkt. 90-4 at 1).
12. Adams's "rare and serious blood disorder" has prevented her from maintaining steady employment, and although she initially made payments on her court debt, she could not "keep [them] up and support [herself] and [her] son on [her] limited income." (Id. ).
13. At no time before the suspension of their licenses were Stinnie or Adams asked about their financial circumstances or reasons for non-payment. (Dkt. 90-3 at 3; dkt. 90-4 at 2).
14. Plaintiffs Bandy and Morgan's licenses were suspended for several years and were recently reinstated, but both face imminent suspension because they cannot afford the payments required by their payment plans. (Dkt. 90-6 at 1; dkt. 90-7 at 1).
15. Bandy and Morgan are currently on installment plans established to pay state court fines and costs, but they face the decision of providing necessities for their families, such as water and electricity, or paying monthly installments. (Dkt. 90-6 at 2; dkt. 90-7 at 4).
16. There was no inquiry into Bandy or Morgan's financial circumstances before or after their licenses were suspended. (Dkt. 90-6 at 1; dkt. 90-7 at 1–2).
17. Loss of a driver's license adversely affects people's ability to gain and maintain employment, often leading to a reduction in income. (Hr'g Tr. at 112).
18. When suspension occurs pursuant to § 46.2-395, neither a judge nor a clerk enters an order suspending the license or notifies the debtor of a license suspension. (Id. at 45–47, 66).
19. Rather, DMV inputs suspensions based on electronic data automatically transmitted from state court computers to DMV. (Id. at 46, 146–7).
20. At sentencing hearings in Virginia state courts, the presiding judge assesses court fines and costs as well as their due date. (Id. at 45–46)
21. At (or within five days of) sentencing, a criminal defendant is provided with a notice indicating possible license suspension if he or she does not pay assessed costs by a designated date. (Id. at 45; 67; 73; § 46.2-395(C) ).
22. After sentencing, the court's disposition, assessed costs, and the due date of any assessed costs are entered into the Circuit Case Management System ("CCMS") and the Financial Accounting System ("FAS").3 (Hr'g Tr. at 43–44, 46).
23. The date that costs become due may be years after the date of sentencing. (Id. at 46, 113).4
24. If a person fails to pay assessed costs within 40 days of the designated date, a fines and costs indicator is automatically, electronically transmitted to DMV.5 (Id. at 46, 66).
25. This information is transmitted from CCMS to the Court Automated Information System, a "system-to-system" process between DMV and the Supreme Court Office of the Executive Secretary ("OES") that allows DMV to routinely receive data from state courts. (Id. at 52, 134).
26. Data goes from CCMS to the Court Automated Information System through OES without any action by the courts. (Id. ).
27. At the time of default, neither the judge nor the clerk enters an order regarding a driver's license suspension for failure to pay fines and costs. (Id. at 45).
28. At the time of default, no notice is sent to the licensee regarding the pending license suspension. (Id. at 47, 70).
29. Through a computer-generated report, the state court clerk's office is able to review information sent to DMV, but the court does not contact defaulted individuals to inform them of license suspensions. (Id. at 54–55).
30. The computer-generated report is used only to ensure that payments or non-payments are appropriately recorded. (Id. at 56).
31. Upon receipt of information regarding non-payment of court fines and costs, DMV records a license suspension and sends a letter informing the defaulted individual that his or her license has been suspended for failure to pay court debt. (Id. at 46).
32. The driving transcript updated by DMV is made available to law enforcement, courts, and attorneys, and can be obtained by insurance companies, as well as individuals. (Id. at 138).
33. Without DMV's actions, an individual's driving record would not reflect a suspension. (Id. at 147).
34. State courts have the authority to create installment payment plans to aid individuals struggling to pay court fines and costs. (Id. at 112); Va. Code § 19.2-354.1.
35. DMV can remove a license suspension based on failure to pay court fines and costs where a...
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