Stinson v. State
Decision Date | 08 February 2010 |
Docket Number | No. S09A2015.,S09A2015. |
Citation | 286 Ga. 499,689 S.E.2d 323 |
Parties | STINSON v. The STATE. |
Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Jason W. Swindle, Carrollton, for appellant.
David McDade, Dist. Atty., Ryan R. Leonard, Asst. Dist. Atty., Thurbert E. Baker, Atty. Gen., Christopher R. Johnson, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Douglas Teeandre Stinson pled guilty to felony murder, kidnapping with bodily injury, kidnapping, aggravated assault, armed robbery, and hijacking a motor vehicle. The trial court imposed concurrent life sentences for murder and kidnapping with bodily injury, and concurrent 20-year terms for the remaining offenses. Shortly thereafter, newly appointed counsel filed a motion to withdraw the guilty plea on several grounds. After a hearing thereon, the trial court denied the motion, and Stinson appeals.* See Carter v. Johnson, 278 Ga. 202, 204(2), 599 S.E.2d 170 (2004).
"Although a guilty plea may be withdrawn anytime before sentencing, once a sentence has been entered, a guilty plea may only be withdrawn to correct a manifest injustice." [Cits.] The test for manifest injustice "will by necessity vary from case to case, but it has been said that withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice if, for instance, a defendant is denied effective assistance of counsel, or the guilty plea was entered involuntarily or without an understanding of the nature of the charges." [Cit.]
Maddox v. State, 278 Ga. 823, 826(4), 607 S.E.2d 587 (2005). Two of these issues are raised in this appeal.
1. Stinson first contends that his guilty plea was not entered knowingly and voluntarily.
(a) One of Stinson's arguments in support of this contention is that his testimony shows that he did not understand his rights under Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), and that plea counsel failed to go over them before entry of the guilty plea.
On the day of the plea hearing, however, Stinson "signed a statement acknowledging that he understood the plea and the rights he was waiving." Rios v. State, 281 Ga. 181(1), 637 S.E.2d 20 (2006). See also Rogers v. State, 286 Ga. 55, 56, fn. 2, 685 S.E.2d 281 (2009). At the hearing, both the prosecutor and the trial court "reviewed the [Boykin] rights [Stinson] would be waiving by pleading guilty, [cit.], and [he] waived those rights[,]" affirmatively responding when asked whether he understood them. Rios v. State, supra. See also Rogers v. State, supra at 56, 685 S.E.2d 281.
In its order denying the motion to withdraw the guilty plea, the trial court found that the State met its affirmative burden of proving Stinson's knowing and voluntary waiver of his rights "through its proffer of the guilty plea transcript, the waiver of rights form entered by [Stinson] upon entering the plea, and the testimony of" his plea counsel. These portions of the record support the trial court's finding. Rogers v. State, supra; Jackson v. State, 285 Ga. 840, 841(1), 684 S.E.2d 594 (2009); Rios v. State, supra.
(b) Stinson also argues that he did not understand that one consequence of his guilty plea would be ineligibility for parole until he had served 30 years. See OCGA § 17-10-6.1(c)(1). However, the defendant's lack of knowledge of such collateral consequences does not affect the voluntariness of the plea. Williams v. Duffy, 270 Ga. 580, 581-582(1), 513 S.E.2d 212 (1999). Smith v. Williams, 277 Ga. 778, 779(1), 596 S.E.2d 112 (2004). Accordingly, we will proceed to address Stinson's separate contention that plea counsel rendered ineffective assistance by affirmatively misrepresenting parole eligibility.
2. To prove ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to a guilty plea, pursuant to Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985), Smith v. Williams, supra. " Seabolt v. State, 279 Ga. 518, 520-521(2), 616 S.E.2d 448 (2005).
At the hearing on the motion to withdraw the guilty plea, Stinson testified that, on the day of the guilty plea and on the preceding Friday, plea counsel erroneously told him that he would serve only 20 years on the life sentence. However, both the plea sheet and the felony sentence sheet, which were signed by Stinson, specifically showed that he would be eligible for parole after serving 30 years. See Leonard v. State, 297 Ga.App. 515, 516, 677 S.E.2d 726 (2009). At the hearing on the motion, plea counsel testified that he advised Stinson that 30 years would be the minimum time which he would have to serve in order to become eligible for parole. The trial court recognized the conflict in the evidence and chose not to believe Stinson, but rather to accept the testimony of plea counsel.
The trial court's Jackson v. State, supra at 842(2), 684 S.E.2d 594. Our review of the record reveals no such error. The trial court Rios v. State, supra at 182(2), 637 S.E.2d 20. See also Seabolt v. State, supra at...
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...actual value of any commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel’ ” (citation omitted)); Stinson v. State, 286 Ga. 499, 500, 689 S.E.2d 323 (2010) (explaining that “the defendant's lack of knowledge of such collateral consequences does not affect the voluntariness of......
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