Stokes v. State

• Decision Date: 10 December 1980
• Docket Number: No. 16,16
• Citation: 423 A.2d 552,289 Md. 155
• Parties: Bernard Lee STOKES v. STATE of Maryland.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 155

289 Md. 155

423 A.2d 552

Bernard Lee STOKES v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 16.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Dec. 10, 1980.

Nancy Louise Cook, Asst. Public Defender, Baltimore, (Alan H. Murrell, Public Defender, on brief), Baltimore, for appellant.

Thomas P. Barbera, Asst. Atty. Gen., Baltimore, (Stephen H. Sachs, Atty. Gen., Baltimore, on brief), for appellee.

Argued before MURPHY C.J. and SMITH, DIGGES, ELDRIDGE, COLE, Davidson and Rodowsky, JJ.

DIGGES, Judge.

In this case we are called upon to apply that venerable principle of Maryland criminal law which prohibits the use of a defendant's significantly incriminating remark when that statement was extracted from him by promise of favor or threat of punishment.

The facts are not in dispute. At 2:30 a. m. on November 14, 1974, two narcotics officers of the Baltimore City Police Department, armed with a warrant, arrived to conduct a search for controlled dangerous substances at the house where petitioner Bernard Lee Stokes and his wife were living with several other persons. Upon entering the dwelling, the officers immediately went up to the Stokes' third floor bedroom where the two were sleeping. After identifying themselves, explaining their purpose, and advising the couple of their Miranda rights, the officers proceeded to search the room. Following an unsuccessful exploration lasting about five minutes, the officers terminated their quest, turned to Stokes and informed him "that if he would produce the narcotics, his wife would not be arrested." As a result of this assurance, the petitioner revealed to the officers that drugs were hidden in a "drop ceiling" on the left side of the room. ¹ The officers then seized the contraband, heroin, and charged Stokes with its possession. At the ensuing trial in the Criminal Court of Baltimore (Grady, J.), Stokes objected to and moved to suppress both the heroin and his statement as to its location. The motion was denied, and Stokes was convicted of the possession charge.

On certiorari to this Court, after his conviction was affirmed in an unreported opinion by the Court of Special Appeals, petitioner contends, as he unsuccessfully contended both in the trial court and in the intermediate appellate court, that his inculpatory statement was involuntary since it was induced by a police promise not to arrest his wife. The State counters with an assertion that this promise, being one primarily designed "to benefit a relative" of the accused, does not impair the admissibility of the inculpatory statement extracted from Stokes nor the drugs which it revealed. Alternatively, the State urges that even if the petitioner's statement is determined to have been involuntarily made, the seized heroin was properly admitted into evidence because the secreted drugs would inevitably have been discovered by the searching police without reliance on Stokes' guidance. Since we do not agree with either of these assertions, we will reverse the judgment entered in this cause.

Little more than one year has elapsed since this Court, in Hillard v. State, 286 Md. 145, 406 A.2d 415 (1979), distilled and rearticulated the criminal law of Maryland concerning the voluntariness and admissibility of "significantly incriminating" statements resulting from "promises and other similar forms of inducement designed to elicit" inculpatory remarks. 286 Md. at 150-151, 406 A.2d at 418-419. Following an analysis of this State's relevant cases, we determined in Hillard:

(u)nder Maryland criminal law, independent of any federal constitutional requirement, if an accused is told, or it is implied, that making an inculpatory statement will be to his advantage, in that he will be given help or some special consideration, and he makes remarks in reliance on that inducement, his declaration will be considered to have been involuntarily made and therefore inadmissible.

(Thus,) it must be shown (by the State) ... that the defendant's decision to make a statement ... was not induced by any promise of favor or threat of punishment. (286 Md. at 153-154, 406 A.2d at 420.)

Recognizing the substantial barrier to its position caused by Hillard, the State, in its effort to parry defeat, urges that the teachings of two of our earlier cases, Rogers v. State, 89 Md. 424, 43 A. 922 (1899), and Jones v. State, 229 Md. 165, 182 A.2d 784 (1962), were neither under attack nor considered by our decision in Hillard, and, consequently, that opinion must be read in tandem with these two earlier precedents. Reasoning that since "Rogers and Jones conclusively indicate that a promise to benefit a relative of a defendant is not sufficient, by itself, to support a finding that an admission in response thereto is involuntary under Maryland criminal law," the Attorney General extrapolates that those cases, rather than Hillard, are the controlling precedents here. Since, in our view, Rogers and Jones harbor no such undertone, and since we consider the Hillard doctrine to be controlling in the circumstances here, we assess the State's position to be without merit.

In Rogers, at the time the defendant and his sister were being questioned in the same room about a homicide, the brother confessed to having committed the murder following a police remark that "if your sister is innocent you are the only one who knows so, and it is your duty as a man to tell what you know about it." 89 Md. at 426-427, 43 A. at 923. The confession was admitted at trial, which ruling was upheld by this Court on appeal. In that case, however, it is clear that there was no threat, promise, or quid pro quo posited by the police remark, and therefore no factual predicate existed to support a finding of involuntariness. Thus, Rogers was not concerned with the issue petitioner presents here and constitutes no authority supportive of the contention made by the State.

In Jones, the trial court was faced with a claim, contradicted by the police, that the officers threatened prosecution of the defendant's pregnant common law wife in order to induce him to confess to a murder. 229 Md. at 171-172, 182 A.2d at 787. The circuit court resolved this evidentiary conflict against the defendant and this ruling was subsequently upheld on appeal. Id. at 172, 182 A.2d at 787. See Jackson v. State, 13 Md.App. 31, 36, 280 A.2d 914, 917 (1971). So, although the evidence presented at trial in Jones posed the issue we now ponder, the trial court there, by its resolution of this testimonial disagreement, destroyed any dispositive precedential impact the case otherwise may have had.

Turning now to the facts before us in this case, it is clear that the police not only promised petitioner they would not arrest his wife if he revealed the location of the heroin, but in addition, this promise bore fruit, for it is equally apparent that Stokes' statement directly resulted from that entreaty. The State's case is therefore reduced to dependence on an argument that "a promise to benefit a relative is not that type of advantage, help or special consideration to an accused which is contemplated by Hillard." Responding to this contention with respect to the reach of Hillard, we make clear here, even if beclouded until now, that the mandate of that case encompasses the issue presented in this case and is dispositive of it. The rule in Hillard announces that a statement is rendered involuntary if it is induced by any official promise which redounds to the benefit or desire of the defendant. And this necessarily includes a promise not to harm (physically or emotionally) a near relative with whom the defendant naturally has a close bond of affection. ² Indeed, in line with what we have just said with respect to a near relative, our predecessors in Jones v. State, supra, by their very willingness to examine the issue whether sufficient evidence existed to support the finding of the trial court that no threat to arrest the defendant's common law wife was in fact made, necessarily recognized that such an inducement, if proven, would have rendered the defendant's statement involuntary.

That principle of Maryland criminal law which excludes an inculpatory statement induced by "any promise of favor or threat of punishment," Hillard, supra, 286 Md. at 154, 406 A.2d at 420, is, perhaps, more extensive than those of other jurisdictions. See, e. g., Biscoe v. State, 67 Md. 6, 7-10, 8 A. 571, 572-573 (1887) (defendant's confession given after an official urged "that it would be better for him to tell the truth" found to be involuntary). Nevertheless, we find substantial agreement that a promise not to arrest a near relative of the defendant, or a threat to do so, constitutes a form of inducement which will render a resulting statement involuntary. See, e. g., Lynum v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534, 83 S.Ct. 917, 920, 9 L.Ed.2d 922 (1963) (confession made after police threatened that state financial aid to defendant's children would be cut off and children taken from her); People v. Manriquez, 231 Cal.App.2d 725, 42 Cal.Rptr. 157 (1965) (defendant's production of narcotics from his kitchen in response to police promise not to arrest his wife); People v. Rand, 202 Cal.App.2d 668, 21 Cal.Rptr. 89 (1962) (defendant's admission that marijuana cigarettes were his prompted by police threat to arrest his wife and take his children "to juvenile"); Jarriel v. State, 317 So.2d 141 (Fla.App.1975) (threat to arrest wife unless defendant made statement); Hall v. State, 255 Ind. 606, 266 N.E.2d 16 (1971) (statement made after police noted that if defendant did not confess, his wife would be arrested and his children placed in the custody of others); Hammer v. Commonwealth, 207 Va. 135, 148 S.E.2d 878 (1966) (confession in response to police chief's promise to refrain from arresting defendant's wife and parents for possession of stolen property). Neither Maryland nor any other jurisdiction of which we are aware, however, goes so far as to say that a confession...