Stroble v. Sir Speedy Printing Ctr.

• Decision Date: 24 July 1990
• Docket Number: No. 90AP-25,90AP-25
• Parties: STROBLE, Appellant, v. SIR SPEEDY PRINTING CENTER et al., Appellees.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

Page 682

68 Ohio App.3d 682

589 N.E.2d 449

STROBLE, Appellant, v. SIR SPEEDY PRINTING CENTER et al., Appellees.

No. 90AP-25.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Tenth District, Franklin County.

Decided July 24, 1990.

Larry R. Zingarelli, Columbus, for appellant.

Kent F. Ozmun, Grove City, for appellees.

BOWMAN, Judge.

Appellant, Shirley Stroble, worked for appellee, Sir Speedy Printing Center ("Speedy"), for over three years. During the course of her employment with Speedy, appellant received yearly reviews, all of which were very positive. Stroble's two-year review states, in part:

"1.) It has been a pleasure working with you during this past year. I have been pleased with your work habits and your attitude. You have taken on new responsibilities willingly and have done everything you can to serve our customers with quality and on-time delivery.

"2.) You have shown leadership qualities since taking over managerial responsibilities in October. I have appreciated your unselfish desire to improve our business, and in helping me in so many ways.

" * * *

"5.) As I mentioned to you, I am going to investigate some type of retirement plan that I could start for you. I feel that we should be looking at the future, and it seems to me that you are interested in a long term working relationship. Of course, this is what I would desire also, and am willing to help you with whatever considerations we can agree upon to satisfy your financial needs, along with professional growth."

Stroble's three-year review states, in part:

"2.) You continue to maintain excellent work habits and produce excellent quality printing from your press. You have also taken on the managerial responsibilities with energy and determination. * * *

" * * *

"4.) I would like to offer you a 5% raise effective today (Feb. 4), which would bring your hourly rate to $11.81. * * * I want to take this opportunity to tell you again something I dont't [sic ] say often enough. That is: I appreciate you as a person and what you do for the business. I am glad that you work here and hope we will have many more years of working together."

On April 27, 1988, Stroble was discharged by appellee, Barry Lowry ("Lowry").

On February 21, 1989, appellant filed a complaint against appellees for wrongful discharge. On October 3, 1989, appellees filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that appellant was an employee at will. Appellees attached an affidavit of Lowry in which he states that, starting in February 1988, Stroble's relationship with him and other employees, as well as her job performance, deteriorated. As a result, Lowry fired Stroble on April 27, 1988. Lowry also avers that he did not promise Stroble employment, although he had hoped the employer-employee relationship would continue. In opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Stroble submitted her yearly reviews and an affidavit in which she states that, based on her job performance reviews, she understood her job to be secure, that she could only be terminated for cause and she did not accept other employment. The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment and Stroble timely filed a notice of appeal on January 5, 1990, asserting a single assignment of error:

"The trial court erred in determining that as a matter of law there was insufficient evidence of an express or implied contract of continued employment between Appellant and Appellees, and that there was insufficient evidence of detrimental reliance by Appellant upon any such contract, to allow the claim of breach of contract under Mers v. Dispatch Printing Co. 19 Ohio St.3d 100 [19 OBR 261, 483 N.E.2d 150] to be given to a jury."

Pursuant to Civ.R. 56(C), summary judgment may be rendered where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Summary judgment may not be rendered unless it appears that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, which is adverse to the party against whom the motion is made. For the reasons that follow, we are unable to say that reasonable minds could come to but one conclusion and find the trial court erred in granting summary judgment.

Stroble argues that there exist genuine issues of fact as to whether Speedy and Lowry could reasonably expect appellant to conclude from the statements in the yearly reviews that she had a contract of employment that could only be terminated for just cause and whether Stroble relied on that promise to her detriment. Appellees argue that the phrases relied on by Stroble are only phrases of praise rather than those involving promises. Appellees cite the Ohio Supreme Court's statement in Helmick v. Cincinnati Word Processing, Inc. (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 131, 135-136, 543 N.E.2d 1212, 1216-1217, " * * * [t]here is no question that, standing alone, praise with respect to job performance and discussion of future career development will not modify the employment-at-will relationship. * * * "

The trial court agreed with appellees and found that " * * * the language relied upon by Plaintiff in the three year evaluation letter does not, as a matter of law, form a basis for reasonable reliance. * * * " The court based its decision on the following statement in appellant's evaluation letter, which stated:

" * * * I am glad that you work here and hope we will have many more years of working together."

The court reasoned that the word "hope" was not in any way definitive and, therefore, found " * * * no material issue of genuine fact to support Plaintiff's claim as this particular phrase was allegedly relied upon to her supposed detriment. * * * "

There is no dispute that, absent an agreement to the contrary, either party to an oral employment-at-will agreement may terminate the employment relationship for any reason which is not contrary to law. However, there are cases where the parties have effectively altered the original employment-at-will contract by an explicit or implicit agreement concerning discharge. Mers v. Dispatch Printing Co. (1985), 19 Ohio St.3d 100, 19 OBR 261, 483 N.E.2d 150. "An additional limit on an employer's right to discharge occurs where representations or promises have been made to the employee which fall within the doctrine of promissory estoppel. * * * " Id. at 104, 19 OBR at 264, 483 N.E.2d at 154. " * * * Employee handbooks, company policy, and oral representations have been recognized in some situations as comprising components or evidence of the employment contract. * * * " Id. at 104, 19 OBR at 264, ...