Strongin v. Nyquist

• Decision Date: 10 November 1976
• Citation: 54 A.D.2d 1031,388 N.Y.S.2d 683
• Parties: In the Matter of Jeanette P. STRONGIN, Appellant, v. Ewald B. NYQUIST, as Commissioner of Education of the State of New York, et al., Respondents.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 683

388 N.Y.S.2d 683

54 A.D.2d 1031

In the Matter of Jeanette P. STRONGIN, Appellant, v. Ewald B. NYQUIST, as Commissioner of Education of the State of New York, et al., Respondents.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department.

Nov. 10, 1976.

Eugene M. Kaufman, New York City, for appellant.

Robert D. Stone, Albany (Louis H. J. Welch, Albany, of counsel), for Nyquist.

Joseph R. Zibelli, Mount Vernon, for Bd. of Ed. of the School Dist. of the City of Mount Vernon and William C. Pratella, as Superintendent of Schools of the City School District of Mount Vernon.

Before KOREMAN, P.J., and SWEENEY, KANE, MAHONEY and LARKIN, JJ.

MEMORANDUM DECISION.

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court at Special Term, entered December 13, 1974 in Albany County, which dismissed petitioner's application, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, to vacate and set aside the decision of respondents, Commissioner of Education and Board of Education, finding petitioner guilty of all of the charges and specifications against her, and terminating her services as a tenured teacher in the Mount Vernon School District.

Petitioner, a tenured teacher, had charges preferred against her and, after a hearing pursuant to section 3020--a of the Education Law, the hearing panel unanimously found petitioner not guilty. The Board of Education rejected the panel's findings, found the petitioner guilty and immediately discharged her. Petitioner filed an appeal with the Commissioner of Education who sustained the board's action. An article 78 proceeding was thereafter commenced against the Commissioner of Education and the Board of Education. The petition was dismissed in all respects and this appeal ensued.

Relying upon Kinsella v. Board of Education D.C., 378 F.Supp. 54, petitioner urges that section 3020--a of the Education Law was unconstitutional at the time of these proceedings due to the fact that it did not require that the school board's decision be based upon the record developed before the hearing panel and the fact that it did not require that the school board render a written decision setting forth its reasoning and factual basis for its decision. When the constitutionality of a State statute is in question, notification of the Attorney General is required (Executive Law, § 71; CPLR 1012, subd. (b)). It was not given here. We deem it immaterial, however, for we find it unnecessary to reach the constitutional issue since the record reveals that the board specifically stated in its determination that it arrived at its decision after deliberation upon the transcripts of the hearings. We are also of the view that the board sufficiently stated the reasons relied upon for the determination (Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287).

Petitioner claims a denial of due process in that the board had an alleged financial interest in the outcome of the proceeding and because the board ruled upon whether or not there was probable cause after the filing of charges. It has been held that a person with a substantial pecuniary interest in a dispute should not participate in its adjudication (Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 93 S.Ct. 80, 34 L.Ed.2d 267; Tumey v. Ohio,273 U.S. 510, 47 S.Ct. 437, 71 L.Ed. 749). Considering that we are dealing with the pay of only one school counselor, we are of the opinion that the board did not have such a substantial pecuniary interest so as to disqualify it as a decision-maker under these circumstances. Since the record fails to disclose any evidence that the board members were actually biased against the...