Stupak v. Winter Park Leasing, Inc.

• Decision Date: 05 September 1991
• Docket Number: No. 76495,76495
• Citation: 585 So.2d 283
• Parties: Jeffrey D. STUPAK, Petitioner, v. WINTER PARK LEASING, INC., Respondent. 585 So.2d 283, 16 Fla. L. Week. S600
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 283

585 So.2d 283

Jeffrey D. STUPAK, Petitioner, v. WINTER PARK LEASING, INC., Respondent.

No. 76495.

585 So.2d 283, 16 Fla. L. Week. S600

Supreme Court of Florida.

Sept. 5, 1991.

David C. Beers of Beers, Jack, Tudhope & Wyatt, P.A., Orlando, for petitioner.

Lamar D. Oxford of Dean, Ringers, Morgan & Lawton, Orlando, for respondent.

GRIMES, Justice.

We review Stupak v. Winter Park Leasing, Inc., 563 So.2d 1102 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990). The basis for our jurisdiction lies in the fact that the district court of appeal rendered a per curiam decision in reliance upon Kraemer v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 556 So.2d 431 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989), a case which this Court subsequently accepted for review. Art. V, Sec. 3(b)(3), Fla.Const.; Jollie v. State, 405 So.2d 418 (Fla.1981).

Jeffrey Stupak was injured while riding in a car driven by David Flory. Flory rented the car from Major Rent-A-Car, which leased it from Winter Park Leasing, Inc., under a master lease agreement covering a number of vehicles. Stupak sued Flory, Major Rent-A-Car, and Winter Park Leasing, Inc. The trial court entered summary judgment for Winter Park Leasing, Inc. The district court of appeal affirmed without discussion, citing Kraemer. In Kraemer, the district court of appeal held that the lessor of a vehicle under a long-term lease agreement was not the beneficial owner of the vehicle and could not be held liable for injuries caused when the vehicle was involved in an accident after the lessee loaned the car to a third party.

In an opinion issued after the Fifth District Court of Appeal's opinion in this case, this Court quashed the lower court's decision in Kraemer and held that the lessor could be held liable under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine. Kraemer v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 572 So.2d 1363 (Fla.1990). The material provisions of the lease agreements at issue here and in Kraemer are the same. ¹ In view of our decision in Kraemer, the lower court's reliance here on the district court of appeal's opinion in that case is in error.

Winter Park Leasing, Inc., argues, however, that the trial court ordered summary judgment due to Flory's "theft or conversion" of the vehicle and that this Court should approve the result reached below on that basis. The rental agreement between Flory and Major Rent-A-Car expired on November 1, p.m., 1987. The accident occurred at approximately 2 a.m., November 2, 1987. The contract specifies that vehicles not returned by the due date are considered theft by conversion. In Susco Car Rental System v. Leonard, 112 So.2d 832 (Fla.1959), this Court held that, under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine, the owner of a rented vehicle may be held responsible for damages resulting from the operation of the vehicle by someone other than the person to whom it was rented, even though the operation was contrary to the express terms of the rental agreement. The Court went on to observe that "when control of such a vehicle is voluntarily relinquished to another, only a breach of custody amounting to a species of conversion or theft will relieve an owner of responsibility for its use or misuse." Id. at 835-36.

The question of whether Flory's use of the car beyond the expiration date of the rental agreement constituted a theft or conversion is a genuine issue of material fact which precludes summary judgment in this case. See Tribbitt v. Crown Contractors, Inc., 513 So.2d 1084 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) (reversing summary judgment for lessor and car owner where issue remained as...