Wong v. State
Citation | 184 So.3d 1122 |
Decision Date | 11 September 2015 |
Docket Number | No. 2D14–646.,2D14–646. |
Parties | Francis WONG, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
Court | Court of Appeal of Florida (US) |
Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Dane K. Chase, Special Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Brandon R. Christian, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
Francis Wong challenges his convictions and sentences for two counts of lewd or lascivious molestation against a victim less than twelve years of age, three counts of lewd or lascivious molestation against a victim between twelve and sixteen years of age, and one count of lewd or lascivious battery against a victim less than sixteen years of age. Wong raises two issues on appeal. Wong asserts that the trial court fundamentally erred in admitting the Williams1 rule testimony of four other minor victims. We find no error in this regard and make no further comment as to this argument. Wong also argues that the trial court erred in denying his request to instruct the jury as to the permissive lesser included offense of committing an unnatural and lascivious act. Because the trial court did not explicitly deny the request and defense counsel otherwise failed to object contemporaneously as the law requires, the issue was not preserved for review. We affirm.
Defense counsel did not file any proposed jury instructions, and it is apparent from the transcript of the charge conference that defense counsel had no intention of requesting an instruction on any lesser included offenses prior to the conference. After receiving some guidance from the State and reviewing the instructions book, defense counsel stumbled upon the instruction for committing an unnatural and lascivious act, a permissive lesser (category two) offense of lewd or lascivious battery and lewd or lascivious molestation. See Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 11.10(b), (c).2 The following exchange transpired:
Unlike an instruction on a necessary or category one lesser which must be given upon request even if unsupported by the evidence, an instruction on a permissive lesser is only given when supported by the pleadings and evidence. See Boland v. State, 893 So.2d 683, 686 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). In that regard, "[t]he trial court is given the discretion to ‘analyze the information or indictment and the proof to determine if elements of category [two] crimes may have been alleged and proved.’ " Cooper v. State, 512 So.2d 1071, 1072 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) (quoting State v. Wimberly, 498 So.2d 929, 931 (Fla.1986) ). Nonetheless, the law is clear that for counsel to be exempt from making a contemporaneous objection in order to preserve for review the failure to give a requested jury instruction the trial court must have unequivocally denied the request for the instruction.See Bryant v. State, 932 So.2d 408, 410 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) ( " ’ . In this case, though counsel arguably, but weakly, requested an instruction for committing an unnatural and lascivious act, the trial court did not rule on the request and thus counsel was not exempt from making a contemporaneous objection.
Taken in context, when defense counsel stated, "I understand," the most logical interpretation is that he acknowledged and agreed with the court's general statement of law that instructing the jury on category two lessers is not mandatory. We know this to be the case because defense counsel continued, Defense counsel obviously understood that there was no ruling by the court to this point because he continued to ask and even "plead" to the court for a favorable ruling. Drawing any other conclusion from the record would be impermissible speculation into the undisclosed mental processes of defense counsel. There was no further discussion of the matter, there was no ruling by the court on the request, and there was no contemporaneous objection.3
Further, defense counsel did not object either before the instructions were given or after.
In Thomas v. State, 419 So.2d 634, 636 (Fla.1982), the Florida Supreme Court held that since counsel requested a special instruction and the court clearly denied it, counsel was not required to object thereafter to preserve the issue for review. However, in the footnote that immediately follows this holding the supreme court clarified that a specific objection would be required if the court failed to explicitly rule on the request and instead simply did not give the requested instruction, a factual scenario that mirrors this case. See id. at 636 n. * () . Likewise, the United States Supreme Court has explained that "the settled rule of Florida procedure that, in order to preserve an objection, a party must object after the trial judge has instructed the jury ... is subject to a limited exception for an advance request for a specific jury instruction that is explicitly denied. " Sochor v. Florida, 504 U.S. 527, 534 n. *, 112 S.Ct. 2114, 119 L.Ed.2d 326 (1992) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). As such, absent an explicit denial, which is not present here, defense counsel was required to object to preserve the issue for review. See Watson v. State, 651 So.2d 1159, 1164 (Fla.1994) ; cf. Higgs v. State, 948 So.2d 1024, 1025 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) ( ); Henig v. State, 820 So.2d 1037, 1039–40 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) ( ).
However, the standard is not whether the court implicitly denied the request or whether it can be inferred that the request was denied. Rather, the standard is whether the trial court clearly, explicitly, and unequivocally denied the request. See Sochor, 504 U.S. at 534 n. *, 112 S.Ct. 2114 ; Bryant, 932 So.2d at 410 ; see also Watson, 651 So.2d at 1164 (citing Sochor, 504 U.S. at 534, 112 S.Ct. 2114 ); Higgs, 948 So.2d at 1025. That an inference or equivalency must be drawn from various statements and actions belies a conclusion that the ruling was clear, explicit, and unequivocal so as to exempt counsel from objecting in order to preserve the issue. See Black's Law Dictionary 307 (10th ed. 2014) (defining "clear" to mean "[f]ree from doubt" and "[u]nambigous"); Black's Law Dictionary 700 (10th ed. 2014) (defining "explicit" to mean "direct," "exact," and "[e]xpressed without ambiguity or vagueness"); Black's Law Dictionary 1760 (10th ed. 2014) (defining "unequivocal" to mean "[u]nambiguous; clear; free from uncertainty"). The dissent contends that further objection by defense counsel at this juncture would have been futile. Since there was no ruling on the request, and certainly not an explicit one, we do not agree. Cf. Heathcoat, 442 So.2d at 957 () ; Hicks v. State, 622 So.2d 14, 17 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993) ().
As to defense counsel's statement, "I understand," in response to the court's...
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