STURGEON v. County of LOS ANGELES

• Decision Date: 23 December 2008
• Docket Number: No. D050832.,D050832.
• Citation: 84 Cal.Rptr.3d 242,167 Cal.App.4th 630
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Harold P. STURGEON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Defendant and Respondent.

167 Cal.App.4th 630

84 Cal.Rptr.3d 242

Harold P. STURGEON, Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Defendant and Respondent.

No. D050832.

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1, California.

Oct. 10, 2008.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing Nov. 7, 2008.

Review Denied Dec. 23, 2008. ^*

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED.

Judicial Watch, Inc., Sterling E. Norris, Los Angeles, and Paul J. Orfanedes for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Jones Day, Elwood Lui, Jason C. Murray and Erica L. Reilley, Los Angeles, for Defendant and Respondent.

BENKE, Acting P.J. Section 19, article VI of the California Constitution requires that the Legislature “prescribe compensation for judges of courts of record.” The duty to prescribe judicial compensation is not delegable. Thus the practice of the County of Los Angeles (the county) of providing Los Angeles County superior court judges with employment benefits, in addition to the compensation prescribed by the Legislature, is not permissible. Accordingly, we must reverse an order granting summary judgment in favor of the county in an action brought by a taxpayer who challenged the validity of the benefits the county provides to its superior court judges.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Judicial Benefits Provided by County

Although the record is not entirely clear, it appears that at some point in the late 1980's the county began providing its superior and municipal court judges with employment benefits in addition to the salary prescribed by the Legislature. Over the years that program has been expanded and altered as the county has modified the benefits it provides its salaried employees.

Currently, the largest component of benefits provided to judges is the county's contribution to its MegaFlex Cafeteria Benefit Plan (MegaFlex). The county pays its salaried employees an amount equal to 19 percent of their monthly salary in the form of a tax free contribution to MegaFlex. Each employee can use the county's contribution to purchase medical, dental and vision coverage or life and disability insurances. Any portion of the county's contribution that is not used to purchase benefits is paid to the employee as taxable income. The county treats its superior court judges as salaried employees of the county for purpose of MegaFlex contributions and thus the county's superior court judges receive MegaFlex contributions equal to 19 percent of their salary. ¹

In addition to the MegaFlex contributions, the county provides its judges with a Professional Development Allowance (PDA). According to the county, the PDA permits judges to participate in educational and professional development programs. Each judge is given discretion in the manner in which his or her PDA is expended. In fiscal year 2007 the PDA amounted to $6,876 per judge.

The county will also match the contribution of each of its salaried employees to a “401(k)” ² program up to four percent of his or her salary. In fiscal year 2007 this amounted to an additional $6,880, ³ the judges were eligible to receive. Finally, the record indicates that since July 1, 1997, the judges have also received employment benefits provided by the state.

In sum, in addition to the salary, benefits and retirement prescribed by the Legislature, in fiscal year 2007 each superior court judge in Los Angeles was eligible to receive $46,436 in benefits from the county. This amount represented approximately 27 percent of their prescribed salary and cost the county approximately $21 million in fiscal 2007.

B. Plaintiff's Challenge

Plaintiff and appellant Harold P. Sturgeon is a county resident and taxpayer. In April 2006 Sturgeon filed a complaint against the county under Code of Civil Procedure section 526a in which he challenged the validity of the benefits the county provided its superior court judges. Sturgeon alleged the benefits the county pays its judges are “unlawful under Cal. Const., Art. VI, §§ 19-20, Cal. Const., Art XVI, § 6, and Cal. Gov.Code § 77000, et seq. , among other relevant statutes and provisions of law, and constitutes an unconstitutional gift of public funds under Cal. Const., Art XVI, § 6.” Sturgeon asked for declaratory and injunctive relief.

The county answered the complaint and moved for summary judgment. The county argued the benefits it provided to its judges were authorized by the Lockyer-Isenberg Trial Court Funding Act of 1997 (Lockyer-Isenberg) (Gov.Code, ⁴ § 77200 et seq.; Stats.1997, ch. 850, §§ 1, 46) and therefore were neither gifts nor a waste of public funds. The county argued that even in the absence of Lockyer-Isenberg, the benefits were not gifts because, in light of the high cost of living in the Los Angeles area and the high salaries paid to lawyers in the region, the benefits were needed to attract and retain skilled and experienced judges. The county argued the Legislature's authorization of the benefits was not an impermissible delegation of the Legislature's duty to prescribe judicial compensation because the benefits were consistent with the Legislature's fundamental approach to judicial compensation and because the marketplace placed inherent limits on how much in the way of benefits the county would be willing to provide its judges.

The trial court granted the county's motion. The court found the county's benefits contributions were neither gifts of public funds nor a waste of public funds and in fact were authorized by Lockyer-Isenberg. Sturgeon filed a timely notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION

I

“A defendant's motion for summary judgment should be granted if no triable issue as to any issue exists as to any material fact and the defendant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. [Citation.].... We review the record and the determination of the trial court de novo.” ( Kahn v. East Side Union High School Dist. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 990, 1002-1003, 4 Cal.Rptr.3d 103, 75 P.3d 30.)

II

Like the trial court, we do not believe Sturgeon can establish that the benefits the county provides its judges are gifts of public funds which violate the terms of Article XVI, section 6 of our state Constitution or amount to the waste of public funds within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 526a.

By its terms, article XVI, section 6 prevents the Legislature from making or authorizing any gift of public funds for private purposes. This prohibition applies to counties and general law cities. (See Goodall v. Brite (1936) 11 Cal.App.2d 540, 544-545, 54 P.2d 510; 85 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. No. 02-711 (2002).) ⁵ “The term ‘gift’ in the constitutional provision ‘includes all appropriations of public money for which there is no authority or enforceable claim,’ even if there is a moral or equitable obligation. [Citation.] ‘An appropriation of money by the legislature for the relief of one who has no legal claim therefor must be regarded as a gift within the meaning of that term, as used in this section, and it is none the less a gift that a sufficient motive appears for its appropriation, if the motive does not rest upon a valid consideration.’

“ ‘It is well settled that the primary question to be considered in determining whether an appropriation of public funds is to be considered a gift is whether the funds are to be used for a public or private purpose. If they are to be used for a public purpose, they are not a gift within the meaning of this constitutional prohibition. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” ( Jordan v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 431, 450, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 122.) Importantly, “[t]he determination of what constitutes a public purpose is primarily a matter for the Legislature, and its discretion will not be disturbed by the courts so long as that determination has a reasonable basis. [Citations.]” ( County of Alameda v. Carleson (1971) 5 Cal.3d 730, 746, 97 Cal.Rptr. 385, 488 P.2d 953.)

With respect to a public employer's provision of benefits to its employees, including bonuses for work already performed, the cases have been fairly uniform in finding that such benefits serve public rather than private purposes. In Jarvis v. Cory (1980) 28 Cal.3d 562, 170 Cal.Rptr. 11, 620 P.2d 598 the plaintiff challenged the Legislature's decision to award lump-sum payments to certain state employees for work performed. In rejecting the plaintiff's argument that the payments were gifts of public funds, the court stated: “[T]he Legislature found that the adjustments made by the bill were ‘necessary to ensure the continued recruitment and retention of qualified and competent state employees.’ We will not disturb the Legislature's finding of a public purpose so long as it has a reasonable basis. [Citation.]

“In this case, we cannot doubt the substantiality of the purpose stated. Nor can we doubt [the legislation] serves the purpose by assuring state employees they will not be abandoned in troubled times, and by raising salaries to a level more competitive with those in the private sector.” ( Jarvis v. Cory, supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 578, fn. 10, 170 Cal.Rptr. 11, 620 P.2d 598.)

In San Joaquin County Employees' Assn., Inc. v. County of San Joaquin (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 83, 113 Cal.Rptr. 912 a retroactive salary increase was also challenged as a gift of public funds. In rejecting the challenge, the court stated: “It is incontestable fact of governmental employment practices that governmental agencies must compete in the labor market with non-governmental employers. Such competition includes not only salaries but sick leave time, vacations and numerous other conditions of employment. It has been, for instance, a judicially noticeable practice of governmental agencies to correlate vacation time allowed to the years of service by an employee.... We cite these examples only to show that in the area of employment, public agencies must compete, and if to so compete they grant benefits to employees for past services, they are not making a gift of public money...