Sturgis Bk v. Hillsdale Health

• Decision Date: 27 October 2005
• Docket Number: Docket No. 261767.
• Parties: STURGIS BANK & TRUST COMPANY, Conservator of the Estate of Tanya E. Walling, a legally incapacitated individual, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HILLSDALE COMMUNITY HEALTH CENTER, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

708 N.W.2d 453

268 Mich. App. 484

STURGIS BANK & TRUST COMPANY, Conservator of the Estate of Tanya E. Walling, a legally incapacitated individual, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HILLSDALE COMMUNITY HEALTH CENTER, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 261767.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted September 8, 2005, at Grand Rapids.

Decided October 27, 2005, at 9:05 a.m.

Released for Publication January 6, 2006.

Benefiel & Farrer (by William L. Benefiel), Kalamazoo, for the plaintiff.

Smith Haughey Rice & Roegge (by Richard C. Kraus and Douglas G. Powe), East Lansing, for the defendant.

Before: SMOLENSKI, P.J., and MURPHY and DAVIS, JJ.

MURPHY, J.

In this medical malpractice action,¹ in which plaintiff alleges that Tanya E. Walling sustained a closed-head injury caused by a fall from a hospital bed, plaintiff appeals as of right the trial court's order granting summary disposition in favor of defendant Hillsdale Community Health Center (hospital). The focus of this appeal regards affidavits of merit and entails statutory construction of MCL 600.2912d and 600.2169 and the interplay between the statutes. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

This action arises out of alleged medical malpractice and negligence that occurred while Walling was being treated at defendant hospital. Walling had been transported to the hospital following an automobile accident in which she was injured. During the hospitalization, Walling allegedly fell out of her hospital bed and sustained a closed-head injury, brain damage, impaired cognitive functioning, and various other related injuries. Sturgis Bank & Trust Company was appointed limited conservator of Walling's estate by the probate court after Walling had petitioned the court, asserting that she was unable to manage her property and business affairs as a result of mental deficiency and physical illness or disability. The conservatorship was limited to the prosecution and settlement of Walling's claims arising from the motor vehicle accident and the alleged malpractice.

Plaintiff originally brought suit against defendant and three individual members of defendant's nursing staff. The claims against the three nurses were dismissed, and they are not parties to this appeal. Plaintiff alleged in the complaint that defendant's nursing staff was negligent in failing to prevent Walling from falling out of her hospital bed, which could have been accomplished by proper monitoring and the use of bed rails, where hospital personnel were aware that Walling was in a physical and mental state that required heightened scrutiny in guarding against such an accident. Pursuant to MCL 600.2912d(1), plaintiff's complaint was accompanied by affidavits of merit from a registered nurse and a nurse practitioner.

Defendant filed a motion for summary disposition, arguing that summary dismissal was appropriate because the affidavits of merit were defective and the period of limitations had expired. More particularly, defendant maintained that the nurse and the nurse practitioner, while being employed in the same health profession as those accused of committing the malpractice, were not qualified under MCL 600.2169(2) to aver with respect to the proximate cause of the injury as required by MCL 600.2912d(1)(d). The trial court initially denied the motion, finding that plaintiff's experts complied with the requirements of MCL 600.2912d(1). The court also accepted an affidavit of merit from a medical doctor that was proffered by plaintiff after the statutory period of limitations elapsed. The trial court allowed the late affidavit as a retroactive amendment to the affidavits previously filed by plaintiff with the complaint.

Subsequently, defendant filed a motion for partial summary disposition with respect to the ordinary negligence count contained in the complaint, and defendant additionally filed a motion for reconsideration relative to the court's ruling on the original motion for summary disposition. Both motions were heard by the trial court in a single hearing, and the court determined that plaintiff's claims sounded in medical malpractice and not ordinary negligence. Moreover, the trial court reversed its earlier decisions with regard to the sufficiency of the affidavits executed by the nurse and the nurse practitioner and as to the doctor's affidavit. The court found that it had committed palpable error. The court now believed that the nurse and the nurse practitioner were not qualified to opine that the alleged breach of the standard of care was the proximate cause of plaintiff's alleged closed-head injury and that the doctor's affidavit was untimely and could not be considered. The trial court found that two affidavits of merit were necessary, one from a nurse because this was the health profession practiced by those accused of malpractice and one from a doctor who could aver with regard to proximate cause. Accordingly, the trial court dismissed plaintiff's action with prejudice. Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration was denied, and plaintiff appealed to this Court.

On appeal, plaintiff argues that it was unnecessary under MCL 600.2912d(1) to obtain the affidavit of a physician in this case in order to make an averment regarding proximate cause and that the affidavits of the nurse and the nurse practitioner were sufficient. In the alternative, plaintiff argues that counsel proceeded in good faith and had a reasonable belief that the affidavits from the nurse and the nurse practitioner complied with the requirements of MCL 600.2169 as directed by MCL 600.2912d(1). Additionally, plaintiff contends that the trial court should have allowed an amendment with retroactive application by way of the doctor's affidavit. Furthermore, plaintiff maintains that the ordinary negligence cause of action should not have been dismissed because the allegations fell within the purview of a layperson's understanding. Next, plaintiff calls on us to apply equity pursuant to Bryant v. Oakpointe Villa Nursing Centre, Inc., 471 Mich. 411, 432-433, 684 N.W.2d 864 (2004), in an effort to save the malpractice claim. Finally, plaintiff argues that Walling's mental incompetence tolled the period of limitations.

We hold that the affidavits executed by the nurse and the nurse practitioner were sufficient for purposes of MCL 600.2912d(1) and the relevant subsection of MCL 600.2169 even if the nurse and the nurse practitioner did not have the expertise or qualifications necessary to establish proximate cause. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's ruling on the issue. Additionally, we conclude that medical judgment is implicated in determining whether safeguards against a fall should have been implemented and in determining the extent of those safeguards, and thus the trial court properly dismissed the ordinary negligence cause of action. In light of our holding, it becomes unnecessary to address plaintiff's additional arguments.

This Court reviews de novo a trial court's decision on a motion for summary disposition. Kreiner v. Fischer, 471 Mich. 109, 129, 683 N.W.2d 611 (2004). Similarly, an issue posing a question of statutory construction is reviewed de novo. People v. Davis, 468 Mich. 77, 79, 658 N.W.2d 800 (2003). Our primary task in construing a statute is to discern and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. Shinholster v. Annapolis Hosp., 471 Mich. 540, 548-549, 685 N.W.2d 275 (2004). The words contained in a statute provide us with the most reliable evidence of the Legislature's intent. Id. at 549, 685 N.W.2d 275. In discerning legislative intent, this Court gives effect to every word, phrase, and clause in the statute. Id. We must consider both the plain meaning of the critical words or phrases as well as their placement and purpose in the statutory scheme. Id. This Court must avoid a construction that would render any part of a statute surplusage or nugatory. Bageris v. Brandon Twp., 264 Mich.App. 156, 162, 691 N.W.2d 459 (2004). "`The statutory language must be read and understood in its grammatical context, unless it is clear that something different was intended.'" Shinholster, supra at 549, 685 N.W.2d 275 (citation omitted). Where the wording or language of a statute is unambiguous, the Legislature is deemed to have intended the meaning clearly expressed, and we must enforce the statute as written. Id. "A necessary corollary of these principles is that a court may read nothing into an unambiguous statute that is not within the manifest intent of the Legislature as derived from the words of the statute itself." Roberts v. Mecosta Co. Gen. Hosp., 466 Mich. 57, 63, 642 N.W.2d 663 (2002). Statutory language, unambiguous on its face, may be rendered ambiguous through its interaction with and relationship to other statutes. People v. Valentin, 457 Mich. 1, 6, 577 N.W.2d 73 (1998). If statutes can be construed in a manner that avoids conflict, then that construction should control the analysis. People v. Webb, 458 Mich. 265, 274, 580 N.W.2d 884 (1998). "We construe an act as a whole to harmonize its provisions and carry out the purpose of the Legislature." Macomb Co. Prosecutor v. Murphy, 464 Mich. 149, 159, 627 N.W.2d 247 (2001).

Medical malpractice actions may be brought against any licensed health facility or licensed health care professional. See MCL 600.5838a. Nurses are licensed health care professionals within the terms of the statute. Cox v. Flint Bd. of Hosp. Managers, 467 Mich. 1, 20, 651 N.W.2d 356 (2002). MCL 600.2912d(1) provides that in medical malpractice actions, a plaintiff or the plaintiff's attorney "shall file with the complaint an affidavit of merit signed by a health professional who the plaintiff's attorney reasonably believes meets the requirements for an expert witness under [MCL 600.2169]." Subsection 1 of § 2912d further provides:

The affidavit of merit shall certify that the health professional has reviewed the notice and all medical records supplied to him or her by the...