Suffolk Housing Services v. Town of Brookhaven

• Decision Date: 08 July 1985
• Citation: 491 N.Y.S.2d 396,109 A.D.2d 323
• Parties: SUFFOLK HOUSING SERVICES, et al., Appellants, v. The TOWN OF BROOKHAVEN, et al., Respondents.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 396

491 N.Y.S.2d 396

109 A.D.2d 323

SUFFOLK HOUSING SERVICES, et al., Appellants, v. The TOWN OF BROOKHAVEN, et al., Respondents.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division,

Second Department.

July 8, 1985.

Steel & Bellman, P.C., New York City (Richard F. Bellman and Lewis M. Steel, New York City, of counsel), Thomas I. Atkins and Margrett Ford, N.A.A.C.P., Brooklyn, N.Y., and Lawrence Sager and Arthur Eisenberg, New York Civil Liberties Union, New York, N.Y., for appellants (one brief filed).

Martin Kerins, Town Attorney, Patchogue, N.Y. (Arden H. Rathkopf, Glen Cove, of counsel), for respondents.

Before GIBBONS, J.P., and THOMPSON, O'CONNOR and NIEHOFF, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

On this appeal, we are called upon to consider two issues: first, whether the doctrine articulated by the Court of Appeals in Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 378 N.Y.S.2d 672, 341 N.E.2d 236 imposes a duty upon a municipality to exercise its zoning powers in order to facilitate the development of low-to-moderate-income or low-cost housing, and, second, whether the actions taken by the defendant town with regard to various applications to develop federally subsidized multiple-family housing for low-to-moderate-income families violated the Federal Fair Housing Act (42 U.S.C. § 3601, et seq.). For the reasons which follow, we answer both questions in the negative.

The plaintiffs in this action are organizations concerned with low-to-moderate income housing and racial integration in the Town of Brookhaven and in Suffolk County, low-to-moderate-income and minority residents of the Town of Brookhaven and other towns located in western Suffolk County, and Brookhaven town taxpayers. In their complaint they alleged, inter alia, that the town, through its zoning ordinance, policies and practices, had prevented the development of sufficient housing to accommodate its steadily increasing low-to-moderate-income population by (1) failing to premap land for multifamily use (rather than permitting such usage by special permit only); (2) imposing excessive minimum acreage requirements for single-family homes; (3) rejecting applications for rezoning for multifamily use; (4) requiring developers of multifamily housing to enter into covenants restricting the number of multi-bedroom units; (5) imposing excessive site-area requirements for additional bedrooms in multifamily housing; and (6) obstructing the development of mobile-home communities within the defendant town. They also alleged that the foregoing restrictions had a disproportionate adverse impact upon the minority residents of the town. In addition, it was alleged, inter alia, that the town had opposed the development of low-to-moderate-income and low-cost housing, by (1) refusing to establish a public housing authority, (2) refusing to cooperate with private efforts to develop such housing within the defendant town, and (3) refusing to apply for federally-funded community development block grants. Plaintiffs further contended that the town had failed to exercise its zoning powers to promote the general welfare as required by Town Law §§ 261 and 263; had deprived the plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws as secured by N.Y. Constitution, article I, § 11; had failed to zone in accordance with a master plan designed to promote the general welfare as required by Town Law § 272-a; and had deprived the plaintiffs of their rights under the U.S. Constitution, 13th and 14th Amendments, as well as under the applicable provisions of the United States Code (42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1983; 3601 et seq.). In their prayer for relief, they asked that the court declare the Town of Brookhaven's zoning ordinance and land use map to be null and void; to enjoin the town's allegedly improper zoning practices; and to order the town to act affirmatively to facilitate the development of low-to-moderate-income and low-cost housing within its geographical area. Trial Term, after a nonjury trial, rejected the plaintiffs' contentions in their entirety and they now appeal. We affirm.

Plaintiffs' primary contention on this appeal concerns the constitutionality of the Town of Brookhaven's zoning ordinance, an issue which is largely controlled by the Court of Appeals' decision in Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 378 N.Y.S.2d 672, 341 N.E.2d 236, supra. In that case, the court, in addressing the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance which, unlike the present one, totally excluded new multifamily housing from the defendant town, set forth the following applicable standard of review (Berenson v. Town of New Castle, supra, at pp. 109-11, 378 N.Y.S.2d 672, 341 N.E.2d 236):

"In determining the validity of an ordinance excluding multifamily housing as a permitted use, we must consider the general purposes which the concept of zoning seeks to serve. The primary goal of a zoning ordinance must be to provide for the development of a balanced, cohesive community which will make efficient use of the town's available land. (Cf. Matter of Golden v. Planning Bd. of Town of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 378 [334 N.Y.S.2d 138, 285 N.E.2d 291], app. dsmd. 490 US 1003 [93 S.Ct. 436, 34 L.Ed.2d 294], supra.)

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"The first branch of the test, then is simply whether the board has provided a properly balanced and well ordered plan for the community. (See Udell v. Haas, 21 N.Y.2d 463 [288 N.Y.S.2d 888, 235 N.E.2d 897].) Of course, what may be appropriate for one community may differ substantially from what is appropriate for another. Thus, in this case, the court must ascertain what types of housing presently exist in New Castle, their quantity and quality, and whether this array adequately meets the present needs of the town. Also, it must be determined whether new construction is necessary to fulfill the future needs of New Castle residents, and if so, what forms the new developments ought to take.

"Secondly, in enacting a zoning ordinance, consideration must be given to regional needs and requirements * * * There must be a balancing of the local desire to maintain the status quo within the community and the greater public interest that regional needs be met

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"Thus, the court, in examining an ordinance, should take into consideration not only the general welfare of the residents of the zoning township, but should also consider the effect of the ordinance on the neighboring communities. While regional needs are a valid consideration in zoning, apart from any question as to the standing of persons outside the zoning jurisdiction to raise the issue, a town need not permit a use solely for the sake of the people of the region if regional needs are presently provided for in an adequate manner. Thus * * * [t]he second branch of the test is whether the town board, in excluding new multiple housing within its township, considered the needs of the region as well as the town for such housing. So long as the regional and local needs for such housing were supplied by either the local community or by other accessible areas in the community at large, it cannot be said, as a matter of law, that such an ordinance had no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare."

Subsequently, the Court of Appeals refined this standard in Kurzius, Inc. v. Incorporated Vil. of Upper Brookville, 51 N.Y.2d 338, 343-44, 434 N.Y.S.2d 180, 414 N.E.2d 680, cert denied 450 U.S. 1042, 101 S.Ct. 1761, 68 L.Ed.2d 240, wherein it stated the following:

"In general, the enactment of a zoning ordinance is a valid exercise of the police power if its restrictions are not arbitrary and they bear a substantial relation to the health, welfare and safety of the community (Euclid v. Ambler Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 [47 S.Ct. 114, 121, 71 L.Ed. 303] ). In New York, the Legislature has delegated zoning power to village boards pursuant to section 7-700 of the Village Law. Such delegation is not, of course, 'coterminous with stated police power objectives and has been considered less inclusive traditionally' (Matter of Golden v. Planning Bd. of Town of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 370 [334 N.Y.S.2d 138, 285 N.E.2d 291], app. dismd. 409 U.S. 1003 [93 S.Ct. 436, 34 L.Ed.2d 294] ). Section 7-704 of the Village Law provides that these zoning regulations must be made in accordance with a comprehensive plan, and may be made only for certain enumerated purposes, including the promotion of health and the general welfare of the village. Thus, both the constitutional and statutory validity of a zoning ordinance depend 'on the facts of the particular case and whether it is "really designed to accomplish a legitimate public purpose" ' (Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 107 [378 N.Y.S.2d 672, 341 N.E.2d 236], quoting Matter of Wulfsohn v. Burden, 241 N.Y. 288, 299 ).

"A zoning ordinance will be invalidated on both constitutional and State statutory grounds if it was enacted with an exclusionary purpose, or it ignores regional needs and has an unjustifiably exclusionary effect (Matter of Golden v. Planning Bd. of Town of Ramapo, supra; Berenson v. Town of New Castle, supra )

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"As legislative acts, zoning ordinances carry a presumption of constitutionality (Town of Huntington v. Park Shore Country Day Camp of Dix Hills, 47 N.Y.2d 61, 65 [416 N.Y.S.2d 774, 390 N.E.2d 282]; Marcus Assoc. v. Town of Huntington, 45 N.Y.2d 501, 505 [410 N.Y.S.2d 546, 382 N.E.2d 1323] ). We have stated on several occasions that this presumption is rebuttable, but that unconstitutionality must be demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt (e.g., Marcus Assoc. v. Town of Huntington, supra ) * * * As Judge FULD stated in Rodgers v. Village of Tarrytown (302 N.Y. 115, 121 ): '[T]he power of a village to amend its basic zoning ordinance in such a way as reasonably to promote the general welfare cannot be questioned. Just as clearly, decision as to how a community shall be zoned or rezoned, as to how various properties shall be classified or...